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In this dissertation, I focus on examining the effects of institutional ownership on 
stocks’ liquidity and liquidity risk using a sample of firms listed on the NYSE and the 
AMEX over the period 1980–2005. The first chapter provides a brief introduction to 
liquidity and emphasizes the role of institutional ownership in financial markets. 
In the second chapter, I examine the relationship between institutional ownership and 
liquidity of stocks, focusing on the effect of institutions’ relative information 
advantage. The information advantage of institutions can affect liquidity through two 
channels: decreasing liquidity resulting from increasing information asymmetry 
(adverse selection effect) and increasing liquidity resulting from increasing price 
discovery due to competition among institutions’ information efficiency effect. 
My evidence indicates a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship between the level of 
institutional ownership and stock liquidity. The two effects vary with the amount of 
publicly available information and asset risk. I also find that institutional ownership 
(Granger) causes liquidity, allaying concerns that the findings result from institutions’ 
preference for liquid stocks. Lastly, I document that liquidity decreases with 
increasing diversification of the portfolio of institutional investors and the fraction of 
equity held by long-term investors.  
In the third chapter, I examine the effects of institutional ownership on stocks’ time 
variation in liquidity. It helps advance an understanding of the sources of commonality 
in liquidity and the determinants of the sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to changes in 
marketwide liquidity (systematic liquidity risk) and the total variance of liquidity of a 
firm over time. I interpret my findings in the context of correlated trading by 
institutions resulting either from their tendency to herd or to trade on common 
information and signals. 
I find that systematic liquidity risk increases with the level of institutional ownership, 
homogeneity and investment-horizon of the institutional investor base, while it 
decreases with ownership concentration and increase in blockholdings. However, the 
variance of liquidity decreases with the level of institutional ownership, homogeneity 
of the investor base and ownership concentration. Overall, the findings indicate that 
the ownership structure of stocks affects both the systematic liquidity risk and the 
variation in their liquidity over time. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Financial markets facilitate the mobilization of capital needed to fund growth. By 
identifying and funding those entrepreneurs with the best chances of successfully 
implementing innovative products and production processes and allocating capital 
efficiently they spur technological innovation. Ross Levine (1997) states “that the 
development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of 
the growth process.”  
One of the most important roles of financial markets is that they ease trading of assets 
and thus help in sharing and diversifying risk. By providing claims on physical 
assets—like equity, bonds and demand deposits—that an investor can buy or sell 
easily, they encourage long-term capital investment in longer term production 
processes. Liquidity refers to the ease with which assets or claims on the assets can be 
transacted and converted into cash or another medium of exchange. A reduction in the 
costs associated with transacting these claims could therefore encourage greater long-
term investment. 
In general, the classical asset pricing models assume perfect financial markets without 
frictions and ignore both the effects of trading costs and the diverse features of 
liquidity. Increase in liquidity should improve sharing of financial risks by influencing 
investors’ trading decisions because a reduction in transaction costs eases making 
changes to portfolio and holding diversified portfolios (Domowitz and Wang (2002), 
Harford and Kaul (2005)). Furthermore, a growing body of asset pricing literature 
examines how liquidity and its time variation affects the required returns of traded 
assets. Current theories predict that both the level of liquidity and the liquidity risk are  
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priced, while existing empirical studies find that the effects of liquidity on asset prices 
are both statistically and economically significant.
1 Existing empirical evidence 
indicates that an asset’s liquidity and systematic liquidity risk are priced.  
Liquidity, by its very nature, is a difficult construct and has multiple dimensions. Kyle 
(1985) writes that “liquidity is a slippery and elusive concept, in part because it 
encompasses a number of transactional properties of markets.” It tries to capture the 
notion that there are costs associated with searching for counterparty, risk of adverse 
selection when trading with an informed counterparty, inventory risk due to delays 
incurred in transacting, and other costs due to imperfect competition in asset markets. 
Liquidity of assets is also a dynamic concept as liquidity exhibits a time varying 
nature. Changes in liquidity at the market level have been associated with various 
puzzling episodes like the stock market crash of 1987, the global liquidity crisis of 
1998, and the financial crisis of 2007–2009. This nature of liquidity both as a priced 
characteristic and as a factor in asset returns, and its role in economic growth makes 
for understanding its determinants important. 
Another key element in modern financial markets is the interplay between firms that 
increasingly raise capital in public markets, and institutional investors that are 
managing a growing pool of assets. Most individual investors select mutual funds, 
pension funds, or retirement products offered by insurance companies and banks, as 
their primary investment vehicle, to ameliorate the problems created by information 
and other frictions. Within the U.S., the average institutional ownership of equity in 
firms, listed on the NYSE and the AMEX, has increased from 15% in 1983 to 60% in 
2005, reflecting a growth rate of 6.3% over the 25 year period. The fact that 
                                                 
1 For recent surveys refer to Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005); Easley and O’Hara (2003); and 
O’Hara (2003).   
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institutions are managing such a sizable share of the wealth invested in the U.S. equity 
markets indicates their increasingly important role in financial markets.  
In this dissertation, I therefore focus on examining the effects of institutional 
ownership on stocks’ liquidity and its variation over time. While liquidity and 
liquidity risk are important, it is not clear whether institutional ownership should affect 
them. Yet, institutions could clearly play a very important role. Institutions due to their 
scale have an inherent advantage in producing and processing information about a 
firm, and thus are better informed than other investors. Their information advantage 
can therefore affect liquidity. Furthermore, by acting as pooling vehicles, they can 
diversify individual liquidity needs, and thereby enhance overall liquidity and reduce 
variation of liquidity over time. However, a concern is raised that the herding behavior 
exhibited by institutions, acts as a force that destabilizes markets by exacerbating 
volatility. Xu and Malkiel (2003) attribute the increasing volatility in financial markets 
over time to an increase in institutional ownership. Even though institutions may 
diversify away the liquidity needs of individuals, their correlated trading behavior can 
still increase episodic demand for liquidity and cause a greater variation in liquidity 
over time.  
There is an extensive literature in finance examining the growth in institutional 
ownership, the role they play in financial markets and their effects on firm policies. 
Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005) study the large growth in institutional ownership 
among equity markets. Preferences of institutions and effects of these preference on 
equity prices is examined in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Falkenstein 
(1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Bennett, Sias, 
and Starks (2003), and Ferreira and Matos (2008). Additionally significant attention is  
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given to analyze the performance of mutual funds and pension funds [Grinblatt and 
Titman (1992, 1993), Hendricks, Patel, Zeckhauser (1993), Coggin, Fabozzi and 
Rahman (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Wermers (1996), Carhart (1997), Blake, 
Lehmann, and Timmermann (1999)]. Institutional investors also play an important 
role in corporate governance by monitoring and disciplining managers through explicit 
actions or “voting with their feet.” A series of papers examines the effect of 
institutions on corporate governance [Smith (1996), Wahal (1996), Bushee (2001), 
Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003), Gillan and Starks (2003), Hartzell and Starks 
(2003), Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003), Almazaan, Hartzell and Starks (2005), Chen, 
Harford and Li (2007), etc.].  
Both the importance of the liquidity of assets in facilitating trading and helping share 
and diversify risks and the growing role of institutions in financial markets, motivates 
this dissertation. I focus on empirically examining the effects of institutional 
ownership on stocks’ liquidity and time variation in liquidity using a large sample of 
firms listed on NYSE and AMEX over the period 1980–2005.  
In the second chapter, I examine the relationship between institutional ownership and 
liquidity of stocks, focusing on the effect of institutions’ relative information 
advantage. I derive implications using microstructure theories that relate investors’ 
characteristics to liquidity and examine how aggregate institutional holdings influence 
stocks’ liquidity level. I also address concerns related to the direction of causality that 
arise from institutions’ preference for liquid stocks. I test for the direction of causality 
in a time series context, and find strong evidence indicating that institutional 
ownership (Granger) causes liquidity and only weak evidence indicating that liquid  
5 
stocks attract institutions. My findings strongly suggest that information advantage of 
institutions affects liquidity and that changes in institutional ownership help predict 
changes in liquidity.  
In the second chapter, I further examine the effects of heterogeneity among institutions 
on liquidity. First, I find strong evidence indicating that liquidity declines with an 
increase in investment horizon and only weak evidence that liquidity of stocks affects 
the investment horizon of institutions. Second, I examine the effect of the 
diversification of the portfolios of institutions holding the stocks on liquidity, 
considering institutions with more diverse portfolios as more risk averse. I find strong 
evidence that increased risk aversion of investors, results in a decline in liquidity 
consistent with a reduction in information efficiency effect.  
The determinants of the levels of liquidity have received sizable attention in existing 
empirical studies in microstructure. In the third chapter, I focus on the time variation 
in liquidity of assets and the sources of commonality in liquidity. Commonality in 
liquidity refers to the existence of systematic factors that commonly affect the 
liquidity of individual securities in financial markets. I aim at gaining an 
understanding of the determinants of the sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to the 
changes in marketwide liquidity (systematic liquidity risk) and the total variance of 
liquidity of a firm over time. I examine the effects of both aggregate institutional 
holdings and other characteristics of the institutions holding the stocks on their 
liquidity variation over time. I derive implications using the literature on herding and 
interpret my findings in the context of correlated trading by institutions resulting from 
their tendency to either herd or trade on common information.   
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I find strong evidence that the ownership structure of an asset affects both the 
sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to changes in marketwide liquidity (systematic 
liquidity risk) and the variation in its liquidity over time. I find that the level of 
institutional ownership, investment horizon of the institutional investor base, 
concentration of ownership, and homogeneity of the investor base are important 
determinants of both systematic liquidity risk and total liquidity variance. Systematic 
liquidity risk increases with institutional ownership, increase in investor horizon, and 
increasing homogeneity of the investor base, while it decreases as ownership gets 
concentrated and block-holdings increase. The total liquidity variance however reacts 
to institutional ownership measures differently. The variance of liquidity decreases 
with level of institutional ownership, homogeneity of the investor base and increasing 
ownership concentration. With increasing information asymmetry among investors, 
systematic liquidity risk decreases while the total liquidity variance increases.  
Overall, the evidence indicates that ownership by institutions affects both liquidity and 
its variation over time for the U.S. equities. Characteristics of the institutional investor 
base such as their investment horizon, diversification of their respective portfolio 
holdings, concentration of ownership among institutions holding the stock, and the 
homogeneity of the institutional investor base are important determinants of liquidity 
and its time variation.   
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LIQUIDITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Institutional ownership is a growing characteristic of U.S. capital markets. As such, 
the role institutions play in financial markets is becoming increasingly important. This 
chapter examines the effects of institutional ownership on stocks’ liquidity. I derive 
implications using microstructure theories that relate investors’ characteristics to 
liquidity and examine how aggregate institutional holdings influence stocks’ liquidity 
level and whether these effects vary with institution type.  
Why is liquidity important? The topic of liquidity has received substantial attention 
from both academics and popular press. Increase in liquidity can lead to improved 
sharing of financial risks by influencing investors’ trading decisions due to reduction 
in transaction costs associated with making portfolio changes. Trading costs are large 
and economically significant (~1%) for large stocks in comparison to expected returns 
on stocks.
2  Liquidity also plays a critical role in the price discovery process. A 
growing body of literature examines how liquidity affects the required returns of 
traded assets.
3 Current theories predict that both the level of liquidity and liquidity risk 
are priced, while existing empirical studies find that effects of liquidity on asset prices 
are both statistically and economically significant.  
                                                 
2 In addition, institutions and asset management firms are concerned about minimizing transaction 
costs, therefore creating a demand for firms that help them in trade execution and reducing trading 
costs. They also care about liquidity of their portfolios, due to concerns of liquidation risk, while 
determining investments.  
3 For recent surveys refer to Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005); Easley and O’Hara (2003); and 
O’Hara (2003).   
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While liquidity and liquidity risk are important, it is not clear whether institutional 
ownership should affect them. Yet, institutions could clearly play a very important 
role. Large institutions have an inherent advantage in producing and processing 
information about a firm, and thus are better informed than other investors.
4 In this 
chapter, I primarily focus on the effect of institutions’ information advantage on 
liquidity.  
Much has been written in the field of microstructure that examines the effect of 
informed traders on liquidity. However, underlying differences in modeling the 
trading behavior of informed investors, the trading motivations of uninformed 
investors, and information structure results in different predictions for stocks’ liquidity 
in the presence of multiple informed traders. I maintain that the presence of informed 
institutions imposes adverse selection costs on uninformed investors and market 
makers, resulting in higher bid-ask spread (transactions cost) and lower liquidity levels 
of a firm’s stock [Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987)]. I also 
assert that informed institutions could play another role. In the presence of multiple 
informed institutions competing among themselves, the rate at which information is 
incorporated into prices increases, leading to lower uncertainty about the true value of 
the asset [Subrahmanyam (1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Spiegel and 
Subrahmanyam (1992), Wang (1993), and Easley and O’Hara (2004)]. With stock 
prices becoming more informationally efficient, traders increase their willingness to 
accommodate supply shocks, given reduction in their trading losses, resulting in 
improved liquidity levels [Madhavan (1992) and Mendelson and Tunca (2004)]. The 
net effect of informed institutional holdings on a stocks’ liquidity level is thus unclear 
                                                 
4 Yan and Zhang (2007) find that trading by short-term institutions forecasts stock returns while Aslan 
et al. (2007) find strong evidence that firms with higher institutional ownership have a higher 
probability of informed trading.  
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and will depend on both the impact of adverse selection and information efficiency 
(price discovery). In this chapter, I focus on this tradeoff in order to determine whether 
institutional ownership is associated with cross-sectional differences in liquidity 
levels. I further examine whether differences in characteristics of institutions holding 
the stocks affect their liquidity, mainly focusing on their investment horizon and 
diversification of their portfolio holdings. 
My first finding indicates a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship between spreads 
(a measure of liquidity) and fraction of shares held by institutions. The non-monotonic 
relationship supports the existence of effects from both adverse selection and 
information efficiency on liquidity, that arise from institutions’ information advantage. 
Growth in institutional ownership is associated with both improved price discovery 
and a simultaneous increase in information asymmetry between informed institutions 
and uninformed investors. The effect of improved price discovery dominates the 
adverse selection effect at lower levels of institutional ownership, resulting in lower 
spreads and increased liquidity. However, at higher levels of institutional ownership 
the adverse selection effect tends to dominate the information efficiency effect 
associated with price discovery, resulting in higher spreads and lower liquidity. The 
non-monotonic relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity can be 
attributed to the consequences of adverse selection and information efficiency effects. 
The marginal effect of increasing institutional ownership on increasing information 
efficiency (price discovery) will be higher at low levels of institutional ownership. At 
higher levels of institutional ownership, the marginal price discovery effect will be 
limited. This gives rise to a non-monotonic effect. The two effects of institutions on  
10 
liquidity are fairly robust, and they vary with the available public information and 
asset risk.
5  
Second, I find strong evidence that growth in competition among informed investors 
increases the rate at which information is incorporated into prices. I examine intraday 
pattern in spreads across firms with different institutional ownership levels and find 
that spreads decline more during the day for firms with greater number of informed 
investors. The finding suggests that the role informed institutions play in price 
discovery has a significant effect on improving liquidity, a notion that is consistent 
with the theoretical findings of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Mendelson 
and Tunca (2004).
6  
Third, I attempt to address concerns related to direction of causality. Falkenstein 
(1996) and others state that institutions exhibit a preference for large liquid stocks.
7 
This preference for liquid securities or a joint determination of both liquidity and 
institutional ownership can affect the relationship I observe in data. However, the non-
monotonic relationship between institutional holdings and stock liquidity partly 
alleviates this concern. For example, if institutions exhibit a preference for liquid 
stocks, stocks that are more liquid will have higher institutional holdings, thus 
suggesting a monotonically increasing relationship. I test for direction of causality in a 
time series context, and find strong evidence indicating that institutional ownership 
                                                 
5 This dual effect of institutional ownership on liquidity is robust when using different measures for 
liquidity, controlling for various known determinants of liquidity, and across subsamples based on 
different firm characteristics. The findings are also robust when attempting to control for endogeneity. 
6 Boehmer and Kelley (2007) also find that stocks with greater institutional ownership and trading are 
priced more efficiently, in the sense that their transaction prices follow a random walk more closely. 
7 Falkenstein (1996) analyses mutual fund portfolios and tests their preference for liquidity using share 
turnover. In the cross-sectional analysis, he assumes that share turnover is an exogenous variable. My 
findings indicate that institutional ownership (Granger) causes share turnover. The portfolio turnover 
measure of institutions is highly persistent over time.  
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(Granger) causes liquidity and only weak evidence indicating that liquid stocks attract 
institutions. These findings strongly suggest that information advantage of institutions 
affects liquidity and that changes in institutional ownership help predict changes in 
liquidity. 
For the three findings reported above, I view institutions as a homogeneous group. 
However, institutions exhibit different characteristics. I therefore examine whether 
heterogeneity among their characteristics—such as investment horizon and portfolio 
diversification—also affect the liquidity of stocks they hold.  
My fourth finding relates to the effect of institutions’ investment horizon on liquidity. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) indicate that investors select securities based on 
anticipated liquidity needs. I use turnover measures of institutions’ portfolios to 
classify institutions into groups based on their investment horizon. After controlling 
for the level of institutional ownership, I find that liquidity increases with a shift in 
holdings from long-term to short-term investors. This finding is also robust in tests of 
causality in the time series context, indicating that changes in investment horizon of 
institutions affect changes in liquidity. 
My fifth finding relates the diversification of institutions’ portfolio holdings to 
liquidity. Investors’ risk aversion can affect liquidity through various channels 
depending on the investor’s information set, trading motives, and the competition 
faced. For lack of a better measure for risk-aversion, I create a proxy for institutions’ 
risk aversion using the concentration of their portfolio holdings. I assume that 
institutions having more diversified portfolio holdings are likely to exhibit greater risk 
aversion, and therefore consider institutions with diversified portfolios as more risk  
12 
averse. After controlling for ownership level and other known determinants of 
liquidity, I find that liquidity decreases with risk aversion of institutions. The marginal 
effect of institutions’ risk aversion on spreads increases with the number of 
institutions, a finding suggesting that risk aversion of informed investors weakens the 
information efficiency effect on liquidity. 
Prior empirical work on ownership and liquidity has examined effects of dispersion of 
ownership [Kothare (1997); Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999); Chiang and 
Venkatesh (1988)] and presence of informed traders on liquidity [Heflin and Shaw 
(2000); Sarin, Shastri, and Shastri (2000); Dennis and Weston (2001); and Rubin 
(2007)].
8 Sarin, Shastri, and Shastri (2000), as well as Dennis and Weston (2001), use 
cross-sectional analysis to examine the effect of institutions’ information advantage on 
both spreads posted by the market maker and the adverse selection component of 
spreads. Sarin, Shastri, and Shastri find that higher fractional ownership of stocks by 
both institutions and firm managers (insiders) increases the spread and reduces quoted 
depth after controlling for the endogeneity between ownership and liquidity. However, 
the authors also find that higher institutional ownership does not affect adverse 
selection component of spreads. On the other hand, Dennis and Weston find that 
spreads decrease with institutional ownership, while the adverse selection component 
increases. Rubin (2007) finds that liquidity increases with the level of institutional 
holdings, due to higher trading activity, and decreases with institutions’ block holdings 
                                                 
8 Both Kothare (1997) and Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999) find that liquidity improves with 
dispersion of ownership. Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) use concentration of insider holdings as a 
measure of information asymmetry and find that bid-ask spreads increase with fraction of insider 
holdings. More recently, Heflin and Shaw (2000) look at 260 firms trading on NYSE/AMEX during the 
year 1988 and find that firms with greater block-holder ownership by either managers or external 
entities have larger quoted and effective spreads, higher adverse selection spread components, and 
smaller quoted depths. The authors conclude that the presence of blockholders reduces liquidity but do 
not find support that liquidity plays a significant role in determining block holdings.   
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due to higher adverse selection. To summarize, the existing findings on effect of 
institutional ownership on liquidity provide mixed evidence.
9  
When examining the effect of institutions on liquidity, all the studies previously 
mentioned assume institutions have a relative information advantage. However, the 
studies focus only on the adverse selection effect resulting from the information 
advantage and test for a linear relationship between institutional ownership and 
liquidity. Unlike these papers, I take a broader approach, from both theoretical and 
empirical standpoints. Theoretically, I consider an additional aspect, the potential 
effect of institutional ownership on information efficiency, which can cause an 
increase in liquidity. Empirically, I test for both the adverse selection and information 
efficiency effects, and I allow for the presence of a non-monotonic relationship 
between institutional holdings and liquidity. I further examine the variation in effects 
of institutional ownership on liquidity depending on both asset risk and information 
availability and also examine effects of differences in institution type on liquidity.  
Another limitation of existing studies is the use of cross-sectional analysis based on 
data over a short time interval. The shorter time frame in the existing studies makes it 
harder to effectively control for unobserved firm-specific effects that simultaneously 
influence institutional ownership and liquidity and the potentially endogenous relation 
between the two.
10 To test the relationship between institutional ownership and 
                                                 
9 Glosten and Harris (1988) also find an insignificant relationship between spreads and insider holdings 
for 250 firms belonging to NYSE over the period 1981–1983. It is thus possible that insiders also have 
two effects on liquidity due to increases in information efficiency and adverse selection. 
10 In their simultaneous equation systems for the purpose of identification, Dennis and Weston (2001) 
exclude size and 1/Price from the liquidity equation, while Sarin, Shastri, and Shastri (2000) exclude 
size, age of the firm, and R&D to sales from the liquidity equation. Size can influence liquidity 
independent of ownership structure because it affects the amount of information available about the 
firm. These studies do not report tests of validity of exclusions. Dennis and Weston also use pooled 
regressions. Their findings could therefore be biased, given persistence in both ownership and liquidity 
measures over time, resulting in a lack of independence across periods. Refer to Petersen (2007).  
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liquidity, I use both annual and quarterly data for the period 1980 to 2005 on 
institutional holdings and various liquidity measures. The panel comprising of 4,578 
firms and spanning 26 years allows me to not only examine variation in liquidity 
across firms, but also, follow firms over time and examine the relationship between 
changes in institutional holdings and changes in liquidity at firm level.  
I provide a number of new results on the relationship between institutional holdings 
and liquidity, and by implication, on the validity of some of the theories related to the 
effects of informed trading on liquidity. To an extent, I reconcile the differences in 
findings across existing studies. Besides the sample differences, the more likely 
explanation for the differences is the existence of a non-monotonic relationship 
between institutional ownership and liquidity. Ignoring the effect of information 
efficiency on liquidity, which also results from institutions’ information advantage, 
and trying to estimate the relationship using a linear specification can bias the results. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the main 
hypotheses relating the effects of informed traders on liquidity by reviewing the 
microstructure literature to develop the hypothesis. Section 2 introduces data focusing 
on the measures of liquidity and institutional holdings, while briefly introducing other 
control variables. Section 3 presents the findings from tests on effects of institutional 
ownership on liquidity and summarizes the robustness checks. Section 4 tests the 
effect of competition among informed investors on information efficiency and 
intraday patterns in spreads. Section 5 addresses the endogeneity concerns and 
presents findings from Granger causality tests. Section 6 examines the effect of 
institutional characteristics such as investor horizon and risk aversion on liquidity. I 
present conclusions on the effects of institutional ownership on liquidity in Section 7.  
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SECTION 1: THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Large institutions have an inherent advantage with respect to producing and 
processing information compared to other investors. They devote resources to 
gathering information and sometimes are privy to corporate information that 
individual investors do not have. However, some institutions follow passive indexing 
strategies and refrain from investing effort in collecting firm-specific information. 
Nevertheless, institutions generally tend to have an information advantage over other 
investors. 
The effect of informed traders on liquidity and price efficiency is an actively 
researched topic. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) indicate 
that in the presence of informed investors acting nonstrategically, the adverse selection 
risk faced by the risk-neutral market maker gives rise to spreads, even in the absence 
of any fixed costs. With an increase in the number of informed institutions, a risk-
neutral market maker widens the spreads to set regret-free prices due to the higher 
adverse selection risk. Thus, firms with a higher fraction of informed traders will have 
higher spreads. This is because both the probability of a trade arising from an 
informed trader and the amount of information represented in the order flow are 
higher. Therefore, spreads should increase and liquidity decline with increases in the 
number of institutions or the fraction of equity held by institutions.
11 Hypothesis 1 
summarizes the prediction relating the effect of adverse selection arising from 
institutions’ information advantage to liquidity. 
                                                 
11 In addition, institutions’ propensity to herd and trade in the same direction can force specialists to 
maintain larger inventories to provide liquidity. This can result in higher spreads or trading costs with 
an increase in institutional ownership due to increased inventory holding costs. The effect of 
institutional herding on time variation in liquidity is explored in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.  
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Hypothesis 1 [Adverse selection hypothesis]: All else being equal, firms with greater 
institutional holdings or held by larger numbers of institutions will have lower 
liquidity (higher spreads).  
My second hypothesis relates to the information efficiency effect that also results from 
information advantage of institutions. Kyle (1985) framework is used extensively to 
study the effect of informed traders and their information advantage on liquidity and 
price efficiency. Mendelson and Tunca (2004) consider a variation of Kyle’s model 
with a single informed investor in a multi-period model and endogenized liquidity 
trading. The authors indicate that as prices reflect more information about the 
security’s value, the reduction in risk of trading the security results in an increase in 
liquidity trading, which provides a greater opportunity for the informed investors to 
hide in the order flow. The increased trading of informed investors’ result in prices 
reflecting more information, an effect I call as information efficiency. 
Subrahmanyam (1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Spiegel and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) show that information efficiency effect is enhanced by 
competition among informed investors. Subrahmanyam (1991) considers a risk-averse 
market maker and multiple informed investors observing a noisy signal of the value of 
the asset. His model suggests that sensitivity of price to order flow (lambda) is 
monotonically decreasing with respect to the number of informed traders, if they are 
risk neutral, and indicates that even in the presence of strategic behavior, increasing 
competition among the informed investors results in higher liquidity. Spiegel and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) extend Subrahmanyam (1991) and allow the liquidity trades to 
be endogenous by motivating them based on hedging needs. The authors also indicate  
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that with an increase in the number of risk-neutral informed investors, the greater 
competition results in higher liquidity.
12  
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), and Back, Cao, 
and Willard (2000) further investigate the effect of multiple informed traders acting 
strategically on liquidity. They analyze the effects of informed traders in multi-period 
models with exogenous liquidity trading. Holden and Subrahmanyam find that in the 
presence of a large number of informed investors with perfectly correlated signals, the 
increased competition among risk-neutral informed investors increases the information 
efficiency of prices. Markets become infinitely deep and almost infinitely tight in no 
time (i.e., there is a low cost to turning around a position). Foster and Viswanathan, 
and Back, Cao, and Willard also suggest that an increase in the correlation among 
signals of the informed investors can enhance the competition among them, resulting 
in a faster incorporation of information into prices.  
These theoretical findings suggest that, in the presence of risk-neutral informed 
investors, the growth in competition among them causes prices to incorporate 
information faster and become more information efficient. This results in reduced 
uncertainty about the value of the stock. As a result, in the presence of informed 
institutions, the price impact of order flow will decrease and uninformed traders will 
be more likely to invest in the stock, further increasing liquidity.
13 Hypothesis 2 
                                                 
12 The strategic-trader models also indicate that with an increase in informed traders the amount of 
information represented in the order flow increases, thereby increasing the adverse selection effect as 
suggested in sequential trade models by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987). 
13 Madhavan (1992) demonstrates that, for infrequently traded stocks, the lack of continuous prices 
impedes the price discovery process. As a result, prices are less efficient and information gathering 
becomes more expensive, further reducing liquidity. This may suggest that the presence of institutions 
with a relative information advantage will lead to price discovery and improve liquidity. On the other 
hand, increased liquidity can result in more uninformed trading, resulting in a slower adjustment of 
prices. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) also indicate that an increase in the number of informed traders  
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summarizes the prediction relating information efficiency effect of institutions on 
liquidity.  
Hypothesis 2 [Information efficiency hypothesis]: All else being equal, firms with 
greater institutional holdings or held by larger numbers of institutions will have higher 
liquidity (lower spreads).  
Wang (1993) models the two implications of informed trading on asset prices by 
incorporating both aspects of information structure: asymmetric information and 
imperfect information. All traders in the model are risk averse and informed traders 
act competitively. Uninformed investors face an adverse selection problem, in the 
presence of the informed, while trying to meet their liquidity needs by trading in the 
market. Informed investors bring more information into prices thus reducing the 
perceived uncertainty about future cash flows and risk of investing in the stock. In this 
setting, the sensitivity of stock price to supply shocks depends on the net effect of the 
two offsetting forces, imperfect information effect and information asymmetry effect 
and can be non-monotonic.
14  
The strategic-trader models of Subrahmanyam (1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam 
(1992), etc., also predict a non-monotonic relationship between the number of 
informed investors and liquidity in the presence of risk-averse informed traders. The 
presence of informed investors thus results in both the effects of adverse selection and 
information efficiency. The observed relationship between liquidity and institutional 
                                                                                                                                              
can lead to improvement in terms of trade for uninformed traders. Another argument is that increase in 
information efficiency will reduce the risk of holding on to inventory. 
14 Wang indicates that instabilities become important in the presence of an endogenous information 
structure. Thus, the effects of multiple informed traders in case of costly information acquisition are 
unclear.  
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ownership will therefore depend on the net effect. Based on these theoretical papers, 
the predicted relationship is highly sensitive to the assumptions of their models. I 
therefore examine the possibility that the net effect of institutions on liquidity resulting 
from both adverse selection and information efficiency effects is non-monotonic.
15 
The information efficiency hypothesis has an additional implication for the intraday 
variation in liquidity measures.
16 In both sequential trade models and multi-period 
strategic-trader models, prices incorporate more information as trading progresses 
after arrival of information. The rate at which prices converge to their true value 
increases with trading intensity of informed investors. With improvement in 
information efficiency of prices, the risk faced by market maker and uninformed 
investors decreases, resulting in higher liquidity. At the start of trading, both the 
likelihood of existence and the magnitude of private information are higher due to 
information accumulation after the end of trading on the previous day. A market 
maker should therefore post higher spreads at the beginning of trading to reduce the 
adverse selection costs. With progress in trading over the day, prices become more 
information efficient and the market maker lowers spreads. 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) use a multi-period model to capture the effect of 
multiple informed traders acting strategically on liquidity. The authors find that soon 
after the start of trading, both market depth and tightness (i.e., cost to turn around a 
position) increase. The rate of decline in spreads increases with the number of 
                                                 
15 Similarly, in Watanabe (2008) in a multi-period model with persistence of information shocks, the 
market maker worsens the terms of trade due to adverse selection. At the same time, the higher 
competition among informed traders allows him to improve the liquidity because each of the informed 
traders makes less profit. 
16 Intra-day spreads for stocks listed on NYSE typically exhibit an inverse J shaped pattern (McInish 
and Wood, (1992)). Spreads decline after opening and exhibit a small spike just prior to close.  
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informed traders. The net effect is that for firms with larger numbers of informed 
traders, spreads start out higher and exhibit a larger decline during the day, relative to 
firms with fewer informed traders. Hypothesis 3 summarizes this prediction with 
respect to information efficiency effect on intraday patterns in spreads.
17  
Hypothesis 3: Spreads of firms with higher institutional ownership and held by larger 
numbers of institutions will decline more during the day. 
The three hypotheses rely on the assumption that institutions are both informed and 
homogeneous. In reality, institutions are not completely homogeneous and differ 
widely with respect to various attributes. Institutional investors differ according to 
their incentive structures and fiduciary duties, and even have different investment 
horizons [Bushee (1998), Bushee and Noe (2000)].
18 Gammill and Marsh (1988) 
document that pension funds, individual investors, and corporations repurchasing their 
own shares were the biggest providers of liquidity on October 20, 1987, a day after 
“Black Monday.” Dennis and Strickland (2005) also find strong evidence that banks 
tend to provide liquidity while mutual funds and investment advisors tend to demand 
liquidity on days with large abnormal returns. I therefore examine the effect of 
institutional characteristics such as investment horizon and portfolio diversification on 
liquidity, with the objective of gaining insight into how holdings by different types of 
institutions affect stocks liquidity. 
                                                 
17 I only test the relationship between the decline in spreads during the day and institutional ownership, 
as NYSE opens with a call auction which makes it harder to estimate liquidity in the first period. 
18 Institutions differ in their preference for assets since their objectives and constraints vary widely. For 
example: insurance companies are less concerned about liquidity as opposed to investment companies 
which may face large fund outflows at short notice in response to poor performance or other shocks.  
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SECTION 2: DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
SECTION 2.1: LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
Liquidity is a difficult construct. It captures the notion that there are costs associated 
with transacting. These costs are associated with exogenous transaction costs, search 
costs, asymmetric information, inventory risk, and imperfect competition in asset 
markets. In addition, liquidity of an asset also indicates the speed and ease with which 
it can be transacted. The unobservable nature of liquidity and its multiple facets make 
it difficult for a single measure to capture its various dimensions. For lack of better 
measures, most studies use the bid-ask spreads posted by a dealer or estimates of the 
price impact of a trade, based on structural models, to quantify liquidity. The 
empirically derived measures of liquidity of stocks that are based on both high 
frequency and daily returns are noisy estimates of the true parameter(s). However, 
most of the measures used in the existing literature are highly correlated. I rely on the 
following four measures to ensure robustness of results: Gibbs estimate (c_BMA) 
proposed by Hasbrouck (2004, 2006), ILLIQ proposed by Amihud (2002), Quoted 
Spread measure divided by price (RELQSPR) and Effective Spread measure divided 
by price (RELESPR).
19  
Gibbs estimate (c_BMA) for liquidity is obtained using a variant of Roll’s model 
(1984) and daily closing prices. Underlying it is the square root of the negative of the 
serial covariance of daily price changes. The estimated annual measure for the 
effective cost of trading is highly correlated with effective spread measures based on 
intraday trading data both in cross-section and in time series.
20 Amihud’s measure of 
                                                 
19 I include only common equity (CRSP share codes 10 or 11) in calculating the liquidity measures as 
trading characteristics of other assets (such as: certificates, ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, units, 
companies incorporated outside U.S., closed end funds, American trust components, preferred stocks, 
and REITs) may differ from that of common equity. 
20 The Bayesian approach proposed by Hasbrouck (2006) has various advantages. The primary 
advantage is that it overcomes estimation errors in the first-order auto-covariance of changes in prices.  
22 
liquidity ILLIQ is related to Kyle’s lambda (1985) and is defined as |R|/(P*Vol), where 
R is daily return, P is the closing daily price, and Vol is the number of shares traded 
during the day. To obtain an annual measure, I take the average of the daily values 
over the year and use the square-root transform to reduce skewness. One obvious 
problem with ILLIQ is its estimation on days with no trading.  
I estimate two other measures of liquidity using the intra-day data from ISSM and 
TAQ for NYSE and AMEX firms. The ISSM database includes trades and quotes data 
for NYSE- and AMEX-listed firms for the period January 1983 through December 
1992, while TAQ database includes similar information for NYSE/AMEX- and 
NASDAQ-listed stocks for the period January 1993 through December 2005. 
RELQSPR is defined as the difference between ask and bid, scaled by the midpoint of 
the prevailing quote.
21 RELESPR is defined as the absolute value of the difference 
between the transaction price and the quote midpoint, scaled by the midpoint of the 
quote. I compute these measures of liquidity by first averaging them over the trading 
day and then using the mean of the daily values for the year. Both c_BMA and ILLIQ 
are available for the entire period 1980–2005, while RELQSPR and RELESPR are 
available for years 1983–2005.
22 I also estimate RELQSPR and RELESPR  on a 
                                                                                                                                              
The correlation of the measure with various other liquidity measures in my sample is very high. (Please 
refer to Table 2.3.)  
21 I calculate the spread measures for firms using quotes only from NYSE and AMEX because the 
autoquotes from other exchanges tend to inflate the quoted spreads. I also kept quotes where the Mode 
field was equal to 1, 3, 6, 10, or 12 and eliminate quotes with non-positive bid or ask price, quotes 
where bid was greater than ask, and in cases in which the quoted spread and effective spread either 
exceeded 25% of the quote midpoint or were greater than $5. I use trades that are coded as regular and 
eliminate trades with non-positive prices or sizes, where the price of the trade was either less than 50%, 
or more than 150%, of the price of the previous trade. I also eliminate opening trades to avoid after-
hour liquidity effects [Barclay and Hendershott, (2004)] and eliminate quotes established before the 
opening of the market.  
22 All findings are robust to using these measures of liquidity. For the sake of brevity, I report findings 
using c_BMA for most tests and summarize findings using the other measures.  
23 
quarterly basis to conduct Granger causality tests. All the measures indicate illiquidity 
for the stocks and an increase in these measures indicates a decline in liquidity. 
SECTION 2.2: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP MEASURES 
I obtain institutional holdings data from Thomson Financial (previously known as 
CDA Spectrum) database, consisting of 13F filings reported quarterly to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the period 1980–2005.
23 Institutional investment 
managers are supposed to report their holdings—number of shares and fair market 
value as of the last day of the calendar quarter as required by Section 13(f)(1) and 
Rule 13f-1. The 13F reporting requirements apply regardless of whether an institution 
is regulated by the SEC or not. They also apply to foreign institutions if they “use any 
means or instrumentality of United States interstate commerce in the course of their 
business.”
24 I simply sum up the holdings at the end of each quarter, for all institutions 
in the sample, to obtain total institutional holdings of the security at the end of the 
quarter. I divide the total institutional holdings by the shares outstanding obtained 
from CRSP at end of each quarter and then take the yearly average of the proportion 
                                                 
23 All institutional managers who exercise investment discretion over 13F securities with a market value 
over $100 million are required to report their holdings within 45 days after the close of the quarter, 
according to the 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Institutions are required 
to report all equity positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. In two respects, 
13F data is incomplete: (1) institutions may be granted exception from filing these reports when they 
request confidential treatment to prevent disclosure of their proprietary trading strategies and (2) 
institutions have to disclose only their long positions, and the 13F filings do not contain information on 
short positions or options written. Given that a majority of institutional investors (pension funds, mutual 
funds, insurance companies) have mandates preventing them from short sales, and, on average short 
interest in most securities is around 2%, this factor should not materially affect the holdings data. In 
addition, CDA-Spectrum classifies each institutional investor as one of five types: bank trust 
departments, insurance companies, mutual funds, independent investment advisors, and unclassified 
institutions.  
24  The filing requirements also apply to hedge funds, if their holdings of U.S. stocks exceed the 
specified thresholds. Hedge funds may be able to mask their holdings from the SEC and, given that a 
large fraction of hedge funds invest in long/short equity strategy, the holdings data will not be accurate. 
Identifying the holdings by hedge fund managers is difficult as the reporting entity is the institution and 
not the fund. An institution can have other funds besides hedge funds, like mutual funds, and the 
disclosed holdings to SEC are at the aggregate level.
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of the holdings to obtain an annual measure of institutional holdings referred to as 
fracinst.  
SECTION 2.3: CONTROL VARIABLES 
High-price volatility and low trading volume increase the inventory risk faced by 
market makers [Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1983), and O’Hara and 
Oldfield (1986)]. Further, higher residual uncertainty about stock prices results in 
reduced liquidity trading and thinner markets. Benston and Hagerman (1974) find that 
higher individual stock volatility is cross-sectionally associated with higher spreads. I 
therefore include stock-return volatility (volatility) as a control variable calculated 
using the standard deviation of the daily stock returns, excluding dividends, over a one 
year period.  
With increases in institutional holdings in a stock, the incidence of large blocks is 
likely to increase. To control for the effect of block ownership on spreads and 
associated reductions in trading, I include the variable number of blocks (NumBlocks), 
where a block exists if an institution holds more than 5% of outstanding equity in the 
firm. I obtain the fraction of shares held by insiders (fracinsider) from Disclosure 
Incorporated’s Compact D database and match the data to CRSP and TAQ using the 
firm’s CUSIP. Insider ownership can result in lower liquidity through two means: by 
reducing free float of outstanding shares and by aggravating the information 
asymmetry problems. Increasing insider ownership could increase information 
efficiency.  
I include additional control variables: log of market capitalization (LnSize), which 
captures size of the firm, and share turnover (turnover) measured as total trading  
25 
volume scaled by total shares outstanding.
25 Stoll and Whaley (1983) indicate that it is 
less expensive to trade stocks of larger firms as there is more information available 
about them due to greater media and analyst coverage. Size also influences liquidity 
by influencing the breadth of ownership of the stock. The payout policy of a firm may 
also influence trading behavior in the firm’s equity, as investors may not need to 
liquidate their holdings to realize gains for a firm paying dividends. Payout policy is 
also associated with clientele of the firm (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005) and may thus 
be associated with liquidity. I therefore include an indicator variable (DivDummy), for 
firms paying dividends, and an additional variable dividend yield (DivYld) calculated 
as annual dividends divided by share price.  
Capital structure of a firm can affect information disclosure as suggested in security 
design literature. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) indicate that increased disclosure by 
a firm leads to a reduction in information asymmetry between the firm and the 
investors, resulting in improved liquidity. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995); and 
Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1998) also indicate that an increase in the number of 
investment analysts following a firm, which proxies for the number of individuals 
producing information, reduces adverse selection costs of trading in the stock and 
improves liquidity. Hence I include both leverage (MktLev) measured as long-term 
debt by market value of total assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt 
and preferred stock) and the log of number of equity analysts following the firm 
(LnNumest) defined as log of (1 + Number of Analysts). High-growth firms tend to 
attract more attention from both media and investors, hence, I include book to market 
ratio (BookToMkt) and R&D to sales ratio (RDbySales) as additional control variables. 
                                                 
25 Turnover is used as a proxy for a variety of effects and, so, interpretation may be difficult. High share 
turnover may indicate a higher dispersion in beliefs of investors arising from differences in information, 
while it can also indicate a measure of liquidity. My findings are robust to excluding turnover as a 
control variable. The findings on using turnover as a measure for liquidity are similar.  
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I include inverse of share price (InvPrice) since spread measures exhibit a nonlinear 
relationship with share prices [Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001)].
26  
Liquidity measures may be sensitive to changes in stock price of the firm during the 
year. Hence, I include annual returns (annret) during the year to control for any related 
effects. Including contemporaneous returns controls for both inventory-related effects 
resulting from financial constraints of market makers, herding behavior of institutions 
and effects related to investors funding status on liquidity. Since institutions also 
respond to past performance by chasing trends and exhibiting herding behavior, I 
include lagged annual returns (lagannret) as another control variable to isolate the 
effect of the herding behavior from information-related effects.
27 
Presence of credit ratings may suggest lower uncertainty about a firm and indicate that 
the investment is prudent. To control for effect of credit ratings and the associated 
information effects, I include an additional indicator variable CredRatDummy equal to 
1 for firms that have available credit ratings and equal to 0 otherwise.
28 I also include 
profit margin (profitability), defined as net income divided by sales, and an additional 
indicator variable for positive cash flows (CashFlowDummy) to capture effects 
associated with financial distress risk on liquidity. 
                                                 
26 To capture any potential nonlinearity due to the minimum tick size and fixed components in the 
spread measures, I also include log of share price (LnPrice). All findings are robust to using either 
LnPrice or InvPrice or both of the measures. 
27 I take log of (1+return), as a measure of annual return, to reduce skewness in the returns. 
28 The credit rating used is Standard & Poor’s Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating (Compustat 
data item 280). This rating is the firm’s “corporate credit rating,” which is a “current opinion on an 
issuer’s overall capacity to pay its financial obligations” (Standard and Poor’s (2001b, p. 61) “SP”). 
1985 is the first year for which this rating is available in Compustat.  
27 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 rely on the premise that institutions have an information 
advantage over other investors. However, many institutions tend to follow passive 
investing strategies and are uninformed. Over time, indexing has become more 
popular as a low cost alternative to active investing. Current estimates suggest that 
roughly 20% of the outstanding equity of various firms held by institutions is managed 
passively through index funds and ETF’s tracking popular benchmarks.
29 The 
presence of index funds acting as a pooling vehicle can reduce trading volume and 
change the information environment of firms included in the indices. To control for 
the effect of being included in leading stock indices on liquidity, I create two 
additional indicator variables for firms belonging to the S&P 500 (SP500Dummy) and 
the Dow Jones Industrial Index (DJDummy).
30  
I include industry fixed effects to control for differences in liquidity using Fama-
French 12 classification. I also include time fixed effects to control for the effects of 
general market conditions such as interest rates—which affects costs of margin trading 
and short selling—default spreads, market volatility, and other macroeconomic 
conditions on liquidity. Time fixed effects also help control for time trends in 
measures of liquidity, resulting from changes in minimum tick sizes and other changes 
in technology.  
SECTION 2.4: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Data on CRSP is available for 80,022 firm years over the period 1980–2005 for firms 
listed on NYSE and AMEX, with 8,558 unique firms. I retain firms listed on NYSE 
                                                 
29 March 4, 2009, The Wall Street Journal, Active vs. Passive: Indexing Wins '08, Benchmarked Mutual 
Funds Pick Up Share 
30 Hegde and McDermott (2003) find that spreads decline when firms are included in the S&P 500 
index, while they increase on their deletion from the index. Liquidity for stocks included among index 
can also increase due to index arbitrage activities.  
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and AMEX for the entire year and securities designated as ordinary common shares 
(share codes 10 and 11), resulting in 57,242 firm-year observations. After merging 
with Gibbs sampler estimate from Hasbrouck and accounting data from 
CRSP/Compustat merged database, 49,190 firm-years remain. After including control 
variables from other data sources and eliminating observations with missing values of 
dividend yield, book to market ratio, last periods’ annual returns, profit margin, 
leverage ratio, and earnings to price ratio, 46,696 observations remain.  
The data specified previously is matched to ownership data from Thomson Financial 
using CUSIP’s. The matching procedure results in 42,931 firm-years. I further 
eliminate firms with stock prices less than $5 and stock prices greater than $1000, 
resulting in 39,701 firm-years, with 4,578 unique firms with an average of 1,525 firms 
each year. Overall, the distribution of firms is uniform over the 26-year sample 
period.
31 Of the 39,701 firm-years remaining, institutional ownership data exists for 
31,388 firm-years. For firms with missing ownership data, I assume that institutional 
ownership is zero.
32 On merging with liquidity measures estimated using intraday data 
from ISSM and TAQ (over the period 1983–2005), 34,575 observations remain. I 
report results based on a full sample of 39,701 firms when using liquidity measures 
c_BMA and ILLIQ, and based on 34,575 firms when using the liquidity measures 
RELESPR and RELQSPR obtained from intraday trade data. To remove the effect of 
outliers, I also winsorize at 1% level and 99% level, the following variables: volatility, 
                                                 
31 Of the 4,578 firms, 3,116 firms are listed on NYSE (31,701 firm-years), with the remaining 1,462 on 
AMEX (8,000 firm years). There are 722 observations for firms belonging to the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index and 7,771 observations for firms belonging to the S&P 500 Index. The sample size is very similar 
to that in Boehmer and Kelley (2007) who look at effect of institutional holdings on price efficiency.  
32 All findings in this chapter are robust to excluding these firms from the analysis. The findings are 
almost identical when retaining firms with stock prices greater than $1 instead of $5.  
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book to market, share turnover, market leverage, profitability, dividend yield, R&D by 
sales, and annual returns.  
SECTION 2.5: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the various measures of liquidity over the 
sample period. The measures are comparable to liquidity measures used in other 
studies. The mean of c_BMA is 0.0046, indicating trading costs of 46 basis points on 
average. The relative effective spread RELESPR (0.0075) is smaller than the relative 
quoted spread RELQSPR (0.0106), indicating that transactions often take place within 
the quotes. These measures are similar to those reported in existing studies [Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), etc.]. 
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for other variables. The mean of equity holdings 
by institutions is 35.4%, for firms in the sample. The average number of institutions 
holding securities is 155, for firms with institutional ownership data available. The 
average market capitalization of firms is $3.1 B with total assets of $6.8 B and a mean 
book to market ratio of 0.70, indicating a bias toward larger firms with lower growth, 
typical for a sample restricted to NYSE/AMEX firms. Approximately 71% of firm-
years have dividend payments with the average dividend yield of 5.1%, again 
indicating the presence of larger and more mature firms. For the 28,455 firm-years 
with analyst following greater than zero, the median number of analysts is 9.6, while 
for the whole sample, the median number of analysts is 6.9. The average stock price is 
$28. Figure 2.1 plots the average illiquidity measures for NYSE/AMEX firms and 
fraction of equity of the firm held by institutions over time. Average institutional 
ownership of equity in firms belonging to NYSE/AMEX has increased from 15% in  
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1983 to 60% in 2005 reflecting a growth rate of 6.3% over the last 25 years. The 
illiquidity measures have declined over the period indicating an increase in liquidity.  
SECTION 3: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LIQUIDITY RESULTS 
The analysis of the effect of institutional ownership on liquidity measures follows the 
exposition of the arguments in the introduction. First, I present univariate results 
followed by those from multivariate analysis. Multivariate analysis not only helps 
control for correlation among various variables and liquidity measures, but also helps 
test the result of interaction between the adverse selection and information efficiency 
effects.  
SECTION 3.1: UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
Panel A of Table 2.3 presents correlations between various liquidity measures for 
firms listed on NYSE and AMEX, while Panel B presents the correlation of 
Hasbrouck’s measure of liquidity (c_BMA) with other variables of interest. The lower 
triangles present Pearson correlations and the upper triangles present Spearman rank 
correlations, as some variables exhibit skewness. The correlations are first calculated 
on an annual basis and the time series means are presented. The variable c_BMA 
exhibits strong positive correlations with other measures of illiquidity (ILLIQ, 
RELQSPR  and RELESPR). The correlation between RELESPR and RELQSPR is 
0.943. The quoted depth (QuotedDepth) measure exhibits a marginally negative 
correlation with the spread-based measures of liquidity.  
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Liquidity measures.  This table presents summary statistics for liquidity measures. Summary 
statistics represent observations pooled over the entire sample period 1980–2005 for the following measures: Gibbs Sample and 
Amihud’s illiquidity measure. The summary statistics for remaining liquidity measures obtained using intraday trading data are for 
the period 1983–2005. The liquidity measures are c_BMA, the Gibbs sampler estimate obtained from Joel Hasbrouck; ILLIQ, 
square root of the Amihud’s measure of illiquidity [Absolute(ret)/Volume]; QSPR, the quoted spread (bid-ask); ESPR, the effective 
spread, equal to [transaction price - (bid+ask)/2]; RELQSPR, relative quoted spread [QSPR/Price]; RELESPR, relative effective 
spread [ESPR/Price]; FracAS_GH, the adverse selection component of the spread estimated using the Glosten and Harris approach. 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum P1 P99 Maximum Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
c_BMA 39701 0.0046 0.0036 0.0008 0.0011 0.0161 0.0631 0.0033 2.18 9.49
Amihud (ILLIQ) 39701 0.2738 0.1257 0.0027 0.0086 1.7699 6.0511 0.3718 2.81 11.60
RELQSPR 34575 0.0106 0.0085 0.0003 0.0005 0.0376 0.1319 0.0086 1.57 4.80
RELESPR 34575 0.0075 0.0056 0.0003 0.0004 0.0286 0.1557 0.0067 2.70 22.15
FracAS_GH 33957 0.5195 0.5089 -1.0868 0.1776 0.9344 1.7743 0.1551 0.41 1.35  
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Other variables.  Summary statistics of institutional 
ownership measures and other control variables, representing pooled observations 
over the entire sample period of 1980–2005 for the following measures: fracinst, 
amount of shares held by institutions that have reported that they held long positions 
in the security of interest in 13F filings divided by shares outstanding; sqfracinst, 
fracinst*fracinst;  fracinsider, fraction of shares held by insiders in the firm; 
InstDummy, an indicator variable and is equal to 1 for firms with fracinst greater than 
0, and 0 otherwise; NumInst, average number of institutions that have reported having 
held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings; MktCap, the total market 
capitalization of the firm calculated at beginning of the year (shares outstanding * 
Price);  Price, average monthly closing share price of the firm over the year; 
Profitability, net income divided by total sales; CashFlowDummy, an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for firms with positive cash flow per share and 0 otherwise; 
SPRatDummy, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a rating available from 
S&P 500 and 0 otherwise; BookToMkt, book value of equity at previous fiscal year 
ending divided by market value of equity at end of last calendar year; MktLev, total 
debt outstanding divided by sum of total assets and market value of equity less book 
value of equity; Volatility; standard deviation of daily returns over the calendar year; 
turnover, total trading volume divided by shares outstanding; annret, the annual 
returns including dividends; lagannret, annual returns from last year; DivDummy, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that have positive dividend payout and 0 
otherwise; DivYld, total dividends paid divided by book value of equity; RDD, an 
indicator variable and is equal to 1 for firms reporting positive R&D expenses and 0 
otherwise; RDbySales, equal to R&D expenses divided by total sales and is zero for 
firms when RDD=0; NumEst, average number of analysts following the firm; 
LnNumEst, natural log of (1+NumEst); ForecastDev, dispersion in the analyst 
forecast; LnSize, the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm.  
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Variable N Mean Median Minimum P1 P99 Maximum StdDev Skewness Kurtosis
fracinst 39701 0.3543 0.3492 0.0000 0.0000 0.9452 0.9500 0.2768 0.23 -1.12
InstDummy 39701 0.8204 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3838 -1.67 0.79
sqfracinst 39701 0.2022 0.1219 0.0000 0.0000 0.8935 0.9025 0.2246 1.14 0.51
NumInst 31388 155 98 1 2 885 1636 181 2.49 8.97
fracinsider 39701 0.0573 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.6916 0.9499 0.1344 3.45 13.13
Sales 39701 6836 772 1 14 104741 1494037 37126 18.13 459.95
MktCap 39701 3159 497 2 9 49846 507217 13353 14.14 296.50
Price 39701 28.17 23.00 5.00 5.25 103.00 998.00 26.36 9.84 226.03
profitability 39701 0.0443 0.0472 -5.6818 -0.3607 0.2814 0.3983 0.1522 -14.44 377.27
CashFlowDummy 39701 0.3736 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4838 0.52 -1.73
SPRatDummy 39701 0.6137 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4869 -0.47 -1.78
BookToMkt 39701 0.7043 0.6095 -8.6534 -0.1196 2.4831 9.9317 0.5226 1.25 16.05
MktLev 39701 0.1840 0.1560 0.0000 0.0000 0.6287 0.7822 0.1530 0.85 0.27
volatility 39701 0.0227 0.0209 0.0068 0.0088 0.0526 0.1132 0.0095 1.46 4.40
turnover 39701 0.7667 0.5715 0.0355 0.0629 3.4738 6.3541 0.6913 2.62 10.73
annret 39701 0.1919 0.1303 -0.9227 -0.5786 1.8088 5.1696 0.4500 1.94 9.10
DivDummy 39701 0.7098 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4539 -0.92 -1.15
DivYld 39701 0.0367 0.0275 0.0000 0.0000 0.1922 0.3912 0.0415 2.04 7.43
RDD 39701 0.3523 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4777 0.62 -1.62
RDbySales 39701 0.0136 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 1.2552 0.0373 9.58 211.25
NumEst 39701 6.9158 3.9167 0.0000 0.0000 32.1667 47.8333 8.1022 1.37 1.42
ForecastDev 25975 0.1159 0.0542 0.0000 0.0000 0.8760 34.2300 0.3857 54.16 4241.02
LnNumEst 39701 1.4787 1.5926 0.0000 0.0000 3.5015 3.8884 1.1551 0.00 -1.37
LnSize 39701 6.1793 6.2093 0.5625 2.1673 10.8167 13.1367 1.9274 0.12 -0.28  
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Figure 2.1: Time trend, liquidity measures, and institutional ownership 
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Table 2.3: Correlation measures.  Correlations across variables of interest for firms listed on NYSE and AMEX during the sample 
period 1980–2005. The bottom triangle presents the Pearson correlations, while the upper triangle presents the Spearman rank 
correlations. The correlations are estimated by pooling all observations over the sample period. Panel A presents correlations 
between various liquidity measures. Panel B presents the correlations between Hasbrouck’s effective spread measure (c_BMA), 
institutional ownership (fracinst) and among various other variables.  
Panel A           
Variable  c_BMA
Amihud 
(ILLIQ) RELQSPR  RELESPR fracAS_GH
c_BMA  1.000  0.516 0.581  0.579  -0.027 
Amihud 
(ILLIQ)  0.582  1.000  0.828 0.841 0.474 
RELQSPR  0.690 0.723  1.000  0.985 0.264 
RELESPR  0.664 0.737  0.943 1.000  0.284 
FracAS_GH  -0.008 0.472  0.226  0.258  1.000 
Note. Panel A variables: The liquidity measures are c_BMA, the Gibbs sampler estimate obtained from Joel Hasbrouck; ILLIQ, square root of the Amihud’s 
measure of illiquidity [Absolute(ret)/Volume]; QSPR, the quoted spread (bid-ask); ESPR, the effective spread, equal to [transaction price - (bid+ask)/2]; 
RELQSPR, relative quoted spread [QSPR/Price]; RELESPR, relative effective spread [ESPR/Price]; FracAS_GH, the adverse selection component of the 
spread estimated using the Glosten and Harris approach.   
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Panel B
Variable c_BMA fracinst fracinsider NumInst Price profitability BookToMkt MktLev volatility turnover annret DivYld RDbySales NumEst LnSize
c_BMA 1.000 -0.282 -0.011 -0.462 -0.670 -0.260 0.173 0.085 0.515 -0.144 -0.023 -0.298 -0.017 -0.297 -0.517
fracinst -0.305 1.000 0.247 0.726 0.314 0.053 -0.226 -0.100 -0.037 0.442 -0.037 -0.060 0.101 0.696 0.434
fracinsider 0.063 -0.049 1.000 0.031 -0.053 0.021 -0.209 -0.105 0.060 0.103 -0.031 -0.205 -0.021 0.045 0.047
NumInst -0.333 0.494 -0.143 1.000 0.612 0.234 -0.389 -0.072 -0.180 0.557 -0.012 0.249 0.099 0.817 0.952
Price -0.385 0.238 -0.073 0.382 1.000 0.398 -0.368 -0.220 -0.488 0.175 0.280 0.369 0.059 0.402 0.706
profitability -0.149 0.061 -0.050 0.114 0.150 1.000 -0.273 -0.273 -0.294 -0.041 0.152 0.273 -0.060 0.134 0.313
BookToMkt 0.175 -0.192 -0.048 -0.281 -0.224 -0.028 1.000 0.287 -0.026 -0.246 -0.250 -0.065 -0.153 -0.250 -0.424
MktLev 0.110 -0.103 -0.022 -0.127 -0.192 -0.090 0.235 1.000 0.049 0.023 -0.118 -0.044 -0.168 -0.086 -0.102
volatility 0.476 -0.063 0.093 -0.153 -0.298 -0.238 -0.012 0.077 1.000 0.352 -0.067 -0.518 0.109 -0.095 -0.287
turnover -0.114 0.437 -0.058 0.303 0.092 -0.056 -0.163 -0.005 0.358 1.000 -0.007 -0.226 0.129 0.350 0.401
annret 0.079 -0.054 0.016 -0.044 0.148 0.035 -0.219 -0.116 0.107 0.048 1.000 0.000 -0.034 -0.047 0.075
DivYld -0.242 -0.045 -0.135 0.282 0.166 0.156 -0.147 -0.065 -0.392 -0.189 -0.061 1.000 -0.032 0.159 0.318
RDbySales 0.002 0.071 0.018 0.119 0.018 -0.349 -0.131 -0.177 0.169 0.159 -0.012 -0.056 1.000 0.092 0.060
NumEst -0.288 0.531 -0.102 0.722 0.305 0.089 -0.195 -0.123 -0.136 0.226 -0.061 0.194 0.116 1.000 0.604
LnSize -0.511 0.452 -0.102 0.852 0.498 0.155 -0.378 -0.143 -0.264 0.294 0.022 0.315 0.070 0.643 1.000  
Note. Panel B variables: fracinst, amount of shares held by institutions that have reported that they held long positions in the security of interest in 13F filings 
divided by shares outstanding; sqfracinst, fracinst*fracinst; fracinsider, fraction of shares held by insiders in the firm; InstDummy, an indicator variable and 
is equal to 1 for firms with fracinst greater than 0, and 0 otherwise; NumInst, average number of institutions that have reported having held long positions in 
the security of interest in 13F filings; MktCap, the total market capitalization of the firm calculated at beginning of the year (shares outstanding * Price); 
Price, average monthly closing share price of the firm over the year; Profitability, net income divided by total sales; CashFlowDummy, an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for firms with positive cash flow per share and 0 otherwise; SPRatDummy, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a rating available from 
S&P 500 and 0 otherwise; BookToMkt, book value of equity at previous fiscal year ending divided by market value of equity at end of last calendar year; 
MktLev, total debt outstanding divided by sum of total assets and market value of equity less book value of equity; Volatility; standard deviation of daily 
returns over the calendar year; turnover, total trading volume divided by shares outstanding; annret, the annual returns including dividends; lagannret, annual 
returns from last year; DivDummy, an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that have positive dividend payout and 0 otherwise; DivYld, total dividends paid 
divided by book value of equity; RDD, an indicator variable and is equal to 1 for firms reporting positive R&D expenses and 0 otherwise; RDbySales, equal 
to R&D expenses divided by total sales and is zero for firms when RDD=0; NumEst, average number of analysts following the firm; LnNumEst, natural log of 
(1+NumEst); ForecastDev, dispersion in the analyst forecast; LnSize, the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm. 
  
37 
Panel B indicates that c_BMA exhibits a strong negative correlation with fraction of 
institutional ownership (fracinst), number of institutional investors (NumInst), size of 
the firm (LnSize), number of analysts following the firm (NumEst), profit margin 
(Profitability), share price (Price), dividend yield (DivYld), and share turnover 
(Turnover). The illiquidity measures decrease if last years’ returns are higher, while 
the relationship with contemporaneous returns is not strong. Firms with higher 
leverage (MktLev), value firms with higher book-to-market ratio (BookToMkt), and 
firms with higher stock return volatility (Volatility) exhibit higher illiquidity. 
Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for firms grouped on the basis of their level of 
institutional ownership (fracinst) each year by first forming a separate group for firms 
with missing institutional ownership data. Liquidity monotonically increases with 
fracinst across firms. However, the rate at which it increases with fracinst appears to 
be diminishing. I similarly find that size of the firms (LnSize), share price, dividend 
yield, and profit margin increase monotonically, while return volatility exhibits a 
slight decrease with fracinst. Since these other variables also affect liquidity due to 
changes in asset risk and information availability, I use multivariate analysis to test the 
relationship between fracinst and liquidity.
33 In the multivariate analysis, I emphasize 
results that are consistent and stable across a variety of specifications to ensure that 
multicollinearity issues are not influencing any inferences. 
 
                                                 
33 Nonparametric results in Table 2.4 fail to control for the high correlation across various control 
variables. However, a fully nonparametric approach suffers from the curse of dimensionality due to the 
large number of control variables.  
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Table 2.4: Parametric analysis: Groups based on level of institutional ownership.  The univariate relationship between level of 
institutional ownership and various measures of liquidity is presented. Ten groups are formed each year by ranking firms based on 
fraction of institutional ownership, after excluding firms having no reported institutional ownership. Measures for firms with no 
reported institutional ownership are presented separately in group 0. Other variables of interest are also presented. 
Group 
no.
No. Of 
firms Percent fracinst
NumIns
tc _ B M A
RELES
PR
RELQS
PR ILLIQ
TWQuo
tedDep
th LnSize Price
turnove
r
volatilit
y MktLev
NumEs
tD i v Y l d
BookTo
Mkt
0 7129 18.0 0.000 0 0.48% 0.74% 1.05% 0.264 42.6 6.3 26.8 0.78 2.28% 0.22 0.26 0.04 0.76
1 3245 8.2 0.071 19 0.73% 1.51% 1.99% 0.778 15.4 4.2 15.4 0.39 2.63% 0.18 1.35 0.02 0.76
2 3260 8.2 0.176 52 0.58% 1.10% 1.52% 0.487 19.6 4.9 18.8 0.47 2.38% 0.19 3.07 0.03 0.77
3 3259 8.2 0.262 94 0.53% 0.93% 1.32% 0.355 30.9 5.5 21.2 0.59 2.35% 0.19 5.21 0.03 0.76
4 3261 8.2 0.338 136 0.48% 0.79% 1.13% 0.280 33.7 5.9 24.2 0.68 2.29% 0.19 6.85 0.04 0.74
5 3256 8.2 0.404 166 0.44% 0.69% 0.99% 0.225 34.1 6.3 27.5 0.76 2.25% 0.18 8.26 0.04 0.70
6 3262 8.2 0.466 187 0.41% 0.61% 0.89% 0.178 39.1 6.6 30.1 0.83 2.23% 0.18 10.01 0.04 0.67
7 3262 8.2 0.525 205 0.38% 0.52% 0.78% 0.136 37.8 6.9 34.3 0.85 2.16% 0.17 11.31 0.04 0.63
8 3258 8.2 0.586 205 0.37% 0.51% 0.76% 0.121 39.1 7.0 33.4 0.94 2.18% 0.17 11.94 0.04 0.64
9 3261 8.2 0.652 217 0.34% 0.44% 0.67% 0.093 37.0 7.1 36.7 1.04 2.15% 0.16 13.47 0.04 0.62
10 3248 8.2 0.752 200 0.32% 0.43% 0.65% 0.099 32.7 7.1 41.3 1.16 2.13% 0.17 12.73 0.03 0.66  
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SECTION 3.2: MULTIVARIATE RESULTS  
3.2.1: Pooled time series and cross-sectional regressions 
I study the relationship between liquidity and institutional ownership in a multivariate 
framework by estimating the following regression:  
) 1 ....( ] [ *
1
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Due to the inherently unbalanced nature of the data, I rely on pooled regressions with 
year and industry fixed effects. The year fixed effects take into account the time trends 
of the variables and thus avoid spurious relationships. Due to persistence in measures 
of liquidity for a firm over time, I estimate the standard errors by clustering them both 
on firm and time dimensions. Clustering ensures that the inference is based on 
standard errors robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over time and 
across firms in the same year.
34  
Table 2.5 presents the findings from the pooled regressions. Spec 1 tests for a linear 
relationship between liquidity and fracinst without any additional control variables. 
The coefficient on fracinst is negative and significant (-0.0037) indicating that spreads 
decrease with institutional ownership. A one standard deviation increase in fracinst 
(0.2768) leads to a 22% decline in proportional spreads. Spec 2 controls for insider 
ownership, analyst following, size of the firm, and share price, along with time and 
industry fixed effects. The coefficient on fracinst stays negative and significant, 
though the effect has a much smaller magnitude of -0.0006. An adjusted R
2 of 46.5% 
indicates that the additional variables and the time and industry fixed effects explain a 
sizable variation in liquidity in the sample. The coefficients on both fracinst and 
                                                 
34 I also use Fama-Macbeth approach to check robustness and stability of parameter estimates over time.  
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fracinsider are negative and significant, a finding that is inconsistent with the adverse 
selection hypothesis. The negative coefficient on fracinst supports the information 
efficiency hypothesis as well as the role of institutions in information production and 
dissemination. Larger firms and firms with higher share prices are more liquid.  
Spec 3 adds return volatility and share turnover as additional control variables with 
similar findings. Spreads increase with volatility while decreasing with turnover. In 
Spec 4, I add various firm characteristics that are associated with the firm’s financial 
performance and capital structure. In Table 2.4, a difference in liquidity and other 
control variables was evident between firms with zero institutional ownership and 
remaining firms in the sample. I therefore include an indicator variable for firms with 
zero reported institutional ownership. I also control for effect of inclusion in indices 
and holdings of index funds by including two indicator variables SP500Dummy and 
DJDummy. I further include number of blocks (NumBlocks) held by institutions, as 
institutions holding large positions may not trade frequently. These variables are 
associated with the amount of free float of the securities in the market.
35 The 
coefficient on fracinst becomes positive, indicating adverse selection effects of 
institutional ownership on liquidity. The small magnitude of the coefficient and 
changes in sign suggest the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between 
institutional ownership and liquidity.  
                                                 
35 Findings indicate that firms included in indices have lower liquidity. Firms with more block holders 
(NumBlocks) tend to have higher liquidity, while firms with no institutional ownership have lower 
liquidity. On using relative quoted spread as a measure of liquidity the sign on NumBlocks flips, while 
the coefficients for inclusion in indices are not robust across other specifications. Hence, I avoid 
drawing inferences from these findings.  
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Table 2.5: Cross-sectional results: Determinants of liquidity.  Cross-sectional results 
for effects of institutional ownership on liquidity for stocks listed on NYSE and 
AMEX are presented. The dependent variable is the annual measure of liquidity 
c_BMA obtained from Joel Hasbrouck. The period of study is 1980–2005 and includes 
39,701 firm years in the sample. Specification 1 excludes year and industry fixed 
effects, while the remaining specifications include both year and industry fixed effects. 
The coefficient on constant term is suppressed. Pooled regression is run using year and 
industry fixed effects due to inherently unbalanced nature of the panel. The standard 
errors are estimated by clustering on year and firm and are presented in italics below 
the estimates.   
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V a r i a b l e S p e c  1S p e c  2S p e c  3S p e c  4S p e c  5S p e c  6
fracinst -0.00366*** -0.00057*** -0.00029** 0.00092*** -0.00464*** -0.00264***
0.00036 0.00015 0.00014 0.00024 0.00045 0.00039
sqfracinst 0.00602*** 0.00385***
0.00048 0.00044
fracinsider -0.0004** -0.00075*** -0.00024*** -0.00059*** -0.00039***
0.00018 0.00019 0.00017 0.00015 0.00013
LnNumEst -0.00004 -0.00005* -0.00007* 0.00006 0.00002
0.00003 0.00003 0.00004 0.00004 0.00003
volatility 0.1076*** 0.08832*** 0.09029*** 0.06377***
0.00761 0.00605 0.00587 0.00501
turnover -0.00043*** -0.00034*** -0.00045*** -0.00019***
0.00015 0.00012 0.00012 0.00007
annret 0.00105*** 0.00106*** 0.00114***
0.00022 0.00022 0.0002
lagannret -0.00018** -0.00016** -0.00012**
0.00008 0.00007 0.00006
RDD -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00006
0.00005 0.00005 0.00004
RDBySales -0.00106* -0.00114** -0.00113*
0.00063 0.00061 0.00062
DivDummy -0.00015* -0.00011 0.00021***
0.00008 0.00008 0.00005
DivYld -0.00019 -0.00007 -0.00206***
0.00061 0.00059 0.0005
LnPrice -0.00272*** -0.00201*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.00025
0.00025 0.00023 0.00029 0.00029 0.00017
InvPrice 0.04312***
0.00421
LnSize -0.00007* -0.0001** -0.00018*** -0.00016*** -0.00108***
0.00004 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 0.00015
SqLnSize 0.00008***
0.00001
BookToMkt -0.00003 0 -0.00026***
0.00007 0.00006 0.00005
MktLev -0.00058*** -0.00062*** -0.00078***
0.0002 0.0002 0.00016
profitability 0.00047*** 0.00041*** 0.00055***
0.00015 0.00014 0.00013
NumBlocks -0.00025*** -0.00022*** -0.00012***
0.00003 0.00003 0.00002
InstDummy -0.00008 0.0006*** 0.00026***
0.00012 0.00016 0.0001
CashFlowDummy 0.00009** 0.00009** 0.00003
0.00004 0.00004 0.00003
SPRatDummy 0.00036*** 0.00041*** 0.00022***
0.00008 0.00008 0.00006
DJDummy 0.0004*** 0.00043*** -0.00076***
0.00012 0.00012 0.00014
SP500Dummy 0.00045*** 0.00042*** -0.0001**
0.00006 0.00005 0.00005
Adj. R2 9.3% 46.5% 50.6% 53.2% 54.0% 59.9%
N o .  o f  p a r a m e t e r s 1 4 04 25 75 86 0
F-Value 4077.1 458.5 500.7 409.9 412.2 562.4  
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * 
indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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The coefficient on number of analysts is negative and significant, indicating that 
increasing analyst coverage increases liquidity. Liquidity is higher for dividend-paying 
firms and increases with dividend yield. Surprisingly, I find that value firms (higher 
book to market) have higher liquidity, while firms with higher debt-to-equity ratio 
have higher liquidity.
36 Liquidity declines for firms with higher contemporaneous 
annual returns and increases for firms with large returns in the past.  
In Spec 5, I therefore include a second-order term for fracinst, designated sqfracinst, 
to test the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between institutional ownership 
and stock liquidity. The remaining control variables are from Spec 4. The coefficient 
on  fracinst  is negative and strongly significant (-0.0046) while coefficient on 
sqfracinst is positive and strongly significant (0.0060). The increase in adjusted R
2 
from 53.2% to 54.0% along with large reductions in both AIC and BIC indicate the 
better fit of the model with the quadratic term. I do not find any support for the 
existence of other higher-order terms.
37  
Spec 6 addresses the possibility that the nonlinearity we observe in Spec 6 could result 
from the nonlinear relationship between liquidity measures and firm size or result 
from the scaling of the liquidity measures by share price. I therefore include square of 
log size and inverse of share price to control for potential nonlinear effects due to size 
and price. The inclusion of these variables improves the fit of the model but the 
estimates of fracinst and sqfracinst remain similar and statistically significant. Spec 6 
                                                 
36 The coefficient on market leverage is not significant when using other measures of liquidity. 
37 Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1998) indicate that informed traders find it more profitable to trade in 
options and thus tend to migrate to options. I therefore include an indicator variable for firms that have 
equity options traded to control for the effect of options on reducing adverse selection risk faced by 
market makers. All findings are robust to inclusion of option dummy. Data on traded options was 
obtained from Optionmetrics, starting January 1996.  
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indicates that the findings are robust to controlling for nonlinear relationship with 
other variables where a potential nonlinear relationship may exist. The negative effect 
on liquidity at higher levels of fracinst observed even after controlling for turnover, 
NumBlocks and inclusion in indices, allays concerns that the increase in spreads is 
associated with reduction in float and trading volume.
38 
I interpret the findings of the non-monotonic relationship between institutional 
ownership and stock liquidity as support for both the information efficiency and 
adverse selection effect arising from institutions relative information advantage. With 
an increase in institutional ownership, the marginal effect of their information 
advantage on price discovery and increasing information efficiency will progressively 
decline. On the other hand, the marginal adverse selection effect is more likely to 
exhibit an increase as market makers will have fewer uninformed investors to recoup 
their losses to the informed investors. For a market maker supplying liquidity, as the 
fraction of informed investors trading the stock increase, the adverse selection risk 
keeps increasing. The observed relationship between liquidity and the fraction of 
informed traders is therefore non-monotonic due to the combination of the two effects. 
3.2.2: Alternate measures for institutional ownership 
The non-monotonic relationship between fracinst and liquidity measures indicates two 
effects of institutions’ information advantage on liquidity. I use two additional 
variables that capture the degree of competition among institutions in order to further 
test the effect of information efficiency on liquidity. First, I use the natural log of the 
average number of institutions holding the security in a year (lnnuminst) as a measure 
of competition. Second, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, I measure 
                                                 
38 These findings are also robust to including either of square of log size and inverse of share price. All 
findings are robust to controlling for effects of share price using InvPrice instead of LnPrice.   
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concentration of institutional ownership in a firm, defining it as the sum of the squares 
of the ownership of each institution in the firm, where the ownership is expressed as a 
percentage of outstanding shares. Due to the positive skewness of the variable, I take 
its natural logarithm to obtain a measure of ownership concentration (lnhhi_inst). An 
increase in ownership concentration also implies a decrease in ownership dispersion. 
The two variables have a correlation of 0.45 in the sample while they exhibit 
correlations of 0.73 and 0.75 with fracinst respectively.  
Table 2.6 summarizes findings from the effects of competition among institutions and 
dispersion in their ownership on liquidity. The control variables used in these tests are 
identical to those used in Spec 6, Table 2.5, and estimates of the control variables have 
been suppressed for sake of brevity. Each specification is estimated using Spec 6 from 
Table 2.5 after excluding fracinst and sqfracinst and adding the variable listed here. 
Spec 7 in this table is thus equivalent to Spec 6 in Table 2.5 for the variable c_BMA. 
Spec 1 presents findings for effect of fracinst on liquidity and indicates that the effect 
of increased institutional holdings on liquidity is not consistent across the various 
liquidity measures. This inconsistency across the liquidity measures primarily results 
because of the non-monotonic relationship between c_BMA and fracinst found earlier. 
In Spec 2, I include lnnuminst and find strong evidence that liquidity increases with 
the number of institutions. The finding supports the effect of greater competition on 
liquidity and hints at the role institutions play in increasing information efficiency.
39 
Spec 3 tests the effect of institutional ownership concentration. Again, the findings are 
not consistent across the various liquidity measures and tend to indicate that liquidity 
increases with institutional ownership concentration, a surprising finding. This 
                                                 
39 I take the natural log transformation of the number of institutions (LnNumInst) and Herfindahl Index, 
and also use a log transformation for the Herfindahl Index (LnHHI_Inst) to reduce skewness. 
ResidFracinst is obtained by orthogonalizing fracinst with LnNumInst to make interpretation of the 
estimates easier.  
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situation can result because of the strong positive correlation between ownership 
concentration and institutional holdings.
40  
Table 2.6: Cross-sectional results: Determinants of liquidity—Alternate measures of 
institutional holdings.  Findings from cross-sectional regressions using other measures 
of institutional holdings are summarized. Findings are presented using institutional 
holdings, with number of institutions holding equity positions in the firm, and 
ownership concentration of institutions measured using a Herfindahl Index. Findings 
for other liquidity measures are presented. Estimates for other variables are suppressed 
to conserve space. Standard errors are clustered at the level of firm and time and 
presented below the estimates in italics. 
c_BMA ILLIQ RELESPR RELQSPR FracAS_GH
Spec 1 fracinst 0.0009*** 0.1009** -0.0006* -0.00043 0.0589***
0.00017 0.03855 0.00033 0.00045 0.01018
Spec 2 LnNumInst -0.0004*** -0.1139*** -0.0020*** -0.0018*** -0.0257***
0.00009 0.01762 0.00025 0.00037 0.00629
Spec 3 LnHHI_Inst -0.00006** -0.0214*** -0.00015*** -0.00001 0.00180
0.00003 0.00375 0.00004 0.00006 0.00201
Spec 4 fracinst 0.0013*** 0.2284*** 0.0011*** 0.00115** 0.0921***
0.00021 0.02985 0.00033 0.00051 0.01235
LnNumInst -0.0005*** -0.14537*** -0.00213*** -0.00198*** -0.04027***
0.00010 0.01865 0.00026 0.00039 0.00772
Spec 5 ResidFracinst 0.00097*** 0.24325*** 0.00103*** 0.00102** 0.08081***
0.00021 0.03012 0.00033 0.00048 0.01059
LnNumInst -0.00041*** -0.12132*** -0.002*** -0.00184*** -0.0291***
0.00010 0.01848 0.00025 0.00037 0.00660
Spec 6 LnNumInst -0.0004*** -0.1060*** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.03181***
0.00010 0.01727 0.00026 0.00038 0.00767
LnHHI_Inst -0.00001 -0.0066** 0.0001** 0.0003** 0.0059**
0.00003 0.00320 0.00005 0.00006 0.00252
Spec 7 fracinst -0.0026*** -0.465*** -0.00667*** -0.00566*** -0.0816***
0.00039 0.09764 0.00105 0.00162 0.02875
sqfracinst 0.0039*** 0.6108*** 0.00637*** 0.00545*** 0.1467***
0.00044 0.06756 0.00082 0.00133 0.02659
Dependent variable
Additional variable
 
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * 
indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance is reported based on two-tailed tests. 
                                                 
40 I do not find a significant relationship when including a square root transformation of the Herfindahl 
Index.  
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Table 2.7: Cross-sectional results: Determinants of liquidity—Other liquidity 
measures and testing methods.  Findings across different testing methods and using 
different measures of liquidity are summarized. Control variables from Spec 6 in 
Table 2.5 are used. Standard errors from pooled regression and with firm fixed 
estimates are clustered at level of firm and year. Both methods include year and 
industry fixed effects. Fama-Macbeth regression includes industry fixed effects and 
presents the time series mean of the coefficient estimates. The between-firm estimates 
are obtained from running a cross-sectional regression for mean values of the 
dependent and independent variables over time at firm level. White standard errors are 
reported in case of between-firm estimates. Estimates for other variables are 
suppressed for the sake of brevity. The standard errors are presented in italics below 
the estimates.   
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c_BMA ILLIQ RELESPR RELQSPR
Panel A: Pooled
fracinst -0.0026*** -0.465*** -0.0067*** -0.0057***
0.0004 0.0976 0.0011 0.0016
sqfracinst 0.0038*** 0.6108*** 0.0064*** 0.0055***
0.0004 0.0676 0.0008 0.0013
Adj. R2 59.92% 80.77% 74.18% 80.86%
Minimum point 34.3% 38.1% 52.4% 51.9%
Panel B: Firm fixed estimates
fracinst -0.0032*** -0.1945*** -0.0067*** -0.0060***
0.0004 0.0571 0.0012 0.0021
sqfracinst 0.0034*** 0.3299*** 0.0053*** 0.004**
0.0005 0.0457 0.0011 0.0018
Adj. R2 38.73% 55.27% 46.11% 59.76%
Minimum point 45.9% 29.5% 63.1% 75.3%
Panel C: Fama-Macbeth approach
fracinst -0.0009* -0.6005*** -0.0061*** -0.0055***
0.0005 0.0768 0.0009 0.0013
Neg (15 /Sig 7) Neg (23 /Sig 22) Neg (23 /Sig 15) Neg (16 /Sig 13)
sqfracinst 0.0014*** 0.7197*** 0.0062*** 0.0057***
0.0005 0.0657 0.0007 0.0009
Pos (17 /Sig 7) Pos (24 /Sig 23) Pos (22 /Sig 16) Pos (20 /Sig 14)
Adj. R2 56.10% 77.59% 67.94% 72.63%
N o .  o f  y e a r s 2 6 2 62 32 3
Minimum point 32.1% 41.7% 49.2% 48.2%
No. of observations 39701 39701 34575 34575
Panel D: Between firm estimates
fracinst -0.0021*** -0.44055*** -0.0058*** -0.0035**
0.0007 0.0588 0.0013 0.0017
sqfracinst 0.0034*** 0.75489*** 0.0038*** 0.00023
0.0007 0.0599 0.0011 0.0016
Adj. R2 66.28% 83.31% 76.77% 76.92%
Minimum point 30.9% 29.2% 75.2% 775.3%
No. of observations 4578 4578 4287 4287  
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * 
indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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Spec 4 includes both fracinst and lnnuminst to capture the effect of an increase in the 
level of institutional holdings and number of institutions. Both coefficients are 
significant at 1% level across all liquidity measures and indicate that liquidity declines 
with institutional holdings but increases with number of institutions. These findings 
are consistent with those from Spec 1 and Spec 2, indicating that multicollinearity is 
not an issue. The positive coefficient on fracinst supports the adverse selection 
hypothesis, indicating that liquidity declines with an increase in the level of 
institutional holdings. The negative coefficient on lnnuminst supports the information 
efficiency hypothesis, indicating that liquidity increases with growth in competition 
among institutions. In Spec 5, I address concern related to the correlation among 
institutional holdings and number of institutions by using the residual obtained from 
orthogonalizing  fracinst (residfracinst) to lnnuminst. Similar findings confirm that 
liquidity increases with number of institutions, while it decreases with institutional 
holdings, keeping the number of institutions constant. Spec 6 includes both lnnuminst 
and lnhhi_inst. Liquidity increases with number of institutions but tends to decline 
with institutional ownership concentration, though the effect of ownership 
concentration is not consistent across measures. These findings are consistent with 
those of Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999), where liquidity increases with 
ownership dispersion due to increased trading demand. However, since I obtain these 
findings after controlling for share turnover, I interpret the increase in liquidity 
associated with number of institutions as support for the information efficiency effect. 
Overall, these findings lend support to both adverse selection and information 
efficiency effects arising from institutions’ information advantage on liquidity.  
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3.2.3: Institutional ownership and adverse selection 
The previous subsections present evidence on adverse selection effect using measures 
of liquidity. The spread measures used to proxy liquidity also have components 
associated with order processing and maintaining inventory. These components do 
vary across firms but should be independent of the presence of informed investors. I 
therefore decompose bid-ask spreads and estimate the adverse selection component 
using a trade indicator model following the approach of Glosten and Harris (1988). 
The last column of Table 2.6 presents findings from cross-sectional regressions of the 
fraction of spread associated with adverse selection (fracas_gh)  and firm 
characteristics using control variables as in Spec 6 of Table 2.5. The variable 
fracas_gh increases with institutional holdings, while it decreases with number of 
institutions holding the stock. This finding suggests that with an increase in 
institutional ownership a higher fraction of the spread is associated with adverse 
selection. However, growth in competition among the institutions increases the 
information efficiency effect, resulting in lowering of the adverse selection 
component. The finding indicates that the two effects of adverse selection and 
information efficiency effects are related and is consistent with the prediction in 
Mendelson and Tunca (2004) where they indicate that an increase in information 
efficiency can result in a lowering of adverse selection effect.  
3.2.4: Other findings 
The estimates on control variables are broadly consistent with earlier findings in the 
literature and across different measures of liquidity. Spreads increase with volatility 
and contemporaneous returns, while they decrease with share turnover, dividend yield, 
share price, number of blocks, and inclusion in major indices. The significant positive 
coefficient on volatility indicates that spreads increase and liquidity declines with an  
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increase in asset risk. Larger firms are more liquid, consistent with their having more 
visibility among investors, greater analyst and media coverage, and greater breadth of 
ownership. Firms with higher past returns have higher liquidity or lower spreads 
subsequently, while firms with higher returns contemporaneously seem to have higher 
spreads. Liquidity is lower for high-growth firms, an effect perhaps resulting from 
higher information uncertainty about them. The effect of inclusion of firms in the Dow 
Jones Index or the S&P 500 Index on liquidity varies across specification, and is 
sensitive to inclusion of other control variables. Similarly, the evidence on effect of 
analyst coverage on liquidity is not robust and therefore I refrain from drawing any 
inferences. 
SECTION 3.3: ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
3.3.1: Additional testing methods  
I test robustness of the results obtained in Section 3.2.1 using alternative estimation 
methods and other liquidity measures. The control variables are identical to those used 
in Spec 6 of Table 2.5. I summarize findings in Table 2.7 by reporting the coefficients 
for variables of interest (fracinst and sqfracinst), number of firms in the subgroups and 
adjusted R
2. The estimates based on within-firm variation obtained using firm fixed 
effects, estimates obtained using between firm variation, and those obtained from the 
Fama-Macbeth approach are very similar. The minimum point of liquidity across 
different measures and estimation techniques is around institutional ownership levels 
of 35%–50%. The consistency in results across other liquidity measures (ILLIQ, 
RELQSPR  and RELESPR) and estimation techniques indicates both robustness of  
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findings and suggests that unobserved firm-specific effects are not biasing the main 
conclusions.
41 
 
Depth conveys another dimension of liquidity and refers to shares that an investor can 
buy and sell at the quoted prices. An increase in depth is associated with improvement 
in liquidity. I test the relationship between depth posted by the market maker and 
fracinst and find that the coefficient on fracinst is significantly positive while that of 
sqfracinst is significantly negative, suggesting that depth initially increases with 
fracinst and subsequently starts declining.  
3.3.2: Testing for non-monotonicity 
I use four additional estimation methods to allay three concerns related to the non-
monotonic relationship between fracinst and measures of liquidity. The first concern is 
that the relationship is convex instead of U-shaped, while the second arises due to a 
lower bound of zero on the illiquidity measures. The third concern exists from 
collinearity among various independent variables.  
The first two methods use slope dummies and the piecewise linear regression 
approach from Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). The findings from the slope 
dummies approach indicate that the slope coefficient monotonically increases from a 
significantly negative value for firms with low institutional ownership to a 
significantly positive value for firms with high institutional ownership. The results are 
further robust to changing the number of groups, using different measures of liquidity, 
                                                 
41 I also estimate the firm fixed effects regression after eliminating firms with less than 10 years of data. 
Similar findings indicate that dynamic panel data bias is not influencing the results. On regressing 
changes in liquidity on changes in the level of ownership (delfracinst) and an interaction term of 
delfracinst and fracinst, I find that the coefficient on delfracinst was negative and significant while that 
on the interaction term was positive and significant. These results further confirm the non-monotonic 
effect found earlier.  
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and forming a separate group for firms with no institutional ownership. The findings 
from piecewise linear regression approach are very similar to findings from the slope 
dummies approach.  
To address the second concern of a lower bound of zero on the illiquidity measures, I 
take the natural log of the illiquidity measures and carry out the tests using the 
transformed measures. Similar findings indicate that the non-monotonic relationship is 
not an artifact of the lower bound on the spread measures and the relationship is, in 
fact, U shaped. 
To address the third concern and ensure the robustness of results to correlation among 
various independent variables and a naturally strong correlation among fracinst and 
sqfracinst, I use a semiparametric approach. I first estimate the residuals from the 
regression of liquidity measure against other control variables using a linear model (by 
excluding fracinst and sqfracinst and other potentially endogenous variables volatility, 
turnover,  and annret). I subsequently test the relationship between the estimated 
residuals and fracinst nonparametrically. I divide firms into 15 groups based on the 
fraction of institutional ownership and calculate both the mean value of residuals for 
firms in each group and fracinst.
42 
Figure 2.2 plots the mean value of residuals for firms in each group and the 95% 
confidence interval for the residuals against both mean value of fracinst and rank for 
the respective group (group number). The first two groups have zero institutional 
ownership, and I therefore combine the two groups. Since I include an indicator 
                                                 
42 A fully nonparametric approach is not feasible due to the curse of dimensionality as there are a large 
number of control variables and time fixed effects. The approach used here is similar to a partial linear 
model.   
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variable for presence of institutions, the mean value of the residuals for the first two 
groups is zero. We can observe a significant U-shaped relationship between the mean 
value of the residuals and mean values of fracinst, and also observe a minimum point 
in a similar range as found earlier. The left axis indicates the mean value of the 
residuals for the groups. The right axis indicates the mean value of the residuals scaled 
by average c_BMA measure for the entire sample, thus indicating the economic effect 
in percentage terms. The figure allays concerns related to multicollinearity and 
indicates that the mean residuals are significantly positive for firms with high 
institutional ownership.
43 
3.3.3: Sub-sample tests 
I further test robustness of results by partitioning the sample into groups based on firm 
characteristics and carry out the tests using Spec 6 from Table 2.5. This approach 
assists in checking stability of parameters and existence of significant interaction 
effects that may influence the main results. 
The results are robust to splitting the sample into equal subperiods 1980–1992 and 
1993–2005 and are further robust to analyzing data prior to reduction of tick size, from 
1/8
th to 1/16
th, in 1997 and after the reduction. Consistent findings across these sub-
periods and findings from the Fama-Macbeth approach indicate stability of estimates 
over time and further suggest that an increase in assets under management with hedge 
funds and/or increase in assets with passively managed index funds are not influencing 
                                                 
43 The plot is very similar when residuals from a regression of logarithmic transformation of c_BMA are 
used, indicating that the results are not an artifact of having a lower bound of zero on the illiquidity 
measures. Findings from varying the number of groups and using other measures of liquidity are also 
similar. If I plot the residuals for liquidity measure against residuals from ownership obtained from 
regressing both on other control variables, as in a partitioned regression, no significant pattern emerges, 
indicating that non-monotonicity tends to mask the relationship. The findings are similar when 
controlling for volatility, turnover, and annret and when using other specifications for estimating 
residuals.  
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the results. The findings are very similar when analyzing separately the firms from 
NYSE and AMEX, when excluding firms with missing institutional ownership, and 
when excluding firms belonging to the financial and utilities sector (SIC codes 
belonging to 6000–6999 and 4900–4949, respectively).
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Figure 2.2: Residuals from c_BMA against level of institutional ownership (fracinst) 
In addition, I group firms based on various characteristics, which institutions consider 
attractive when making investment decisions, and test whether the effect of 
institutional ownership on liquidity is consistent across these groups. I form groups 
based on the following firm characteristics: size, dividend yield, analyst coverage, 
positive cash flows, stock price, volatility, turnover, number of analysts, and existence 
of common stock ranking and credit rating. The non-monotonic relationship is evident 
                                                 
44 In addition, I looked at different industry classifications based on 1-digit and 2-digit SIC codes. The 
findings are not affected by the classification choice.  
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across all subsamples, further reducing some concern that the relationship between 
liquidity and institutional holdings results from institutional preferences for certain 
stock characteristics. Some differences in parameter estimates across groups based on 
size and volatility are evident, suggesting that the effect of institutional ownership on 
liquidity varies with the amount of publicly available information and asset risk. I 
explore these interaction effects in more detail in the next section. 
SECTION 3.4: INTERACTION EFFECT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AND ASSET RISK ON 
LIQUIDITY  
The amount of public information available and asset risk can influence trading 
decisions of investors and thereby affect liquidity. I explore this possibility by 
examining the differences in effects of institutional ownership on liquidity across 
firms with varying amounts of public information and asset risk. For the sake of 
conciseness, I present the findings using only two measures of liquidity. I selected 
c_BMA and ILLIQ as they are available for the longest duration. 
3.4.1: Effect of publicly available information 
Information advantage of institutions can vary with public information availability. I 
therefore contend that with increases in available public information, the effect of 
institutions on liquidity through the two channels of increasing information efficiency 
and adverse selection will be attenuated. The resulting prediction is that with an 
increase in public information, the relationship between institutional ownership and 
liquidity will become less convex. I examine this interaction effect using two variables 
that proxy for increase in public information about the firm: analyst following and 
firm size. I create interaction terms of the two variables with institutional ownership 
variables fracinst and lnnuminst and their squared terms, respectively. I then add the  
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interacted variables to the pooled regression (Spec 6, Table 2.5) for testing the effect 
of public information availability on the relationship between institutional ownership 
and liquidity.  
Panel A of Table 2.8 indicates that the coefficient on lnnuminst*Size is positive and 
significant while that on sqlnnuminst*Size is negative and significant. The findings are 
similar when using number of analysts to measure information availability and are 
robust across other measures of liquidity. Results from the interaction of these 
variables with institutional ownership level, fracinst, tend to be somewhat consistent 
but are not statistically significant. Overall, the findings support that an increase in 
public information attenuates both the information efficiency and adverse selection 
effects and, in addition, reduces the effect of information advantage of institutions on 
liquidity.
45  
3.4.2: Effect of asset risk 
Mendelson and Tunca (2004) indicate that in the presence of a single informed trader, 
the effect of adverse selection on liquidity is enhanced with greater risk and 
uncertainty about firm value. In the presence of multiple informed traders acting 
strategically, the findings are not entirely obvious. It seems reasonable to expect that 
the role informed investors will play in reducing uncertainty will be larger when the 
asset is more risky. I therefore argue that both adverse selection and information 
                                                 
45 On partitioning the firms into groups based on size of the firm and number of analysts I find that the 
coefficient on fracinst is negative and larger in magnitude for smaller firms and fewer analysts 
compared to those for larger firms and more analysts. In unreported results, on forming five groups 
based on size of the firm each year and estimating the coefficients on fracinst and sqfracinst separately 
for each size group, the coefficients on fracinst are negative and significant and those on sqfracinst are 
positive and significant for all the size groups. The coefficient on fracinst decreases in magnitude with 
size of the group, while that on sqfracinst has similar magnitude across the groups. The findings are 
identical when using natural log of sales as a measure for size of the firm and are qualitatively similar 
when using age of the firm as a measure of information availability.  
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efficiency effects on liquidity arising from an institution’s information advantage will 
be enhanced for firms with higher risk. The resulting prediction is that with increase in 
firm risk, the relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity will become 
more convex. To examine this interaction effect, I use two variables that are associated 
with increases in asset risk and uncertainty about firm value: return volatility and 
analyst forecast dispersion. As in the previous subsection, I test the effect of asset risk 
on the relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity using the interaction 
terms in the pooled regression.  
Panel B of Table 2.8 indicates that the coefficient of fracinst*Volatility is negative and 
significant while that on sqfracinst*Volatility is positive and significant. The findings 
are similar when using analyst forecast dispersion to measure uncertainty about firm 
value. However, the coefficients on the main effects lnnuminst and sqlnnuminst lose 
significance when interaction terms with volatility are included, while the interaction 
terms with analyst forecast dispersion are not statistically significant. Overall, these 
findings support that an increase in asset risk enhances both information efficiency 
and adverse selection effects and increases the effect of information advantage of 
institutions on liquidity.
46  
                                                 
46 These findings are largely consistent with findings in the robustness section in which I estimated 
coefficients on fracinst and sqfracinst separately for groups based on volatility. I found that for firms 
with higher volatility, the adverse selection effect on liquidity tends to be higher, as indicated by a 
larger coefficient on sqfracinst. The coefficient on fracinst was slightly more negative.   
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Table 2.8: Interaction effect with available public information and asset risk.  Findings 
to test for the differential effects of institutional ownership on liquidity across firms 
with varying public information availability and asset risk are presented. Panel A 
presents the effect of public information availability. Panel B presents the effects of 
asset risk. The tests are carried out using Spec 6 from Table 2.5. Estimates for other 
variables are suppressed for the sake of conciseness. The variable c_BMA is the Gibbs 
sampler estimate obtained from Joel Hasbrouck; ILLIQ, square root of the Amihud’s 
measure of illiquidity [Absolute(ret)/Volume]; LnNumInst is defined as log (number 
of institutions); SqLnNumInst, square of LnNumInst;  NumEst, number of analysts 
following the firm; ForecastDev, standard deviation of the analyst forecasts. Standard 
errors are clustered at the level of firm and time and presented below the estimates in 
italics.   
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Panel A: Differential effect of public information availability
Variable c_BMA ILLIQ c_BMA ILLIQ c_BMA ILLIQ
Spec 1 Spec 3 Spec 5
LnNumInst -0.0028*** -0.6920*** LnNumInst -0.0021*** -0.3552*** LnNumInst -0.00166 -0.4258***
0.00047 0.04318 0.00037 0.04457 0.00030 0.05362
SqLnNumInst -0.0002** 0.01615* SqLnNumInst 0.00028*** 0.03116*** SqLnNumInst 0.00021 0.0496***
0.00009 0.00944 0.00005 0.00487 0.00004 0.00493
LnNumInst*LnSize 0.00104*** 0.1633*** LnNumInst*NumEst 0.0005*** 0.19335*** LnNumInst*log(1+Age) 0.00010 0.0121***
0.00011 0.01312 0.00016 0.01361 0.00003 0.00258
SqLnNumInst*LnSize -0.00004*** -0.00945*** SqLnNumInst*NumEst -0.0001*** -0.0184*** SqLnNumInst*log(1+Age) -0.00002 -0.0024***
0.00001 0.00088 0.00002 0.00164 0.00001 0.00049
Spec 2 Spec 4 Spec 6
fracinst -0.0055*** -1.2899*** fracinst -0.0026*** -0.8823*** fracinst -0.0031*** -0.5059***
0.0017 0.1414 0.0007 0.1212 0.0005 0.1092
sqfracinst 0.0029 1.4123*** sqfracinst 0.00343*** 0.9024*** sqfracinst 0.0042*** 0.6361***
0.0021 0.1995 0.0009 0.1100 0.0005 0.0818
fracinst*LnSize 0.0006*** 0.1355*** fracinst*NumEst 0.0001 0.3419*** fracinst*log(1+Age) 0.0002 0.0138
0.0002 0.0174 0.0003 0.0415 0.0001 0.0122
sqfracinst*LnSize -0.0001 -0.1355*** sqfracinst*NumEst 0.0001 -0.2748*** sqfracinst*log(1+Age) -0.0001 -0.0083
0.0003 0.0277 0.0004 0.0431 0.0002 0.0167
Panel B: Differential effect of asset risk
Variable c_BMA ILLIQ c_BMA ILLIQ
Spec 1 Spec 3
LnNumInst 0.00020 -0.2147*** LnNumInst -0.0014*** -0.3707***
0.00052 0.04949 0.00029 0.05117
SqLnNumInst -0.00004 0.0204*** SqLnNumInst 0.00015*** 0.0395***
0.00006 0.00558 0.00003 0.00459
LnNumInst*Volatility -0.0600*** -6.765*** LnNumInst*ForecastDev -0.00005 -0.1054***
0.01456 2.07049 0.00014 0.01142
SqLnNumInst*Volatility 0.0075*** 0.8971*** SqLnNumInst*ForecastDev -0.00001 0.0223***
0.00194 0.23978 0.00003 0.00245
Spec 2 Spec 4
fracinst -0.0002 -0.2105* fracinst -0.0025*** -0.4372***
0.0008 0.1152 0.0004 0.0965
sqfracinst 0.0013* 0.2311** sqfracinst 0.0036*** 0.5575***
0.0008 0.1039 0.0005 0.0665
fracinst*Volatility -0.1078*** -11.1983*** fracinst*ForecastDev -0.0024*** -0.3373***
0.0350 3.5084 0.0009 0.0692
sqfracinst*Volatility 0.1101*** 16.7331*** sqfracinst*ForecastDev 0.0036** 0.7011***
0.0374 4.5244 0.0015 0.1106  
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance 
is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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SECTION 4: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND INFORMATION 
EFFICIENCY 
In this section, I test the implications arising from the effect of information efficiency 
on liquidity in an intraday context. In both sequential trade and multi-period strategic 
trader models, prices incorporate more information as trading progresses. Liquidity 
increases (spreads decline) with information efficiency of prices, while growth in 
competition among the informed traders enhances the rate at which spreads decline 
during the day. The net effect is that for firms with a greater number of informed 
traders, spreads should start out higher and exhibit a larger decline over the day, 
relative to firms with fewer informed traders holding everything else equal. I test this 
claim of Hypothesis 3 by looking at the intraday patterns in spreads and examine the 
relationship between changes in spreads and fraction of equity held by institutions. 
Figure 2.3 presents a plot of changes in quoted spreads for five groups of firms based 
on their level of institutional ownership. I first calculate spreads for firms for each 10-
minute interval starting at 9:30 AM (a total of 39 intervals).
47 I then calculate mean 
decline in spreads for firms in each group and plot it against time intervals. The plot 
indicates that across all groups spreads decline as trading progresses during the day; 
the decline is higher for firms with larger fracinst. The rate of decline in spreads is 
higher at the beginning of the day consistent with the claim that liquidity increases as 
prices become more informationally efficient. The familiar inverse J-shaped 
relationship for intraday spread measures, shown in McInish and Wood (1992) is 
                                                 
47 I carry out the intraday analysis using data for four years at four-year intervals (1986, 1990, 1994, and 
1998). Data for 1986 and 1990 come from ISSM database while that for 1994 and 1998 come from 
TAQ database. I selected only four years due to extensive computational requirements. The findings for 
individual years are similar.   
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evident, though the evidence on increase in spreads near the end of the trading day is 
not as strong.
48 
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Figure 2.3: Intraday pattern–Decline in quoted spreads at different IO Levels 
I obtain similar results when dividing the firms into five quintiles based on the number 
of institutions.
49 Figure 2.4 presents a similar plot, along with 95% confidence 
intervals for the percentage changes in quoted spreads, for firms belonging to the 
bottom and top quintiles. The plot indicates a statistically significant difference in the 
intraday decline across the two quintiles, with the decline being larger for firms with a 
greater number of institutions.  
                                                 
48 These findings are robust to using other measures of liquidity (effective spread, time weighted quoted 
spreads, and their versions scaled by share prices). 
49 Number of institutions is a better measure to capture the degree of competition.  
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Figure 2.4: Intraday pattern–Decline in quoted spreads for different number of 
institutions 
Table 2.9 presents findings from cross-sectional regressions between percentage 
change in liquidity measures and level of institutional ownership. I control for various 
firm characteristics that are associated with information environment of firm and asset 
risk. Intraday change in liquidity for firms is calculated by taking the percentage 
change in the average spreads from the first half hour of trading (9:30 AM to 10:00 
AM) to the half hour of trading prior to noon (11:30 AM to 12:00 PM). The table also 
presents findings with respect to changes in spreads from the first 10-minute interval 
(9:30 AM to 9:40 AM) and spreads half an hour later (10:10 AM to 10:20 AM). The 
positive and significant coefficient of fracinst indicates that the percentage decline in 
spreads during the day increases with institutional ownership. Another interesting 
observation is that spreads decline more for high-growth firms. This suggests that 
there is greater private information for high-growth firms at start of trading. These  
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findings are also robust to first calculating the percentage change every day and 
subsequently taking an average for the firm over the year.
 These findings indicate a 
reduction in spreads as trading progresses during the day, with larger declines 
observed for firms with higher institutional ownership and greater number of 
institutions. The result supports the role institutional investors’ play in increasing 
information efficiency and suggests that competition among them can result in an 
increase in liquidity. The finding is consistent with the prediction of Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992), where informed traders have correlated signals about the value 
of the asset causing an increase in competition and faster incorporation of information 
into prices.
50 The findings are also consistent with those of Boehmer and Kelley 
(2007) who find that institutional holdings and institutional trading improve price 
efficiency using a different methodology. 
SECTION 5: ENDOGENEITY OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND 
CAUSALITY  
So far in this chapter, I have assumed that the level of institutional holdings in a firm 
is exogenously set and independent of the liquidity of the firm’s shares. Falkenstein 
(1996); Gompers and Metrick (2001); and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) use cross-
sectional analysis to show institutional preference for large liquid stocks. However, 
these studies view liquidity as exogenous. For example, Falkenstein (1996) uses 
monthly share turnover to measure liquidity and treats it as an exogenous variable 
when looking for preference of mutual funds.
51  Another possible concern is that 
                                                 
50 In Back, Cao and Willard (2000) when informed investors have imperfectly correlated signals, 
competition does not necessarily improve information efficiency. A large amount of private information 
remains near the end of the trading day, and authors argue that market will learn more from a 
monopolist than competing informed traders. 
51 My findings presented later in this section suggest that turnover measure of institutional portfolios is 
a persistent characteristic and institutional ownership Granger causes share turnover measures.  
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institutions select stocks based on characteristics that are correlated with future 
liquidity. For example Chan and Lakonishok (1995) indicate that large institutions try 
to incorporate the price impact of their trades when selecting their trading strategy, 
thus implying that trade by institutions influences price impact measures, and hence 
liquidity. However, if institutional preference for liquid stocks were determining the 
earlier results, we would instead expect a negative linear relationship between fracinst 
and liquidity measures. The robust non-monotonic relationship therefore suggests that 
there exists more to the link between liquidity and institutional ownership and that the 
relationship could be jointly endogenous. Also, the robustness of findings to including 
firm fixed effects reduces the concern that effects associated with unobserved firm 
characteristics are biasing the relationship between liquidity and fracinst.  
In this section, I test for causality in the time series context in an attempt to mitigate 
the concern related to institutional preference for liquid stocks. I explore the 
intertemporal association between stocks’ liquidity and the fraction of shares held by 
institutions. Liquidity measures and institutional ownership of firms are highly 
persistent after accounting for time trends when examined using transition matrices. 
Controlling for endogeneity is a challenge due to difficulty in identifying exogenous 
changes in institutional ownership levels and finding valid external instruments. The 
strong persistence in the endogenous variables also result in weak internal instruments 
(lagged values of endogenous variables).
52 Following a firm over time and examining 
                                                 
52 I used the system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) for panels with a large number of firms and a small time dimension as an additional 
robustness measure. The system GMM approach combines two approaches for handling the firm fixed 
effects and dealing with potentially endogenous variables, while avoiding the dynamic panel bias. It 
estimates a combination of two sets of equations, first in differences to remove the firm fixed effect and 
second in levels. For the difference equation, deeper lags of both dependent and endogenous variables 
are used as instruments. To expunge the fixed effects from the level equation, the system GMM also 
introduces differences in the endogenous variable as instruments, under the assumption that changes in 
the endogenous variables are uncorrelated with the firm fixed effect under suitable stationarity 
conditions [Anderson and Hsiao (1982)]. The instrument set is created following the procedure  
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the association between changes in institutional ownership and stocks’ liquidity helps 
provide some evidence on the direction of causality in a time series context. I employ 
Granger causality tests to identify the lead-lag relationship between liquidity and 
institutional ownership, making use of quarterly data of institutional ownership 
available over the period 1983–2005.  
For the Granger causality tests, I use the liquidity measures based on the intraday 
trading data from ISSM/TAQ (RELESPR and RELQSPR) and aggregate the data to a 
quarterly frequency, as institutional ownership data is available quarterly for each 
firm. Using quarterly data for the time series tests helps increase the number of 
observations in time series. Other data filters are similar to those reported in Section 2. 
The panel spans 1983–2005 and has data on 81,962 firm quarters for 3,055 firms after 
retaining firms with a minimum of ten quarters of consecutive data available. I refrain 
from making the panel balanced for most tests, as doing so leads to a sizable reduction 
in the number of firms. I first test whether the time series of institutional ownership 
and liquidity measures are trend stationary using various unit root tests available for 
panel data. I strongly reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in fracinst and both 
liquidity measures with P-values of less than 0.0001 across different tests.
53  
                                                                                                                                              
suggested by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), which increases number of available instruments. 
The system is then estimated as a single equation, under the assumption that the same functional 
relationship applies to both the transformed (differenced) and untransformed (level) variables. The 
findings from the system GMM approach using various specifications and both quoted and effective 
spreads are very similar to those obtained from the cross-sectional regressions earlier. However, the 
persistence in both liquidity and ownership variables results in weak instruments, making it difficult to 
address the endogeneity problem. These findings are available from the author. 
53 Similar results are obtained using a balanced panel.  
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Table 2.9: Intraday pattern in liquidity–Information efficiency effect.  Cross-sectional 
results from regression of percentage decline in spreads against institutional ownership 
level are presented. Spec 1 and Spec 2 use percentage decline in spreads from first half 
hour of trading to half hour of trading prior to 12 PM as dependent variable. Spreads 
are first calculated for each firm over 30-minute intervals for each day in a year, and 
then taking an average of the spread measure is calculated over the year. Spec 3 and 
Spec 4 use percentage decline in spreads from first 10 minutes of trading to those 
prevailing half an hour after the end of the first 10 minutes. Percentage decline is 
calculated by measuring the change in the average spread (quoted spread and effective 
spread) measures over the year during those time intervals. Intraday data for four years 
(1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998) at intervals of four years are used in the analysis to 
reduce computational requirements. All specifications include year and industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of firm and time and presented below 
the estimates in italics.  
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Variable Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4
Constant 0.00968 0.10208*** -0.05031*** 0.02467
0.0203 0.0296 0.0051 0.0241
fracinst 0.0153** 0.00955* 0.02454** 0.02847***
0.0077 0.0050 0.0107 0.0104
price 0.00003 0.00045* -0.00006 0.00023
0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
lnsize 0.00303 -0.00644 0.00998*** 0.00157
0.0023 0.0045 0.0016 0.0031
volatility 0.34972 0.02269 0.41441** 0.26455
0.2805 0.3239 0.1858 0.3795
turnover 0.01383*** 0.00551 0.02135*** 0.01061*
0.0012 0.0060 0.0021 0.0059
booktomkt -0.00503*** -0.00955*** -0.00201 -0.01166**
0.0024 0.0024 0.0020 0.0053
mktlev 0.01186*** -0.00317 0.01597 -0.01642
0.0040 0.0046 0.0106 0.0111
numblocks -0.00089 0.00228 -0.00175 -0.00093
0.0009 0.0024 0.0018 0.0038
sp500dummy -0.01456* -0.01548*** -0.00708 -0.01063**
0.0076 0.0034 0.0069 0.0049
djdummy -0.03217*** -0.01179 -0.04511*** -0.02709*
0.0096 0.0112 0.0142 0.0147
% decline measured 
over the periods
Liquidity measure QSPR ESPR QSPR ESPR
Adj. R2 40.6% 20.5% 38.7% 14.7%
No. of observations 4729 4755 4729 4755
No. of parameters 23 23 23 23
F-Value 137.62 64.37 137.62 50.66
(9:30 AM to 10:00 AM) - 
(11:30 AM to 12:00 PM)
( 9:30 AM to 9:40 AM) -  
(10:10 AM to 10:20 AM)
 
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * 
indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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Having recognized that the time series are trend stationary, I test whether changes in 
fracinst lead to changes in liquidity, and vice versa, using the Granger causality tests. 
I estimate pooled regressions and include additional control variables from the cross-
sectional study to control for effect of other time-varying variables on liquidity 
measures. I also include time fixed effects for each quarter to account for time trends 
in both liquidity measures and fracinst as well as to prevent structural changes from 
biasing the results. I test for Granger causality using the specifications given below.
54 
To test if fracinst (Granger) causes Liq (liquidity measures), I test the joint hypothesis 
that δ1= δ2= δ3= …….=δn are all equal to zero, by using both standard F test and 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). To test if Liq (Granger) causes fracinst, I test 
the joint hypothesis that η1= η2= η3= ……= ηn are all equal to zero. Since right-hand 
side variables in equations 2 and 3 are identical, I use OLS to estimate the equations 
separately.
55  
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54 To reduce the possible combinations to be estimated, I follow the standard practice of restricting the 
lag lengths of both fracinst and liquidity measures to be equal, and sufficient such that uit is a white 
noise term. I test whether residuals are a white noise using the portmanteau statistic for a multivariate 
time series following Granger and Newbold (1986) and combine tests across firms following the 
approach of Fisher’s test. Findings from the system GMM approach also indicate no second order 
autocorrelation among the first differenced residuals. 
55 OLS is efficient in this case. Only in case of Spec 3, when I include sqfracinst and its lagged values 
in equation 2, OLS will not be efficient, even though it will still be a consistent estimator. Since I 
include time fixed effects for each quarter in both the equations, the correlation between the error terms 
from the two equations should be small due to a well-specified model, suggesting that the loss in 
efficiency will be small.  
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Table 2.10 presents the findings from testing whether institutional ownership 
(Granger) causes liquidity using both relative quoted spread (RELQSPR) and relative 
effective spread (RELESPR) as liquidity measures, while Table 2.11 presents findings 
from reverse causality tests. Spec 1 includes lagged values of both returns and 
volatility and further includes other contemporaneous control variables used in the 
cross-sectional study.
56 Spec 2 modifies Spec 1 by including lagged values of turnover 
measured on a quarterly basis, while excluding the contemporaneous turnover 
measure; Spec 3 modifies Spec 2 by including the lagged values of sqfracinst in order 
to account for the nonlinear effects when testing effects of institutional ownership on 
illiquidity. I strongly reject the hypothesis that institutional ownership does not 
(Granger) cause liquidity when using lags of the orders of 1 to 10, using both F tests 
and likelihood ratio tests using BIC for comparing the fit between the unrestricted and 
restricted models. The test for incremental lag lengths indicates that five to six lags are 
sufficient to capture the dynamic behavior. In most cases, the P-values from F tests are 
less than 0.001. On including sqfracinst in Spec 3, I observe a significant 
improvement in model fit at all lag lengths, when comparing model fit with the 
unrestricted case of Spec 2. The findings are similar across the two measures of 
liquidity. Investors may use trading volume and turnover as a metric for liquidity and 
prefer stocks with high turnover. Therefore, I test robustness of the Granger causality 
tests using turnover as a measure of liquidity. I find strong evidence indicating that 
fracinst ( Granger) causes turnover, while only weak evidence suggesting that 
turnover (Granger) causes  fracinst. On testing whether measures of liquidity 
RELQSPR or RELESPR (Granger) causes fracinst (Table 2.11), I fail to reject the 
                                                 
56 Number of analysts, size at end of quarter, share turnover in the quarter, both natural log and inverse 
of average share price during the quarter, book-to-market ratio, dividend yield during the year, market 
leverage, profitability, R&D by sales and indicator variables for positive dividend payout, R&D 
expenses, existence of S&P common stock rating, and inclusion in the Dow Jones Industrial Index and 
the S&P 500 Index.  
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hypothesis that liquidity does not (Granger) cause fracinst using the F test, but reject 
the hypothesis on using BIC as model selection criterion. Only weak evidence of 
reverse causality exists, and the evidence tends to weaken with inclusion of higher 
order lags.
57 
Overall, these findings indicate a strong effect of institutional ownership on future 
liquidity, robust to inclusion of higher-order lags of liquidity measures. Only weak 
evidence exists supporting the notion that liquidity affects future institutional 
ownership. Many other specifications give similar results—the qualitative results are 
not sensitive to the lag order and exclusion of variables that may be considered 
endogenous such as volatility, turnover, number of analysts, and dividend yields. 
These findings suggest that the relationship between institutional ownership and 
liquidity is not a result of institutional preference for liquid stocks. Ownership by 
institutions appears to have a direct effect on the information structure of the firm and 
thus appears to play a role in determining liquidity. 
SECTION 6: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP TYPE AND LIQUIDITY 
This section further examines the effect of heterogeneity among institutions on 
liquidity. Institutional investors have varying incentive structures and fiduciary duties, 
and even different investment horizons [Bushee (1998), Bushee and Noe (2000)]. To 
better understand the effect of institution type on liquidity, I classify institutions into 
groups based on portfolio holding and trading characteristics. I examine the effect of 
institutions’ investment horizon and risk aversion measured using portfolio 
                                                 
57 The findings in this section are also robust to using the F-M framework and running a VAR for each 
quarter using cross-sectional variation for identification of the parameters. I test model fit using F tests 
and find strong evidence that fracinst (Granger) causes liquidity. I only find weak evidence in favor of 
reverse causality. Also, on summing up the coefficients for lagged values of fracinst and sqfracinst, the 
sums are negative for fracinst and positive for sqfracinst. Results are also robust to excluding size of the 
firm, as institutions may use size of the firm as a proxy for liquidity.  
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concentration on liquidity. Ideally, I would like to classify the institutions at the fund 
level as each reporting institution may have different types of funds with different 
objectives; however, the reporting entity being the institution precludes this choice.  
SECTION 6.1: INVESTOR HORIZON 
I use institutional holdings data from CDA/Spectrum as of the end of the quarter and 
estimate measures of portfolio turnover for each institution. The rationale for using 
portfolio turnover as a means for classifying institutions is that short-term investors 
will buy and sell their investments frequently, while long-term investors will hold their 
positions unchanged for a considerable period. To implement this idea empirically, I 
follow the approach proposed by Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) to estimate 
portfolio turnover measures of the institutions. Yan and Zhang (2009) also use this 
approach to classify institutions as short-term and long-term and, subsequently, show 
that trading by short-term institutions forecasts future stock returns. The turnover 
measures exhibit considerable persistence over time, indicating that institutions do not 
typically change their investment horizon and trading habits (Table 2.12).
58  
                                                 
58 I divide institutions into 3 groups based on the measure of their portfolio turnover, with group 1 
having the lowest turnover and group 3 having the largest. Subsequently, I calculate transition 
probabilities for each group, i.e., the probability that next year the institutions would fall into the three 
turnover groups after conditioning on this year’s rank. Finally, I take the time series average across all 
years. In Table 2.12, I find that one year onward the probability of staying in the same group remains 
considerably higher (60%–65%) than the probability of switching to one of the other two groups 
(unconditional probability should be 33%). Similar results are observed when dividing the institutions 
into more groups.  
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Table 2.10: Granger causality tests: Institutional ownership causes liquidity.  Results 
from testing whether institutional ownership Granger causes liquidity measures are 
presented. Spec 1 includes lagged values of returns and volatility of returns and other 
contemporaneous control variables used in the cross-sectional study (Spec 6, Table 
2.5). Spec 2 includes lagged values of share turnover measured on a quarterly basis 
and excludes the contemporaneous turnover measure, while Spec 3 includes both the 
lagged values of share turnover and squared term of the fraction of institutional 
ownership to account for the nonlinear effects when testing effects of institutional 
ownership on illiquidity. There are 81,962 firm quarters used in the estimation. Firms 
with data available for less than 10 consecutive quarters are eliminated from the study. 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is used for model selection as it penalizes free 
parameters more strongly than does Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
  
 
7
4
No. of 
Lags
Unrestricted 
(includes 
Fracinstqtr and 
lagged values 
of it)
Restricted 
(excludes 
Fracinstqtr and 
lagged values 
of it)
F-Test Unrestricted 
(includes 
Fracinstqtr and 
lagged values 
of it)
Restricted 
(excludes 
Fracinstqtr and 
lagged values 
of it)
F-Test Rest 
versus 
Unrestri
cted
BIC BIC BIC BIC
Spec 1
1 102 629 717 106.40 87.97 3362 4016 674.99 654.28
2 106 567 651 58.87 41.56 15 1561 2076 274.89 257.53 450
3 110 554 613 36.80 19.86 3 510 915 151.57 135.17 263
4 114 280 335 30.55 13.75 68 101 440 100.78 84.75 102
5 118 194 238 25.53 8.82 22 -105 178 72.30 56.47 52
6 122 125 146 20.18 3.54 17 -219 14 54.53 38.83 29
7 126 131 133 16.79 0.20 -2 -297 -106 42.86 27.25 19
8 130 151 139 15.04 -1.52 -5 -294 -136 35.44 19.87 -1
9 134 -80 -106 13.61 -2.92 58 -281 -150 30.10 14.59 -3
10 138 42 0 12.28 -4.21 -31 -113 0 26.77 11.30 -42
Spec 2
1 102 531 743 230.67 211.83 3397 4069 692.72 671.86
2 107 477 688 123.06 105.53 11 1618 2158 287.45 269.99 356
3 112 454 638 78.18 61.10 4 571 1009 162.58 146.11 210
4 117 156 339 62.73 45.82 60 162 538 110.14 94.06 82
5 122 109 278 50.64 33.85 9 -48 278 81.00 65.12 42
6 127 48 194 41.15 24.44 12 -180 101 62.58 46.84 26
7 132 67 193 34.65 18.00 -4 -262 -23 49.77 34.12 16
8 137 91 206 30.94 14.32 -5 -280 -67 42.22 26.62 4
9 142 -109 -11 27.40 10.83 40 -261 -74 36.27 20.73 -4
10 147 32 112 24.47 7.93 -28 -77 92 32.44 16.94 -37
Spec 3
1 103 451 743 328.84 292.41 80.58 2991 4069 1120.49 1078.41 406.55
2 109 353 688 202.36 167.49 61.96 16 1229 2158 500.37 464.77 194.78 294
3 115 351 638 130.36 95.67 34.57 0 250 1009 287.03 253.12 107.00 163
4 121 62 339 104.12 69.44 23.61 48 -119 538 197.57 164.25 70.19 61
5 127 24 278 85.38 50.72 16.87 6 -293 278 147.19 114.18 49.05 29
6 133 -23 194 70.84 36.21 11.78 8 -394 101 115.30 82.47 35.64 17
7 139 11 193 60.60 26.00 8.00 -6 -449 -23 93.59 60.88 26.76 9
8 145 47 206 54.40 19.80 5.48 -6 -444 -67 79.79 47.14 20.52 -1
9 151 -152 -11 50.05 15.63 4.80 33 -416 -74 70.45 38.01 17.28 -5
10 157 -6 112 46.06 11.77 3.83 -24 -224 92 63.88 31.60 14.65 -32
Decrease in 
LL/(Increase in 
DOF) (Spec 2 
versus Spec 3) 
[Unrestricted]
Increme
ntal lag 
length 
test
No. of 
paramet
ers
Rest 
versus 
Unrestri
cted
Increme
ntal lag 
length 
test
Decrease in 
LL/(Increase 
in DOF) (Spec 
2 versus Spec 
3) 
[Unrestricted]
fracinst (Granger) causes RelQSPR fracinst (Granger) causes RelESPR
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Table 2.11: Granger causality tests: Liquidity causes institutional ownership.  Results from Granger causality tests for reverse 
causality (i.e., testing whether liquidity measures Granger cause institutional ownership) are presented. Spec 1 includes lagged 
values of returns and volatility of returns and other contemporaneous control variables used in the cross-sectional study (Spec 6 
Table 2.5). Spec 2 includes lagged values of share turnover measured on a quarterly basis and excludes the contemporaneous 
turnover measure. There are 81,962 firm quarters used in the estimation. Firms with data available for less than 10 consecutive 
quarters are eliminated from the study. Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used for model selection as it penalizes free 
parameters more strongly than does Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
No. of 
Lags
No. of 
paramete
rs
Unrestricted 
(includes 
RelQSPR and 
lagged values of 
it)
Restricted 
(Excludes 
RelQSPR and 
lagged values of 
it)
F-Test Rest 
versus 
Unrestric
ted
Incremen
tal lag 
length 
test
Unrestricted 
(includes 
RelESPR and 
lagged values of 
it)
Restricted 
(excludes 
RelESPR and 
lagged values of 
it)
F-Test Rest 
versus 
Unrestric
ted
Incremen
tal lag 
length 
test
Spec 1
11 0 2 8506 8506 3.69 -0.42 8503 8506 7.60 0.82
21 0 6 1613 1607 0.97 -2.72 1723 1610 1607 3.15 -3.03 6892
31 1 0 618 619 3.76 0.21 249 625 619 2.49 -1.72 985
41 1 4 405 415 5.99 2.49 53 424 415 2.21 -1.64 201
51 1 8 317 326 5.44 1.96 22 338 326 2.32 -2.11 87
61 2 2 212 216 4.16 0.69 26 232 216 1.97 -3.76 106
71 2 6 126 124 3.14 -0.33 21 143 124 1.82 -6.07 88
81 3 0 81 77 3.04 -0.43 11 99 77 1.77 -7.23 44
91 3 4 34 25 2.38 -1.09 12 50 25 1.77 -10.55 50
10 138 11 0 2.40 -1.09 6 30 0 1.87 -12.47 20
Spec 2
11 0 2 8659 8662 7.59 3.50 8656 8662 10.75 0.81
21 0 7 1742 1741 3.27 -0.39 1383 1739 1741 5.46 0.52 6917
31 1 2 735 741 5.72 2.19 201 743 741 4.25 -0.20 997
41 1 7 534 550 7.55 4.06 40 554 550 3.61 -0.55 188
51 2 2 455 473 6.97 3.50 16 479 473 3.49 -0.80 76
61 2 7 362 373 5.39 1.94 19 382 373 3.07 -1.67 96
71 3 2 292 297 4.11 0.66 14 308 297 2.92 -2.76 74
81 3 7 251 253 3.64 0.19 8 266 253 2.91 -3.53 43
91 4 2 210 207 3.09 -0.35 8 221 207 2.93 -4.71 44
10 147 195 192 3.18 -0.28 3 210 192 3.10 -5.50 12
BIC BIC
RELQSPR (Granger) causes Fracinst RELESPR (Granger) causes Fracinst
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Table 2.12: Persistence in trading characteristics of institutions.  A transition matrix is 
presented that is constructed based on classifying managers into groups based on their 
portfolio turnovers. Portfolio turnover of manager is estimated following the method 
proposed by Gaspar et al. (2005). Managers are ranked into three groups each year 
based on the estimated portfolio turnover measure. The transition matrix presents the 
likelihood that a manager will move from one group to another group in the 
subsequent year (t+1) or 3 years later (t+3). First row for each group presents number 
of managers belonging to the group at time t and their groups in subsequent year/three 
year later. Second row for each group presents the transition probabilities for 
managers starting in a group (from left-hand column) into a different group. Third row 
presents the transition probabilities based on the overall universe.  
77 
 
 
 
 
Year t (Starting 
Group) Low Medium High Total
Low 7380 2265 555 10200
72.4% 22.2% 5.4%
24.1% 7.4% 1.8%
Medium 2411 5908 2024 10343
23.3% 57.1% 19.6%
7.9% 19.3% 6.6%
High 580 2259 7252 10091
5.7% 22.4% 71.9%
1.9% 7.4% 23.7%
Total 10371 10432 9831 30634
Year t (Starting 
Group) Low Medium High Total
Low 5240 1979 603 7822
67.0% 25.3% 7.7%
22.1% 8.4% 2.5%
Medium 2257 4124 1726 8107
27.8% 50.9% 21.3%
9.5% 17.4% 7.3%
High 688 2172 4869 7729
8.9% 28.1% 63.0%
2.9% 9.2% 20.6%
Total 8185 8275 7198 23658
After 1 year After 3 years
Numbers that stay in same group 20540 14233
Fraction that stays in same group 67.0% 60.2%
Year t+1 (Ending group)
Year t+3 (Ending group)
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Table 2.13: Investor horizon and liquidity.  Findings on the differential effect of 
investor horizon on liquidity of stocks are presented. A summary of findings across 
different testing methods and using different measures of liquidity is presented. The 
variable  long_short is difference between fraclong and fracshort (the difference 
between long-term ownership and short-term ownership). Control variables from Spec 
6 in Table 2.5 are used. Turnover is excluded from the regression as it used to classify 
institutions into groups. Standard errors from pooled regression and with firm fixed 
estimates are clustered at level of firm and year. Both methods include year and 
industry fixed effects. Fama-Macbeth regression includes industry fixed effects and 
presents the time series mean of the coefficient estimates. Estimates for other variables 
are suppressed for the sake of brevity. The standard errors are presented in italics 
below the estimates.  
c_bma Illiq relespr relqspr
Panel A: Pooled
fracinst -0.0027*** -0.5266*** -0.0075*** -0.0067***
0.0005 0.0647 0.0010 0.0016
sqfracinst 0.0033*** 0.4980*** 0.0057*** 0.0049***
0.0004 0.0534 0.0009 0.0014
long_short 0.0003 0.03605** 0.0015*** 0.0014***
0.0002 0.0177 0.0004 0.0003
Adj. R2 58.00% 78.33% 75.77% 82.61%
Minimum Point 42% 53% 66% 68%
Panel B: Firm fixed estimates
fracinst -0.0030*** -0.2364*** -0.0066*** -0.0051***
0.0004 0.0260 0.0007 0.0008
sqfracinst 0.0030*** 0.2693*** 0.0048*** 0.0037***
0.0004 0.0212 0.0005 0.0006
long_short 0.0007*** 0.0224*** 0.0014*** 0.0015***
0.0001 0.0069 0.0003 0.0002
Adj. R2 36.26% 51.52% 51.51% 67.19%
Minimum Point 51% 44% 68% 70%
Panel C: Fama-Macbeth approach
fracinst -0.0008* -0.6701*** -0.0077*** -0.0071***
0.0005 0.0554 0.0008 0.0012
sqfracinst 0.0009** 0.6764*** 0.0066*** 0.0061***
0.0004 0.0524 0.0006 0.0008
long_short 0.0004*** 0.045*** 0.0016*** 0.0015***
0.0001 0.0152 0.0002 0.0002
Pos (20/Sig 3) Pos (20/Sig 4) Pos (23/Sig 14) Pos (22/Sig 12)
Adj. R2 49.67% 73.30% 65.05% 68.72%
N o  o f  y e a r s 2 52 52 32 3
Minimum Point 50% 50% 50% 58%
No. of Obs. 29260 29260 27630 27630  
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * 
indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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I form three groups of institutions each year based on their portfolio turnover, 
classifying them as having a short-term, medium-term or long-term investment 
horizon. Subsequently, I divide stock holdings of each firm into three categories based 
on the fraction of shares held by each type of institution. I form the three categories by 
using the investment horizon of institutions from the previous year, to reduce the 
contemporaneous effect of their turnover on liquidity. Fraction of shares held by low 
turnover institutions is referred to as fraclong. Buy and hold investors have low 
turnover. Similarly, fracmedium and fracshort represent shares held by medium-term 
investors and short-term (high turnover) investors, respectively.  
Cross-sectional tests: I test for the effect of differences in investors’ trading horizon 
on liquidity measures. I include the difference between shares held by long-term 
investors (fraclong) and short-term investors (fracshort)—represented as long_short—
as an additional variable to Spec 6, Table 2.5. I do exclude turnover as a control 
variable since I partitioned institutions into groups based on their portfolio turnovers 
and evidence in the previous section indicated that fracinst (Granger) causes turnover. 
Table 2.13 presents the findings for various liquidity measures and estimation 
techniques. The coefficient on long_short is positive and significant, indicating that 
firms with higher long-term institutional ownership tend to be less liquid. An increase 
in investor horizon resulting from growth in long-term ownership by 1%, keeping total 
institutional ownership level constant, results in an increase of RELQSPR and 
RELESPR by about 13% to 20%. This finding indicates the sizable impact investor 
horizon and composition can have on liquidity measures. 
Granger causality tests: Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that investors with 
higher liquidity needs prefer more liquid securities. The effect of investor horizon on  
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liquidity can therefore be a consequence of the matching of investors with firms, with 
short-term investors preferring more liquid firms. I therefore conduct Granger 
causality tests by breaking down the fraction of equity held in a firm by long-term 
(fraclong) and short-term (fracshort) investors, following the procedure described in 
Section 5.1, in order to identify whether investor horizon has an influence on measures 
of liquidity. 
I reject the hypothesis that both fraclong and fracshort do not (Granger) cause 
liquidity measures RELESPR and RELQSPR, respectively, when including the squared 
terms of the ownership variables (sqfraclong and sqfracshort). Including the squared 
terms of ownership type improves the model fit significantly for both measures of 
liquidity, strongly suggesting the existence of the nonlinear effect. The findings from 
both F tests and comparing model fit using BIC are similar. The findings are also 
robust to various other specifications and to including turnover measure. Five to seven 
lags are usually sufficient to capture the dynamic behavior across different 
specifications.  
However, I cannot reject the hypothesis that liquidity does not (Granger) cause levels 
of holdings by both long-term and short-term investors. There is only very weak 
evidence (unreported results) that RELQSPR (Granger) causes fracshort. The findings 
thus indicate that liquidity of the securities in the past has some influence on short-
term ownership but not on long-term ownership. This finding is consistent with the 
claim by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) that investors with higher liquidity needs will 
invest in securities with greater liquidity. Overall, these findings also support that even 
after controlling for institutions preference for liquid securities, their investment 
horizon influences liquidity.  
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SECTION 6.2: RISK AVERSION 
Risk aversion of investors can affect liquidity by influencing the trading intensity of 
informed investors and trading (portfolio rebalancing) needs of the uninformed 
investors. Pritsker (2005) also indicates that investors risk aversion is an important 
determinant of market liquidity, as it determines investors’ willingness to pay to 
eliminate or take on additional risk for an additional period. Subrahmanyam (1991) 
models the effect of risk aversion of informed traders on liquidity in a single-period 
model and finds that liquidity could be decreasing, unimodal or increasing function of 
risk aversion depending on the number of informed investors. Liquidity increases with 
risk aversion for a smaller number of informed investors while it decreases with risk 
aversion as the number of informed investors increases. However in a multi-period 
model, as used by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), risk-averse informed investors 
trade more aggressively in the earlier periods (if their signals are perfectly correlated) 
resulting in faster incorporation of information into prices and increasing liquidity. 
However, if the signals of the informed are not perfectly correlated their trading 
intensity may decrease, resulting in reduced information efficiency and perhaps lower 
liquidity. The theoretical work therefore suggests that risk aversion of informed 
investors affects liquidity and the effect on liquidity varies with the degree of 
competition among the informed and the information structure.
59 
I try to empirically identify the effect of risk aversion of informed investors on 
liquidity. Risk aversion of investors is an unobserved characteristic and I therefore 
create a proxy for risk aversion using various measures of portfolio concentration of 
                                                 
59 Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), as well as Mendelson and Tunca (2004) investigate the effect of 
risk aversion of uninformed investors/liquidity traders on liquidity. Spiegel and Subrahmanyam find 
that liquidity increases with risk aversion of uninformed investors, if their trading is motivated by 
hedging needs, while Mendelson and Tunca indicate the opposite—that liquidity is a decreasing 
function of risk aversion of liquidity traders.  
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institution: size of the portfolio, Herfindahl Index for portfolio, number of industries 
the institution invests in, number of securities in the portfolio, and number of 
securities that comprise 50%, 75%, and 90% of the portfolio, respectively. I consider 
institutions with more concentrated portfolios and holding fewer securities as less risk 
averse, and institutions with less-concentrated portfolios and holding more securities 
as more risk averse.
60 As expected, Herfindahl Index for the portfolio exhibits a 
negative correlation with the other measures of portfolio concentration of institution 
and size of the portfolio. I subsequently take the first principal component of these 
measures and use it as a measure for risk aversion of each manager/institution.
61 The 
obtained risk aversion measure for each institution is then used to construct a 
weighted-average measure for each firm, with weights being the fraction of equity 
held by the institution in the firm. This weighted-average measure, called Diverse, 
indicates whether the investors owning the securities in the firm have concentrated 
portfolios or diverse portfolios. This measure for risk aversion of investors in a firm 
differs from both concentration in ownership (lnhhi_inst) and fraction of equity held 
by the institutions (fracinst), used earlier. Diverse exhibits a correlation of 0.75 with 
fracinst and a correlation of 0.52 with the concentration of institutional holdings 
(lnhhi_inst) in the firm, indicating that firms with higher institutional ownership tend 
to have more-diversified investors. 
I test the effect of risk aversion of institutions on liquidity by using pooled regressions 
as described earlier. I present findings using c_BMA as the liquidity measure and add 
Diverse as an additional variable to Spec 6, Table 2.5. I exclude the indicator variable 
                                                 
60 One way to think of the argument is that not only the proportion of equity held by all institutions but 
also the characteristics of each institutions’overall portfolio has an affect on the liquidity of assets they 
hold. 
61 The first principal component by itself explained close to 61% of the total variance in the 7 variables.  
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InstDummy, as Diverse measure is available only for firms with institutional 
ownership data available. Table 2.14 presents the findings. Spec 1 controls for the 
non-monotonic relationship between liquidity and institutional ownership (fracinst) 
and indicates that spreads increase in risk aversion of investors.
62 Findings from Spec 
2 and Spec 3 are similar after controlling for number of investors and concentration of 
institutional ownership. A one standard-deviation increase in Diverse (1.613), holding 
the ownership level constant, is associated with an increase in the effective spread 
measure of (0.0003), which is equivalent to almost a 0.1 standard-deviation decrease 
in liquidity measure. These findings indicate that, ceteris paribus, if investors in the 
firm are more risk averse and have more diversified portfolios then liquidity is lower. I 
include interaction term between Diverse and fracinst in Spec 4, and an interaction 
term between Diverse and lnnuminst in Spec 5. The positive and significant interaction 
term indicates that with growth in competition among institutions, the marginal effect 
of investor risk aversion on spreads becomes larger. I interpret these findings to 
indicate that increasing risk aversion of informed investors reduces the information 
efficiency effect, resulting in lower liquidity. This finding is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions in Subrahmanyam (1991), where liquidity decreases with 
investor risk aversion and the marginal effect of investor risk aversion on liquidity 
increases as the number of informed investors increase. 
                                                 
62 The effect of investor risk aversion on liquidity is consistent with the claim in Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2007) where market liquidity is a function of funding liquidity and decreases with investor 
risk aversion.   
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Table 2.14: Investor risk-aversion (portfolio diversification of institutions) and 
liquidity.  Cross-sectional results for effects of estimate of risk aversion of institutions 
on liquidity for stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX are presented. The dependent 
variable is the annual measure of liquidity c_BMA obtained from Joel Hasbrouck. The 
variable Diverse is a weighted-average measure trying to capturing how diverse the 
institutions holding equity in the firm are. For construction of Diverse please refer 
Section 6.2. The period of study is 1980–2005. Pooled regression is run using year and 
industry fixed effects due to the inherently unbalanced nature of the panel. The 
standard errors are estimated by clustering on year and firm and are presented in italics 
below the estimates. Control variables from Spec 6 in Table 2.5 are used and their 
coefficients are suppressed for sake of brevity. 
Variable Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5
fracinst -0.0033*** -0.00268*** -0.00316***
0.0005 0.00057 0.00051
sqfracinst 0.00369*** 0.00232*** 0.00305***
0.00048 0.0007 0.00046
lnnuminst -0.00123***
0.00027
sqlnnuminst 0.00012***
0.00003
lnhhi_inst -0.00025**
0.00009
sqlnhhi_inst 0.00002**
0.00001
Diverse 0.00014*** 0.00018*** 0.00018*** 0.00004 -0.00012**
0.00004 0.00003 0.00003 0.00006 0.00006
fracinst*Diverse 0.00028***
0.0001
numinst*Diverse 0.00008***
0.00001
Adj. R2 58.3% 57.9% 57.6% 58.4% 58.1%
No. of Obs. 32373 31126 31126 32373 31063
No. of Parameters 61 61 61 62 62
F-Value 425.0 410.6 399.8 418.6 400.9  
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * 
indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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To summarize, the findings in this section show that both ownership structure of a 
firm and characteristics of the investors affect liquidity. Intrinsic differences among 
owners’ characteristics can have a large effect on liquidity of the assets they hold, 
even after trying to account for preferences for certain security characteristics and 
controlling for known determinants of liquidity. 
SECTION 7: CONCLUSION 
An extensive literature in finance examines the effects of informed traders on liquidity 
and price efficiency of assets. Using a large sample of firms belonging to NYSE and 
AMEX over the period 1980–2005, I empirically examine the effect of institutional 
ownership on liquidity. Institutions are distinct from other investors due to their 
information advantage, providing an appropriate setting in which to test the theories 
relating effects of informed traders on liquidity. In this chapter, I examine two effects 
on liquidity that evolve from information advantage of institutions: information 
efficiency effect and adverse selection effect. 
Increase in fraction of institutions among the population of investors is associated with 
more information gathering and informed trading, which reduces the perceived 
uncertainty about the terminal asset payoffs [Wang (1993), Easley and O’Hara 
(2004)]. The presence of institutions and competition among them increases the rate at 
which information is incorporated into prices. This makes prices more information 
efficient, helping to improve liquidity of stocks. Increase in fraction of institutions also 
results in greater information asymmetry and the adverse selection risk faced by 
uninformed traders and market makers, resulting in a decline in liquidity. The 
presence of informed traders on liquidity depends on the net of these two effects.  
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Taken as a whole, I find strong evidence that institutional ownership affects liquidity. 
Foremost, I obtain a robust nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between various 
measures of liquidity and fraction of shares held by institutions after controlling for 
other known determinants of stock liquidity. As institutional ownership increases in 
cross-section, liquidity initially increases (spreads decrease). However, for ownership 
levels beyond 35%–40%, further increase in institutional ownership causes a decline 
in liquidity (spreads increase). I interpret these empirical findings as support for the 
hypotheses that the information advantage of institutions affects liquidity through two 
channels. The decline in spreads with number of institutions is consistent with the 
effect of information efficiency on liquidity. The evidence provides support for the 
strategic trader models by Kyle (1985), Subrahmanyam (1991), Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992), and Mendelson and Tunca (2004), where liquidity improves 
with increases in number of informed investors and competition among them. At 
higher levels of institutional holdings, the observed decline in liquidity is consistent 
with the asymmetric information models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and of 
Easley and O’Hara (1987). The adverse selection effect on liquidity gets further 
enhanced as the number of uninformed and liquidity motivated traders decline with 
growing institutional ownership. 
The net effect on liquidity arising from the information advantage of institutions is an 
outcome of both the information efficiency and adverse selection effects. The 
marginal effect of increasing institutional ownership on information efficiency 
declines, resulting in a non-monotonic effect of institutional ownership level on 
liquidity. Both the effects arising from the information advantage of institutions also 
vary with the amount of public information availability and asset risk.  
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I further address the simultaneity problem due to joint determination of institutional 
ownership and liquidity, using Granger causality tests. I reject the hypothesis that 
institutional ownership does not (Granger) cause liquidity, indicating that changes in 
institutional ownership help forecast changes in liquidity. The non-monotonic effect 
along with Granger causality results strongly suggest that institutions have a causal 
effect on liquidity by influencing the information structure of the firm. It is interesting 
to note that only weak evidence exists in support of the reverse causality.  
Further, I examine the effects of heterogeneity among institutions on liquidity. First, I 
find strong evidence indicating that liquidity declines with an increase in investment 
horizon and only weak evidence that liquidity of stocks affects the ownership type and 
investment horizon of institutions. Second, I examine the effect of diversification of 
the portfolios of institutions holding the stocks on liquidity, considering institutions 
with more diverse portfolios as more risk averse. I find strong evidence that increased 
risk aversion of investors results in a decline in liquidity consistent with a reduction in 
information efficiency effect.  
Overall, the findings strongly suggest that ownership structure of an asset plays a 
significant role in determining its liquidity by affecting the information structure. The 
presence of informed investors not only increases the adverse selection risk faced by 
uniformed investors, but also helps to increase the information efficiency of prices 
reducing the uncertainty about future payoffs. The net effect on liquidity is a 
combined result of these two effects. Future research may benefit from treating 
liquidity of an asset as endogenous and incorporating the effects of ownership 
structure on liquidity for asset pricing implications.   
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LIQUIDITY RISK  
INTRODUCTION 
A large increase in institutional ownership of stocks within the U.S. market has made 
it important to study their role in the functioning of financial markets. The effect of 
liquidity and its time variation on asset valuation and expected returns has received 
substantial attention from both academics and the popular press. There is growing 
empirical evidence that an asset’s liquidity and systematic liquidity risk are priced.
63 
Recent events in the financial markets also indicate the importance of considering both 
liquidity and its time variation in portfolio construction. Most studies of liquidity 
document that liquidity varies in cross-section and examine its determinants by 
analyzing this cross-sectional heterogeneity. In the second chapter, I studied the 
effects of institutional ownership on liquidity of stocks. In this chapter, I analyze the 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the time-series variation of liquidity in equity markets. 
I try to answer the question why does the day-to-day variation in liquidity differ across 
firms. I mainly focus on the effects of institutional ownership and various other 
attributes of the institutional investor base holding common stock on the stocks’ daily 
variation in liquidity. I also try to understand the mechanics by which the ownership 
structure affects the transmission of liquidity demand across securities. 
Why should we care about time variation in liquidity? Most institutions and investors 
express concerns about liquidity and liquidity risk of the portfolio constituents when 
determining investments. Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1994) even make the case that 
                                                 
63 For brief surveys please refer to Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005); Easley and O’Hara 
(2003); and O’Hara (2003). Time variation in liquidity has been identified as a non-diversifiable priced 
risk in Acharya and Pedersen (2006); Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); and Koraczyk and Sadka (2008). 
More explicitly, liquidity risk of an asset has been identified as the sensitivity of an assets liquidity to 
changes in marketwide conditions, mainly marketwide liquidity and market returns.  
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institutions concern for liquidity of their investments deters them from building up the 
concentrated ownership that is required to have an influence on corporate decisions. 
Longstaff (2004) shows that illiquidity of assets can have a significant effect on the 
optimal portfolio choices of investors and can lead investors to abandon diversification 
as a strategy. I here argue that not only should an asset’s liquidity but also the 
variation of an asset’s liquidity over time matter to an investor’s portfolio choices. 
Merton Miller (1991) said “Liquidity, according to Keynes, offers a classic example of 
the fallacy of composition: what is true for a part is not necessarily true for the whole. 
The ability to reverse positions and get out quickly vanishes when everyone tries to do 
it at once.” So, under normal circumstances, investors can time their trades to take 
place when trading costs are low. However, if investors don’t have the required 
discretion in the timing of their trades giving consideration to the time varying nature 
of liquidity becomes increasingly important. For example an investor trying to 
replicate or hedge an option, has much less discretion about when he can trade the 
underlying. This suggests that time variation in liquidity could play an important role 
in the area of derivative pricing. Stochastic liquidity will also affect the ability of 
arbitrageurs to eliminate mispricing. The capital constraints on arbitrageurs generally 
force them to hold undiversified portfolios, thus exposing them to total liquidity 
variation. This emphasizes the importance of being cognizant of the time variation in 
liquidity of an asset and identifying the determinants of both total and systematic 
liquidity variation of an asset over time.  
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam ((2000), hereafter referred to as CRS), Huberman 
and Halka (2001), and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) were first to document 
comovement in liquidity indicating existence of a systematic component in the time 
variation of liquidity. O’Hara (2003), in her presidential address, points out that, not  
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only is the issue of sources of commonality in trading costs (liquidity) unresolved, the 
impact of such commonality on asset returns is also contentious. Unless such 
commonality in driven by systematic factors and is undiversifiable, effect of liquidity 
on asset returns will be of second order. Thus, tracing commonality in liquidity to its 
sources is important. Also, while documenting commonality CRS find that changes in 
marketwide liquidity explain only a small fraction of the time-variation in liquidity of 
a firm, thereby indicating a large idiosyncratic component to liquidity variation. 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001) examine the effect of volatility of 
liquidity on expected returns, using trading activity as a measure of liquidity. They 
hypothesize that since investors care about transaction costs, risk-averse agents will 
desire compensation for fluctuations in trading cost which don’t necessarily have to be 
systematic. However, they find that the second moment of liquidity has a significant 
negative impact on equity returns, a finding not only surprising but also contrary to 
their hypothesis. 
The second chapter in the dissertation found that institutional ownership had a 
significant effect on liquidity. I found that the information advantage of institutions 
affects liquidity through two channels: adverse selection and information efficiency. 
The adverse-selection effect results from an increase in information asymmetry. The 
information-efficiency effect, however, results from an increase in competition among 
institutions. Competition promotes the rate at which private information is 
incorporated into prices, reducing uncertainty about future payoffs. I found evidence 
of a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship between the level of institutional 
ownership and various measures of stock liquidity. I also observed that institutional 
investor characteristics, such as investment horizon and risk aversion, affect liquidity.   
91 
This chapter goes a step further and examines time variation in liquidity and liquidity 
risk of assets. Sudden changes in marketwide liquidity have been associated with 
various puzzling episodes like the stock market crash of 1987, the global liquidity 
crisis of 1998, and the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Identifying factors and variables 
that determine liquidity risk of an asset will thus aid in both the portfolio construction 
process and risk management.
64 In spite of the growing evidence that liquidity risk is 
priced, the empirical evidence on what causes differences in the sensitivity of changes 
in an assets’ liquidity to changes in marketwide liquidity is limited. Furthermore, our 
knowledge of what determines the cross-sectional variation in measures of volatility of 
liquidity is also very narrow.  
In this chapter, I focus on determining whether ownership structure of an asset is an 
important determinant of both total and systematic liquidity variation over time. To the 
best of my knowledge, only Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008, hereafter referred to as 
KLS) attempts to identify sources of difference in sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to 
marketwide liquidity, the systematic component of liquidity variation. Their study 
examines the effect of firm size on commonality in liquidity and finds that larger 
stocks exhibit greater commonality in liquidity. They claim that the greater 
commonality in liquidity among stocks of the larger firms results from greater 
institutional holdings of those stocks and attribute it to the institutional herding 
behavior. Chordia, Shivkumar, and Subrahmanyam (2004) examine the cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in the time-series variation of liquidity in equity markets and find that 
smaller firms exhibit greater day to day variation in liquidity.
65 These studies help us 
                                                 
64 Commonality in liquidity has implications for risk management by asset management firms as 
induced co-movement in returns caused by effects of current portfolio holdings of institutions on 
liquidity and returns may be independent of historical correlation of returns of the underlying stocks. 
65 The authors examine the comovement between liquidity and absolute returns and find that the 
institutional holdings influence the relationship negatively in large firms.  
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learn about the effect of level of institutional ownership but leave us without much 
understanding of the effect of different attributes of institutional ownership on time 
variation in liquidity. 
In this chapter, I try to address some of these gaps in the literature and answer the 
following questions: Why does the day-to-day variation in liquidity of stocks differ 
across firms? Does ownership structure of the firm explain the liquidity variation in its 
equity over time? Does clientele and ownership structure of firms result in 
commonality in liquidity, and if so why? What are the attributes of the ownership 
structure that lead to meaningful differences in both time series variation of liquidity 
and sensitivity of a firm’s liquidity to market liquidity across firms? What other firm 
characteristics influence an asset’s liquidity risk?  
I focus on the U.S. equity markets and examine the effects of equity ownership by 
institutions on a stock’s sensitivity to marketwide liquidity and its liquidity variation 
over time. I focus mainly on institutions, because they hold a large fraction of 
outstanding equity in the U.S. firms. Since the information environment of a firm is 
also a very important determinant of its liquidity, as indicated in the second chapter, I 
further examine the effects of information environment of the firm on measures of its 
liquidity variation over time.  
Institutions can clearly play an important role in an asset’s time variation in liquidity. 
Increasing volatility in financial markets over time is often attributed to the increase in 
institutional ownership (Xu and Malkiel (2003), Dennis and Strickland (2005)). 
Institutions often follow similar investment strategies. As a result, their trading could 
be correlated. For example, many institutions follow passive indexing strategies, in  
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which they make changes to their portfolios only in case of fund flows or changes to 
the index constituents. Others follow active trading strategies (like value or 
momentum) with relatively higher turnover.  
The institutional ownership in U.S. equity markets has been increasing. The 
institutions exhibit similarity to each other and are therefore susceptible to shocks 
faced by other institutions. This susceptibility to common shock increases the 
likelihood that the effect of these common shocks will be transmitted to the assets they 
hold. For example, in presence of a sudden demand for liquidity a contagion effect can 
be initiated, having a significant effect on asset valuations and liquidity. 
Differentiating the underlying motivation for a trade driven by liquidity needs from 
one driven by information is not easy, making liquidity suppliers less willing to meet 
the sudden increased demand. This can enhance volatility of liquidity of an asset if its 
respective owners are more susceptible to liquidity shocks. Fernando, Herring, and 
Subrahmanyam (2008) provide evidence that the concentrated ownership of PERPS 
by Japanese banks was a primary cause for their sudden large decline in liquidity, even 
when it was evident that the liquidity demands of Japanese banks were not motivated 
by information. Another good example of correlated trading was the significant 
drawdown observed by institutions following similar quantitative equity strategies, in 
August 2007. Khandani and Lo (2007) find that the correlated trading resulted from a 
large number of levered long-short equity funds beginning to unwind their positions to 
reduce their leverage. Thus, increasing homogeneity of the investor composition can 
significantly increase liquidity risk, further indicating that increasing institutional 
ownership can enhance liquidity risk.  
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In this chapter, I focus on correlated trading by institutions as an underlying cause for 
commonality in liquidity. I rely on theories of herding, primarily ones related to 
information cascades, to come with various testable predictions. Correlated trading by 
institutions can result either from a tendency to herd or trade on common information 
and signals without relying on the actions of others. I examine whether measures of 
systematic liquidity risk and liquidity variation over time change with the ownership 
attributes of the firm and interpret the results in light of my predictions. 
I first confirm the existence of commonality in liquidity, using a “market model” and 
various liquidity measures over a long sample period (1983–2005). Secondly, I 
examine the effect of institutional ownership attributes on measures of systematic 
liquidity risk. I find that systematic liquidity risk increases with the level of 
institutional ownership after controlling for the size of the firm. The finding indicates 
that stocks predominantly held by institutions exhibit greater commonality in liquidity 
and higher systematic liquidity risk, due to the greater homogeneity of institutional 
investors. This finding is inconsistent with the conjecture of Huberman and Halka 
(2001) who suggest that commonality in liquidity emerges due to noise traders, unless 
we are willing to reject the notion that institutions are informed traders in the financial 
markets. 
After controlling for the level of institutional ownership and the size of the firm, I find 
that systematic liquidity risk increases with the homogeneity of the institutional 
investor base and the investor horizon, while it decreases with the concentration of 
ownership and an increase in the block-holdings. Increasing homogeneity of the 
investor base enhances the effect of a common liquidity shock faced by the owners of 
the assets. Furthermore, an increase in homogeneity of the institutional investor base  
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will increase the likelihood of herding as each institution faces a similar decision 
problem and there is a reduction in dispersion of their private information. 
Homogeneity of the investor base thus becomes a source of commonality in liquidity 
and increased systematic liquidity risk. However, an increase in ownership 
concentration and block-holdings result in an opposite effect. Institutions holding 
larger stakes in a firm have greater incentives to collect information and act on their 
private information, and are less likely to rely on the inference drawn from the actions 
of others. As a result, with ownership getting concentrated among fewer institutions, 
the likelihood of correlated trading will reduce, thereby reducing commonality and 
systematic liquidity risk. 
My third set of findings shows the effect of institutional ownership measures on time 
variation in firm-level liquidity. I find that a large component of variation in liquidity 
over time remains unexplained by market liquidity and market returns suggesting that 
firm-level liquidity variation is mostly idiosyncratic. However, the time variation in 
liquidity for a firm is highly persistent. It decreases with firm-size, institutional 
ownership, and homogeneity of the investor base, while increasing with concentration 
of ownership. The effect of investor horizon though wasn’t consistent across 
measures. 
Lastly, I find that the measures of information asymmetry play a useful role in 
determining the cross-sectional variation in both systematic liquidity risk and total 
liquidity variance. Systematic liquidity risk decreases while the total liquidity variance 
increases with increasing information asymmetry. Greater information asymmetry is 
associated with an increase in private information. Investors with private information 
are more likely to rely on their information in making decisions and, as a result, will  
96 
not only exhibit a lower propensity to herd but would potentially act in a stabilizing 
manner. This stabilizing effect of the more informed institutions will reduce the 
likelihood of information cascades. Thus, increasing information asymmetry will be 
associated with reduced herding and correlated trading, resulting in a lower systematic 
liquidity risk. However, an increase in private information-based trading will result in 
idiosyncratic liquidity needs resulting in greater variation of liquidity over time. These 
findings provide a useful link between information asymmetry, one of the most 
important determinants of liquidity, and measures of changes in liquidity over time.  
On the whole, the above findings point out the different effects of institutional 
ownership structure on variation of liquidity over time. KLS focus on examining the 
effect of fraction of equity held by institutions on the systematic liquidity risk, and 
exploring whether the effects vary across mutual funds, pension funds, investment 
advisors, etc. They did most of their analysis at portfolio level and find that the 
divergence in commonality in liquidity among the large and small U.S. stocks over 
time results from the growth in institutional ownership. In this study, I rely on the 
theoretical literature on herding behavior of agents and stochastic liquidity to 
formulate implications of a firm’s ownership structure and information environment 
on correlated trading of the institutional investor base. Thereby, I find additional 
effects that arise from cross-sectional differences in institutional investor base—like 
homogeneity and investment-horizon of the institutional investor base, concentration 
in ownership among institutional investor base, and presence of blockholdings—on 
both systematic liquidity risk and the total variation in liquidity. I further examine the 
effects of information asymmetry and private information on time variation in 
liquidity and systematic liquidity risk, thereby establishing a link between information 
risk and stochastic liquidity.  
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There are some aspects of this study that should be interesting both from an academic 
and a practical point of view. First, it documents the sizable cross-sectional variation 
in time series behavior of liquidity and systematic liquidity risk. The time variation in 
liquidity has implications for portfolio managers following active strategies, and 
highlights the possibility that cost to liquidate a portfolio can vary significantly 
depending on market conditions. The results help shed light on the type of firms that 
are likely to become expensive to trade when market liquidity decreases. It also raises 
the possibility that portfolio managers following active investment strategies can 
reduce their execution costs by exploiting the time-series variation in liquidity and 
developing optimal execution strategies. Second, stochastic liquidity, a source of 
friction in asset markets, can have implications for asset pricing, especially for pricing 
derivative securities, where dynamic replication of portfolios leaves less discretion in 
terms of timing of trades. Considering the time variation in liquidity of the underlying 
assets, may therefore be important for market makers of options and other derivative 
instruments. Third, the study relates the time series variation in liquidity of an asset to 
its clientele. The findings point to the different effects of institutional ownership on 
systematic liquidity risk and total variation of liquidity and therefore could be useful 
for regulators to think of clientele effects on systemic risk. Furthermore, the causes of 
investor herding could be crucial for determining policy responses for mitigating herd 
behavior. Fourth, I find a link between measures of information asymmetry and time 
variation in liquidity, thereby establishing a link between information risk and 
liquidity risk. Various market microstructure models examine the effect of information 
asymmetry and probability of informed trading on liquidity levels. I indicate that 
private information by affecting the likelihood of correlated trading can increase the 
variation in liquidity over time while simultaneously decreasing the systematic 
liquidity risk. Fifth, in general there is a large focus on factors related to the supply of  
98 
liquidity in the literature. I show that demand for liquidity also has a significant and 
varied impact than previously thought. Future empirical analysis can explore some of 
these demand effects.  
This chapter also raises some additional interesting questions. First set of questions 
relate to the time series properties of liquidity. Does liquidity exhibit some sort of 
regimes with states of high and low liquidity? If so, what are some of the triggers of 
changes in liquidity and can we predict the duration of these different states of 
liquidity? Do changes in liquidity exhibit clustering similar to return volatility? 
Secondly, since many institutions and individual investors tend to follow “style 
investing” examining effect of ownership structure on commonality within the style 
buckets could also be interesting. In a similar line, examining commonality in liquidity 
among stocks predominantly held by institutions that belong to same location could 
provide further evidence on herding. Similarly, one could also examine the effect of 
uncertainties about firm and macro environment on the variation in stock liquidity. 
The finding on effect of lengthening investor-horizon on increasing liquidity risk 
remains a puzzle. Further examining the effect of investor horizon on liquidity risk in 
an equilibrium model and its effects on asset pricing could therefore be interesting. 
Lastly, another useful avenue of research could be to examine the effects of liquidity 
shocks and information shocks in the same equilibrium model. This can help 
understand the transmission of these shocks across assets and come up with additional 
empirical predictions on the joint dynamics of returns and liquidity. 
The remaining chapter is broadly organized as follows. Section 1 presents related 
literature on commonality in liquidity and liquidity risk and develops hypotheses on 
effect of institutional ownership on commonality in liquidity. Section 2 describes the  
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data and measures of systematic liquidity risk and liquidity variation over time. It also 
describes the measures of institutional ownership and characteristics. Section 3 
presents the main findings on the effects of institutional ownership on liquidity risk 
and its time variation. I present my conclusions in Section 4. 
SECTION 1: LIQUIDITY AND LIQUIDITY RISK 
This section develops the study’s hypotheses after briefly reviewing the literature on 
effect of liquidity risk on expected returns and commonality in liquidity.  
SECTION 1.1: LIQUIDITY RISK AND EXPECTED RETURNS 
Asset-pricing literature indicates the importance of both the effect of transaction costs 
and the sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to market returns and marketwide liquidity in 
determining its equilibrium expected returns. After controlling for various asset 
characteristics and risk measures, the influence of an assets’ liquidity level and 
systematic liquidity risk on its prices appears to be both statistically and economically 
significant.
66 The findings indicate that the marketwide liquidity is a state variable that 
is important for asset pricing, and assets exhibiting a higher sensitivity to the state 
variable (facing higher liquidity risk) have higher expected returns. These studies also 
show that firms that are more illiquid seem to have higher liquidity risk measured in 
terms of their liquidity betas. The liquidity beta estimates the systematic liquidity risk 
of an asset by measuring the co-movement in the liquidity of the asset with that of the 
market liquidity. Most of these studies have examined market liquidity as a state 
variable but have not considered the total variation in liquidity of an asset. One 
                                                 
66 For brief surveys please refer to Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005); Easley and O’Hara 
(2003); and O’Hara (2003). For theoretical and empirical findings please refer to Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986); Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996); Eleswarupu (1997); Chalmers and Kadlec 
(1998); Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001); Huang (2003); Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005); Korajczyk and Sadka (2008); Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007); 
etc.  
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exception is a study by Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001) which 
examines the effect of second moment of turnover on equity returns. The authors 
hypothesized that since investors care about transaction costs, risk-averse agents will 
desire compensation for fluctuations in trading cost. The effect will be more important 
if investors have less discretion in timing their trades. However, contrary to their 
hypothesis they find that the second moment of liquidity has a significant negative 
impact on equity returns. To summarize, these findings suggest that both the level of 
liquidity and its time variation, both systematic and unsystematic, should be related to 
expected returns. 
SECTION 1.2: COMMONALITY IN LIQUIDITY AND SOURCES 
Financial crises in the United States (1987), U.S./Iraq war (1990), South East Asia 
(1997), Russia (1997), LTCM collapse and bond market crisis (1998), and the sub-
prime crisis (2007, 2008, 2009) indicate that credit and market conditions can tighten 
suddenly, leading to a large decline in marketwide liquidity. Various microstructure 
studies investigate factors that influence an asset’s liquidity. Chapter 2 talks at length 
about the various determinants of asset liquidity. However, in general, theories don’t 
explicitly state sources of time variation and commonality in liquidity.  
Empirical studies first documented the existence of intertemporal changes in liquidity. 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and 
Huberman and Halka (2001) showed the existence of time variation and commonality 
in both measures of trading activity and liquidity in the equity markets. These papers 
suggest that commonality in liquidity arises due to the market makers’ activity to 
preserve the inventory level, macro news announcements, and changes in other macro 
economic variables such as credit spreads and term spreads. Brockman, Chung, and  
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Perignon (2008) extended the evidence of commonality in liquidity across 46 
exchanges. Subsequent studies tried to identify macroeconomic factors as a source of 
the time variation in liquidity. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) study the 
daily variation in aggregate market spreads, and the influence of market returns, 
volatility and interest rates on liquidity. Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005) 
indicate the presence of common factors that drive liquidity and volatility in stock and 
bond markets and establish a link between “macro” liquidity, or money flows, and 
“micro,” or transactions, liquidity. In a vector autoregressive framework, they find that 
innovations to stock and bond market liquidity are correlated. Watanabe (2008), using 
data from 1965 to 2001, establishes a link between macroeconomic fundamentals and 
market liquidity and finds the effects to be stronger in the earlier part of the sample. 
Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) look at whether liquidity betas and liquidity risk 
premium vary across different economic states.  
Recent theoretical work focuses on examining causes of commonality in liquidity. 
Various multi-security models of market microstructure have examined how the 
market-maker learns by observing signals and trading in other stocks. For example 
Caballe and Krishnan (1994), in a single period model, show that, due to correlated 
fundamentals, market makers learn from order flows of other stocks. This makes the 
security price determined not only by its own price or order flow but also by those of 
other stocks. Watanabe (2008) extends the multi-security model to a multi-period 
framework, and models the information arrival process explicitly as following a multi-
variate GARCH process. He examines transmission of the information shocks across 
assets and their effect on asset liquidity and time variation in liquidity. The persistence 
and correlation in the information shocks, gives rise to commonality in liquidity by 
increasing return volatility. By examining Dow stocks Watanabe finds evidence that a  
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Dow stock’s illiquidity exacerbates in the size of information about not only itself, but 
also about other Dow stocks, thus demonstrating a significant cross-sectional effect of 
information on liquidity. In contrast, Fernando (2003) examines transmission of 
liquidity shocks across assets. He decomposes liquidity shocks faced by investors into 
systematic and idiosyncratic components and models how heterogeneity in investors’ 
sensitivity to the systematic shocks affects transmission of the liquidity shocks across 
assets. His model introduces liquidity shock as a change in investors’ marginal 
valuation of risky assets without arrival of new information about the fundamental 
value of securities. He finds that common liquidity shocks do not give rise to 
commonality in liquidity demand. In contrast, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks create a 
demand for liquidity, which investors can then meet by trading in more liquid assets.  
Other theoretical models have examined commonality in liquidity resulting from 
investor’s time variation in their preference for liquidity and funding constraints on 
market-makers due to market fluctuations. Vayanos (2004) indicates that when fund 
flows to institutions are contingent on past performance, preference for liquidity can 
be time varying and increasing in return volatility. This can lead to a flight to quality 
and co-movement in returns and liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) model 
the effects of availability of funds with traders on the liquidity of assets and find that 
funding liquidity and asset liquidity are mutually reinforcing. This mutual 
reinforcement can lead to sudden changes in market liquidity, commonality in 
liquidity, flight to liquidity and safety, etc.  
Empirical studies have also tried to identify sources of commonality in liquidity. 
Coughenour and Saad (2004) discuss that commonality in liquidity can arise from 
common variation in either demand for liquidity or supply of liquidity or both. They  
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look for the supplier effects and find evidence that the individual stock liquidity co-
varies more with stocks that are handled by specialists belonging to the same 
company, apart from information reflected by market liquidity variation. They claim 
that this results from the shared capital and information among specialists within a 
firm. Brockman and Chung (2002) document the existence of liquidity commonality 
in purely order-driven settings of the Swiss Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Domowitz, Hansch, and Wang (2005), using ASX data, show that 
commonality in liquidity is driven by co-movement in supply and demand induced by 
cross-sectional correlation in order types. They indicate that order flow commonality 
is a source of return commonality while order type commonality is a source of 
liquidity commonality. The last two studies primarily indicate correlated trading as a 
source of liquidity commonality.  
The above notion of commonality in liquidity closely relates to the effect of 
information environment of a firm and liquidity needs of investors on their trading and 
herding behavior. Herding is a result of an obvious intent by investors to copy the 
behavior of other investors or be influenced by others’ actions and could be a rational 
behavior on part of financial market participants.
67 However, herding must be 
distinguished from “spurious herding” during which investors facing similar decision 
problems and information sets make similar decisions. In both cases, we will observe 
correlated trading (or similar decisions), but an observation of correlated trading does 
not necessarily indicate herding. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) document that the U.S. 
fund managers head-quartered in the same city exhibit similar portfolio choices. They 
argue that these correlated portfolio choices could arise (i) through peer to peer 
communication; or (ii) simply because fund managers in a given area commit 
                                                 
67 For a brief survey on herding behavior in financial markets, please refer to Bikhchandani and Sharma 
(2001).   
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themselves to investment decisions based upon common sources of information—such 
as a local newspaper or TV station. The finding of Hong, Kubik and Stein suggests 
that interactions among institutions and access to common sources of fundamental 
information could result in herding and correlated trading. 
The theoretical literature examining herding, indicates that herding can result from 
imperfect information, career and reputation concerns, and compensation structures. 
Banerjee (1992) proposes a herding model where the agents make their decisions 
sequentially. Each agent, to an extent, ignores his or her own private information and 
follows the decisions made previously by other agents. This behavior is rational since 
previously made decisions are based on important information that only those decision 
makers possessed. Such sequential decisions made by rational agents result in herding, 
where private information of agents deciding later stops playing a role in their decision 
making. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992); Welch (1992); and Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) also examine herding that results from imperfect 
information leading to informational cascades. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argue that 
in the presence of career and reputational concerns agents will herd together. Maug 
and Naik (1996) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) examine the effects of 
compensation structure and suggest that herding could also arise in the presence of 
benchmarking of performance as the incentives provided by the compensation scheme 
and terms of employment are such that imitation is rewarded. Herding can also result 
if agents imitate each other due to their intrinsic preference for conformity to others. 
Concerns are raised that herding behavior by financial market participants could be a 
force that destabilizes markets by exacerbating volatility and, thus, also be a source for 
commonality in liquidity. By and large, the empirical studies that examine herding do  
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not examine or test a particular model of herd behavior.
68 They generally use a purely 
statistical approach to gauge whether clustering of trading decisions, irrespective of 
the underlying reasons for such behavior, is taking place in certain securities markets. 
Due to the unobservability of the underlying motivation for trades, it is extremely 
difficult to identify whether the observed correlated trading is a result of herding 
behavior or a reaction to changes in underlying fundamentals.  
However, on the whole the evidence suggests that correlated trading by institutions 
can be an underlying source of commonality in liquidity. These findings therefore 
suggest that institutional ownership can influence a stock’s liquidity variation over 
time. Furthermore, depending on their underlying motivation for trading and 
propensity to herd, the observed variation in liquidity across groups of stocks could 
differ based on their ownership structure. 
SECTION 1.3: HYPOTHESES 
1.3.1: Ownership and liquidity risk 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Bergstresser and Poterba 
(2002) find evidence that money flows to mutual funds depends on their past 
performance. Retail investors tend to chase winners, resulting in significant inflows to 
winners and outflows from losers. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) on examining the 
flow-performance relationship for pension fund managers find that past winners do not 
attract large inflows, though the assets under management decline for the losers. They 
attribute this difference in flow-performance relationship between pension funds and 
                                                 
68 Herding behavior among the U.S. pension funds is examined in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1992), while that among U.S. mutual funds is examined in Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1995, 
1999), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Chevalier and Ellison (1999). Herding behavior in 
emerging markets is examined in Borensztein and Gelos (2000), Kim and Wei (1999), and Choe, Kho, 
and Stulz (1999), while that among security analysts is examined in Trueman (1994), Graham (1999), 
Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), and Welch (2000).  
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mutual funds to their materially different clientele, possibly following different 
evaluation procedures and criteria. These fund flows can therefore induce demand for 
liquidity while differences in clientele in a stock can result in differences in systematic 
liquidity risk.  
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) model the phenomenon of “style investing” as a source of 
commonality in returns. They argue that investors group assets into categories in order 
to simplify portfolio decisions and allocate funds at the level of these categories. If 
some of the investors using such categories are noise traders with correlated sentiment, 
then their allocation of funds can result in coordinated demand of assets. Teo and Woo 
(2003) find empirical support for “style investing.” Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler 
(2005) further find that inclusion in the S&P 500 index results in an increasing co-
movement (beta) of the stock with that of the index. The role of mutual funds and 
pension funds in the equity markets, along with the prevalence of “style investing,” 
can therefore induce co-movement in returns and also be a source of commonality in 
liquidity.  
The prevalence of herding behavior among the U.S. institutions (Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Wermers (1999)), correlated trading 
demands due to “style investing” (Barberis and Shleifer (2003)), dependence of fund 
flows on past performance resulting in time-varying liquidity needs (Vayanos (2004)), 
and effects of funding availability with traders on asset liquidity (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2008)) suggest that institutional ownership level can influence the time 
variation in liquidity of stocks. The increasing likelihood of fund flows during volatile 
times due to flight to quality and safety can increase the demand for liquidity by 
institutions. Institutions are also relatively more homogeneous in nature than are the  
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individual investors. Kelly (1995), Barber and Odean (2000), Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2001), find that households do not tend to diversify their account holdings. 
Households on average own three to four stocks in their brokerage account, while the 
median household portfolio includes only two stocks. One third of the households own 
only one stock. One can interpret these findings as reflecting a greater heterogeneity 
among individual holdings. Due to the greater homogeneity of institutions, the 
likelihood of them facing a common funding shock is higher. Susceptibility of 
institutions to funding shocks and their propensity to exhibit herding behavior can 
therefore induce correlated trading, causing both a time variation in market and asset 
liquidity. Furthermore, liquidity of firms with larger institutional ownership will 
exhibit higher commonality and also have greater measures of systematic liquidity 
risk. The above discussion sets the stage for the first hypothesis of this chapter. 
Hypothesis 1: The sensitivity of a stock’s liquidity to market liquidity will increase 
with an increase in the amount of outstanding equity held by institutions. 
The above hypothesis assumes that institutions are more homogeneous in nature than 
are individual investors. Institutions do exhibit heterogeneity across various 
dimensions such as investment horizon, capital surplus requirements faced by them, 
accessibility to funding sources, investment styles they follow, etc. As ownership of an 
asset becomes more homogeneous, both the likelihood of owners facing a common 
liquidity shock and the effect of the liquidity shock on the asset will increase. 
Homogeneity of ownership also increases the likelihood of herding due to a reduction 
in the dispersion of the private information of institutions. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, 
and Welch (1992), Welch (1992), and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) suggest that 
informational cascades begin when agents acting rationally start ignoring their private  
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information and reach a decision based on observing the actions of others. With 
ownership becoming more homogeneous, the reduction in the dispersion in private 
information and an increase in the similarity of the decision problem increases the 
likelihood of herding. It also increases correlated trading arising from observation of 
common signals or following similar styles. Thus, for firms having similar levels of 
institutional ownership, increasing homogeneity of the investor base will increase the 
systematic liquidity risk. Fernando (2003) also finds that with increasing heterogeneity 
of investors exposure to systematic liquidity shocks, the impact of the liquidity shocks 
gets alleviated through partial risk-sharing by trading between high and low-exposure 
investors.  
Hypothesis 2: The sensitivity of a stock’s liquidity to market liquidity will increase 
with increasing homogeneity of investors, after controlling for the level of institutional 
ownership.  
Liquidity risk may depend not just on the homogeneity of investor base but also on the 
concentration of ownership. If an institution holds concentrated or large positions in a 
firm, the institution will have a stronger incentive both to collect and act on its private 
information. So, for firms having ownership concentrated in fewer hands, its investors 
will have greater incentive to gather and act on their information. As ownership 
dispersion increases, this incentive to collect and act on private information reduces 
and investors may rely more on their inference of other’s actions.
69 An increased 
reliance on the actions of others increases the likelihood of herding. As a result, for 
similar levels of institutional ownership, the likelihood of herding behavior and 
correlated trading will be lower when ownership is concentrated among fewer 
                                                 
69 The free riding problem has been extensively discussed in Gromb (1993), Zingales (1995), Maug 
(1998), Bolton and Van Thadden (1998), Edmans and Manso (2008), etc.   
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institutions. Stocks having concentrated ownership or large block-holdings may 
therefore exhibit lower liquidity risk. In other words, ownership dispersion will be 
associated with increased herding behavior and correlated trading resulting in 
increased systematic liquidity risk.  
Hypothesis 3: The sensitivity of a stock’s liquidity to market liquidity will decrease 
with ownership concentration and block-holdings. 
In the previous chapter, I examined the effect of differences in investment horizon of 
institutions holding the stock on its liquidity level. Investment horizon of an institution 
is determined by both its demand for liquidity and the likelihood of facing a liquidity 
shock. Constantinides (1986) argues that investors can alleviate the effects of 
transaction costs by investing for longer durations and reducing their trading activity. 
However, Huang (2003) shows that if investors are likely to face liquidity shocks and 
face borrowing constraints, they will invest in more liquid assets. In equilibrium, one 
would observe that institutions more likely to face liquidity shocks will have a short-
term investment horizon and hold more liquid securities. Evidence in Chapter 2 
showed that stocks held largely by institutions with short-term investment horizons 
were more liquid. I also found strong evidence that short-term institutional ownership 
Granger caused liquidity. This raises the possibility that liquidity risk of stocks will 
depend on investment horizon of the investors primarily holding those stocks. 
Investors with short horizon may be more likely to face liquidity shocks and demand 
liquidity during financial crisis when, in general, market liquidity is lower. As a result, 
sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to market liquidity will increase as the investment 
horizon of the investor base decreases.  
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Hypothesis 4: The sensitivity of a stock’s liquidity to market liquidity will be a 
function of the investment horizon of investors holding the stock and should increase 
with shortening investor horizon. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) examine supplier effects as a source of 
commonality in liquidity and indicate that funding availability with traders should 
affect asset liquidity. Strength of balance sheet of financial intermediaries providing 
liquidity is dependent on market conditions and therefore should matter to asset 
liquidity. These financial intermediaries are more likely to face binding financial 
constraints precisely when it is most incumbent on them to provide liquidity. Market 
returns, by affecting financing constraints, affect the supply of liquidity; negative 
market returns decrease liquidity much more than positive returns increase liquidity. 
The asymmetric effect arises in their model as the providers of liquidity become 
demanders of liquidity after a large drop in asset prices, causing both an increase in 
liquidity demand as well as a reduction in the supply of liquidity. Hameed, Kang, and 
Viswanathan (2007) test these predictions and find that the impact of market returns 
on stocks’ liquidity is asymmetric, with a larger decline in liquidity taking place in 
down markets in comparison to the increase in liquidity in up markets.  
In hypothesis 4, I set out the role that investor horizon could have on systematic 
liquidity risk of stocks. I claimed that stocks held primarily by institutions having 
shorter-term investment horizons will exhibit greater liquidity risk. If there exists a 
common cause for liquidity shocks faced by short-term investors and other financial 
intermediaries supplying liquidity, then the asymmetric effect, noted by Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2008), could be aggravated with increase in short-term institutional 
ownership. This suggests that investor horizon will not only affect the systematic  
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liquidity risk, but also help explain the asymmetric effect of market returns on 
liquidity of stocks. I use the following specification to estimate the asymmetric effect 
of market returns on liquidity of stocks. 
it it t t t t it Sqret Mktret Mktret MktLiq MktLiq Liq ε β β β β β α + + + + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − + + − − + + * * * * * 3 2 2 1 1 0  
Hypothesis 5: The difference between the sensitivities (β2+ - β2-) of a stock’s liquidity 
to positive market returns (β2+) and negative market returns (β2-) will be a function of 
investment horizon of institutions holding the stock and should increase with 
shortening investment horizon. 
1.3.2: Information asymmetry and liquidity risk 
The effect of increasing information asymmetry on liquidity measures is well 
documented in market microstructure literature. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) indicate that in the presence of informed investors acting 
non-strategically, the adverse-selection risk faced by the risk-neutral market maker 
gives rise to spreads, even in the absence of any fixed costs. With an increase in the 
number of informed institutions, a risk-neutral market maker widens the spreads to set 
regret-free prices due to the higher adverse selection risk. These theories however are 
not very explicit about the effect of information asymmetry on time variation of 
liquidity and systematic liquidity risk.  
Hypothesis 1 set the role of institutions’ herding behavior and correlated trading as a 
determinant of the systematic liquidity risk of assets. Correlated trading could result 
from both herding and investors acting on common signals about macroeconomic 
factors. However, as private information increases, those investors having more  
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precise information may not join the herd and even act in a stabilizing manner. This 
would reduce the likelihood of herding resulting from information cascades 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992); Welch (1992); Froot, Scharfstein, and 
Stein (1992)). Thus, in the presence of greater private information, both the likelihood 
of herd formation and correlated trading will reduce. One can make an opposite 
argument that if investors with private information know the same private signal, their 
trades will be correlated. The competition to exploit the information and resulting 
correlated trading will increase the demand for liquidity. However, if such private 
information originates in an idiosyncratic manner, then the resulting trades will be 
idiosyncratic. This will increase the total variation in liquidity and may not increase 
the systematic liquidity risk. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Systematic liquidity risk of stocks will be smaller for firms with greater 
amounts of private information. Stated differently, systematic liquidity risk of stocks 
will decrease as information asymmetry among investors’ increases. 
All of the above hypotheses focused on understanding the determinants of 
commonality in liquidity and systematic liquidity risk. The second moment of 
liquidity has a significant negative impact on equity returns (Chordia, Subrahmanyam, 
and Anshuman (2001). I also claimed that time variation in asset liquidity should be 
important for derivative pricing and arbitrageurs trying to exploit and eliminate 
“mispricing.” Because changes in market liquidity and returns explain a small part of 
the total liquidity variation over time, I further examine determinants of liquidity 
variance. I mainly examine the effects of institutional ownership and information 
asymmetry measures on liquidity variation.  
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As information becomes easily available and more dispersed, both ownership 
dispersion and liquidity increases. Reduction in information asymmetry makes 
investors more certain about the firm’s expected cash flows, making it easier to infer 
the underlying motivation for a trade. As a result, liquidity suppliers will be more 
willing to meet sudden increased demands in case of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. 
However, in presence of greater private information, the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks 
are likely to be associated with private information. The liquidity suppliers may 
therefore be less likely to meet these liquidity shocks, and as a result a greater time 
variation in liquidity may be observed. The spikes in demand for liquidity could also 
be greater in presence of private information. A cross-sectional implication of the 
information asymmetry argument is that stocks that are more likely to have greater 
information asymmetry, should not only have lower liquidity but also exhibit greater 
liquidity variation over time.  
Hypothesis 7: Liquidity variation of stocks will be greater for firms with larger 
information asymmetry. Stated differently, liquidity variation of stocks will be greater 
for firms when the probability of information-based trading or adverse-selection 
component of spreads is larger. 
SECTION 2: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section, I first describe the data and measures of liquidity risk. I follow the 
approach of CRS to measure commonality in liquidity and liquidity risk. I use a much 
larger sample from 1983–2005 for firms listed on NYSE and AMEX in comparison to 
CRS, giving me the ability to explore the cross-sectional differences in sensitivity of a 
stocks liquidity to market liquidity (liquidity beta) in a panel setting. Following a firm  
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over time provides the ability to associate changes in a firm’s liquidity beta with 
changes in its ownership characteristics along with changes in other characteristics.  
The rest of this section describes the data first, then summarizes the time variation in 
market liquidity, and later describes the firm level measures of liquidity risk and 
commonality in liquidity. Subsequently, I investigate whether differences in 
institutional ownership and investor type (holding periods of institutions) affect 
measures of liquidity risk, both the total time variation in liquidity of a firm’s stock 
and liquidity beta a measure of systematic liquidity risk of a firm’s stock and test the 
hypotheses. 
SECTION 2.1: DATA DESCRIPTION: 
I estimate daily liquidity measures for firms, as indicated in Section 2 of Chapter 2. I 
rely on the following four measures to ensure robustness of results: Quoted Spread 
(QSPR), Quoted Spread measure divided by price (RELQSPR), Effective Spread 
(ESPR), and Effective Spread measure divided by the midpoint of the quote 
(RELESPR). QSPR is defined as the difference between ask and bid, while ESPR is 
defined as the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the 
quote midpoint. I estimate these four measures of liquidity using the intraday data 
obtained from ISSM and TAQ for NYSE and AMEX firms. The ISSM database 
includes trades and quotes data for NYSE- and AMEX-listed firms for the period 
January 1983 through December 1992, while TAQ database includes similar 
information for NYSE/AMEX- and NASDAQ-listed stocks for the period January 
1993 through December 2005. I compute these four measures by first averaging them 
over the trading day. These measures are available on a daily basis for years 1983– 
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2005. All the measures indicate illiquidity for the stocks and an increase in these 
measures indicates a decline in liquidity. 
I also filter stocks for the following additional criteria before including them in the 
analysis: 
1)  I exclude names belonging to the following categories: certificates, 
ADRs, shares of beneficial interests, units, companies incorporated outside the 
United States, Americus trust components, closed-end funds, and real estate 
investment trusts. 
2)  I exclude those names where the average price of the firm over the year 
is below $2 and above $200. This is important because daily variation in 
liquidity for firms outside these price ranges can be very high, due to either 
binding tick constraints, discreteness in price changes, or very low trading 
volume.  
I map the liquidity data to data from CRSP/Compustat and institutional ownership 
data from 13-F filings using ticker and CUSIP combination resulting in 41,992 firm 
years. For the estimation of liquidity beta, I eliminate firms if daily return and liquidity 
measures are available for less than 100 days, resulting in 41,604 firm years in the 
sample, an average of 1808 firms each year. There are 4,914 unique firms over the 
period 1983–2005.  
SECTION 2.2: MARKET LIQUIDITY AND MARKET RETURNS 
I start with presenting summary statistics associated with the liquidity measures. Using 
the daily measures of liquidity for the firms in the sample, I estimate both an equal-
weighted and a value-weighted measure of the marketwide liquidity. Subsequently, I  
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calculate the percentage daily changes in the market liquidity.
70 Figure 3.1 presents the 
mean annual measures of marketwide liquidity over the sample period along with the 
bands that include 90% of the daily market liquidity values for each year. The chart 
indicates that the marketwide liquidity exhibits a sizable variation over time. The 
volatility of market liquidity measures also varies over time and is much higher in the 
years 1987, 1990, 1998, and 2001. The spread-based liquidity measures have clearly 
been trending down over time, indicating an increase in the market liquidity.  
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of both equal-weighted and value-weighted 
marketwide liquidity measures. Since the liquidity measures increase with the size of 
the firm, the value-weighted measures of liquidity are smaller than the equal-weighted 
measures. The mean equal-weighted RELQSPR average is around 1.2% over the entire 
sample period, while the value-weighed measure is around 0.3%. The average QSPR 
is $0.19 while average ESPR is $0.15. Effective spread measures are lower than the 
quoted spreads, indicating existence of execution of trades within the quotes. The 
median spread measures are somewhat smaller than the means, suggesting existence 
of some positive skewness in the daily distribution of liquidity. 
Figure 3.2 presents the daily value-weighted marketwide liquidity measures for 
RELQSPR and RELESPR, along with the value-weighted returns of the CRSP 
universe. This chart indicates the sizable variation in liquidity measures over time and 
the volatility in both the liquidity measures and market returns. Stochastic volatility is 
a well-known phenomena, and the chart indicates that the transaction costs increase 
with increasing volatility. The liquidity measures also exhibit a large decline around 
                                                 
70 I further eliminate those days from the analysis when there were less than 200 securities for which 
liquidity measures were available, as changes in the composition of the index may inaccurately reflect 
changes in marketwide liquidity.   
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the reduction of minimum tick sizes in years 1997 (June 24
th, 1997) and year 2001 
(January 29
th, 2001).
71 I observe large increases in spread measures around the 1987 
crash, U.S./Iraq war (1990), LTCM crisis in 1998, Enron troubles in the later part of 
year 2001, and accounting fraud revelation at WorldCom in July 2002. There is 
evidence of the influence of business cycles on the liquidity measures as observed 
from increases in spreads in the early 1990s and early 2000s, when the economy was 
in a contraction phase.
72  
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the changes in daily marketwide liquidity 
measures. A prefix of Δ (or D1) on a measure indicates the daily percentage change in 
the measure. The changes in the daily market liquidity measures exhibit significant 
variation over time. The distribution of changes in market liquidity measures exhibits 
positive skewness and high kurtosis. This indicates that the spread-based measures of 
market liquidity vary over a wide range within short time periods. I also observe that 
the changes in value-weighted market liquidity measures (for QSPR and RELQSPR) 
tend to be larger than changes in the corresponding equal-weighted market liquidity 
measures. This finding can be considered consistent with larger firms exhibiting a 
higher liquidity commonality, while smaller firms exhibiting more variation in 
liquidity. Both the equal-weighted and value-weighted measures of market returns 
exhibit negative skewness and kurtosis. 
                                                 
71 In unreported results, the dollar depth measures indicate an upward trend indicating an increase in 
liquidity. Also, a large decline in quoted depth is observed around reduction in minimum tick sizes. The 
tick size changed from 1/8 to 1/16 of a dollar on 06/24/1997 and changed from 1/16 of a dollar to 
decimal system on 01/29/2001 respectively. 
72 http://www.nber.org/cycles.html  
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Figure 3.1: Market liquidity measures over time  
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics: Marketwide liquidity measures.  Mean and median 
values of marketwide liquidity measures obtained using intra-day trading data for the 
period 1983–2005 are presented. Both equal weighted and value weighted marketwide 
liquidity measures are calculated based on firms included in the sample. The four 
liquidity measures calculated on a daily basis are qspr, which is the quoted spread 
(bid-ask);  espr, which is the effective spread and is equal to [transaction price - 
(bid+ask)/2]; relqspr, which is proportional quoted spread [qspr/Price]; relespr, which 
is proportional effective spread [espr/Price]. Panel A presents the equal weighted 
measures. Panel B presents the value weighted measures. 
Panel A
year espr qspr relespr relqspr espr qspr relespr relqspr
1983 0.2057 0.2629 0.0130 0.0159 0.2047 0.2619 0.0130 0.0159
1984 0.1889 0.2503 0.0154 0.0186 0.1881 0.2497 0.0156 0.0187
1985 0.1757 0.2414 0.0155 0.0190 0.1754 0.2411 0.0146 0.0188
1986 0.1871 0.2530 0.0158 0.0194 0.1863 0.2527 0.0153 0.0193
1987 0.1964 0.2627 0.0200 0.0208 0.1896 0.2574 0.0151 0.0187
1988 0.1590 0.2424 0.0182 0.0235 0.1523 0.2425 0.0170 0.0233
1989 0.1406 0.2293 0.0173 0.0224 0.1398 0.2285 0.0154 0.0221
1990 0.1409 0.2268 0.0217 0.0270 0.1395 0.2256 0.0179 0.0252
1991 0.1482 0.2210 0.0230 0.0269 0.1479 0.2204 0.0202 0.0264
1992 0.1406 0.2178 0.0129 0.0182 0.1401 0.2167 0.0129 0.0182
1993 0.2131 0.2123 0.0152 0.0193 0.2179 0.2118 0.0152 0.0192
1994 0.1754 0.2053 0.0143 0.0186 0.1673 0.2034 0.0142 0.0185
1995 0.2515 0.1940 0.0144 0.0175 0.2650 0.1939 0.0144 0.0174
1996 0.2133 0.1918 0.0127 0.0156 0.1381 0.1915 0.0121 0.0155
1997 0.1291 0.1771 0.0104 0.0136 0.1300 0.1795 0.0105 0.0138
1998 0.1216 0.1712 0.0108 0.0145 0.1212 0.1706 0.0099 0.0133
1999 0.1159 0.1666 0.0121 0.0166 0.1154 0.1657 0.0120 0.0165
2000 0.1194 0.1690 0.0131 0.0180 0.1179 0.1668 0.0126 0.0175
2001 0.0856 0.1147 0.0107 0.0142 0.0821 0.1094 0.0104 0.0138
2002 0.0688 0.0895 0.0092 0.0120 0.0691 0.0890 0.0091 0.0120
2003 0.0551 0.0783 0.0064 0.0088 0.0552 0.0763 0.0064 0.0089
2004 0.0550 0.0751 0.0047 0.0063 0.0546 0.0749 0.0048 0.0064
2005 0.0518 0.0678 0.0043 0.0057 0.0517 0.0673 0.0043 0.0057
Equal Weighted (Median) Equal Weighted (Mean)
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Panel B
year espr qspr relespr relqspr espr qspr relespr relqspr
1983 0.1829 0.2535 0.0051 0.0070 0.1828 0.2539 0.0050 0.0069
1984 0.1679 0.2394 0.0055 0.0075 0.1671 0.2387 0.0055 0.0075
1985 0.1568 0.2324 0.0046 0.0067 0.1559 0.2320 0.0046 0.0067
1986 0.1761 0.2559 0.0045 0.0064 0.1745 0.2544 0.0045 0.0064
1987 0.1839 0.2688 0.0049 0.0068 0.1785 0.2633 0.0044 0.0062
1988 0.1445 0.2342 0.0046 0.0072 0.1384 0.2331 0.0044 0.0071
1989 0.1285 0.2166 0.0038 0.0061 0.1275 0.2154 0.0037 0.0060
1990 0.1277 0.2188 0.0040 0.0066 0.1268 0.2173 0.0039 0.0065
1991 0.1293 0.2121 0.0039 0.0060 0.1287 0.2106 0.0038 0.0060
1992 0.1215 0.1924 0.0029 0.0045 0.1203 0.1891 0.0029 0.0045
1993 0.1319 0.1992 0.0038 0.0056 0.1322 0.1992 0.0038 0.0056
1994 0.1271 0.1871 0.0039 0.0057 0.1264 0.1843 0.0039 0.0057
1995 0.1322 0.1771 0.0037 0.0051 0.1356 0.1770 0.0037 0.0050
1996 0.1285 0.1776 0.0033 0.0045 0.1218 0.1771 0.0033 0.0045
1997 0.1092 0.1545 0.0025 0.0035 0.1060 0.1499 0.0023 0.0034
1998 0.0949 0.1404 0.0021 0.0031 0.0935 0.1390 0.0021 0.0030
1999 0.0920 0.1396 0.0021 0.0031 0.0907 0.1384 0.0020 0.0031
2000 0.0925 0.1413 0.0021 0.0032 0.0877 0.1348 0.0021 0.0032
2001 0.0479 0.0682 0.0013 0.0018 0.0436 0.0614 0.0012 0.0017
2002 0.0378 0.0526 0.0012 0.0016 0.0369 0.0507 0.0011 0.0016
2003 0.0265 0.0681 0.0008 0.0025 0.0259 0.0571 0.0008 0.0021
2004 0.0325 0.0565 0.0010 0.0017 0.0283 0.0520 0.0008 0.0015
2005 0.0277 0.0465 0.0007 0.0013 0.0276 0.0433 0.0007 0.0012
Value Weighted (Mean) Value Weighted (Median)
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Figure 3.2: Daily time series of market liquidity and market returns  
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics: Changes in marketwide liquidity ad market returns.  Summary statistics of daily percentage changes 
in marketwide liquidity measures using firms listed on NYSE and AMEX during the sample period 1983–2005 are presented. A 
prefix of D1 indicates the daily percentage change, for e.g. D1esprt =(esprt - esptt-1)/esprt. Changes in both equal weighted and 
value weighted marketwide liquidity measures are calculated using firms in the sample. Also presented are the CRSP value 
weighted and equal weighted returns over the sample period. 
Min P1 Mean Median P99 Max Stddev Kurt Skew
Daily changes in equal weighted market wide liquidity measures
D1espr -0.5555 -0.2592 0.0025 -0.0010 0.3389 0.9895 0.0753 30.84 2.67
D1qspr -0.2082 -0.0734 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0854 0.3836 0.0278 19.30 1.26
D1relespr -0.8956 -0.4839 0.0140 -0.0002 0.9340 8.9047 0.2323 483.38 16.54
D1relqspr -0.3641 -0.0635 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0731 0.5609 0.0280 40.93 1.79
Daily changes in value weighted market wide liquidity measures
D1espr -0.6816 -0.1548 0.0027 -0.0005 0.2083 2.0737 0.0856 156.93 7.99
D1qspr -0.6823 -0.2788 0.0050 -0.0007 0.4044 2.2604 0.1165 114.76 7.31
D1relespr -0.8009 -0.1816 0.0046 -0.0014 0.2411 3.5060 0.1174 279.55 12.29
D1relqspr -0.7467 -0.3129 0.0073 -0.0011 0.4782 3.5323 0.1479 160.22 9.47
CRSP Returns
EWRETD -0.1039 -0.0192 0.0010 0.0015 0.0187 0.0693 0.0072 19.11 -1.32
VWRETD -0.1714 -0.0251 0.0005 0.0008 0.0246 0.0866 0.0097 22.31 -1.13  
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Table 3.3: Correlation measures: Marketwide liquidity measures.  Panel A presents correlations between the different marketwide 
liquidity measures, both equal weighted and value weighted. Panel B presents correlations between the changes in different 
marketwide liquidity measures and CRSP value weighted and index weighted returns. For both Panels A and B, the bottom triangle 
presents the Pearson correlations while the top triangle presents the Spearman rank correlations. Panel C presents the first and 
second order autocorrelation coefficients between the changes in value weighted marketwide liquidity measures. The suffix _ew 
indicates equal weighted measures of marketwide liquidity while the suffix _vw indicates value weighted measures of marketwide 
liquidity. A prefix of D1 indicates percentage daily change in the liquidity measures. 
Panel A: Correlations between market wide liquidity measures
Variable espr_ew qspr_ew relespr_ew relqspr_ew espr_vw qspr_vw relespr_vw relqspr_vw
espr_ew 1.000 0.825 0.724 0.600 0.928 0.821 0.860 0.796
qspr_ew 0.741 1.000 0.780 0.739 0.944 0.989 0.950 0.946
relespr_ew 0.459 0.632 1.000 0.960 0.750 0.790 0.805 0.828
relqspr_ew 0.513 0.796 0.770 1.000 0.650 0.743 0.735 0.781
espr_vw 0.808 0.973 0.577 0.698 1.000 0.951 0.944 0.902
qspr_vw 0.730 0.985 0.624 0.774 0.973 1.000 0.948 0.954
relespr_vw 0.752 0.943 0.639 0.750 0.955 0.949 1.000 0.970
relqspr_vw 0.685 0.927 0.645 0.788 0.910 0.955 0.969 1.000   
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Correlations between changes in market wide liquidity measures and CRSP value weighted and equal weighted stock returns.
Variable D1espr_ew D1qspr_ew D1relespr_ew D1relqspr_ew D1espr_vw D1qspr_vw D1relespr_vw D1relqspr_vw VWRETD EWRETD
D1espr_ew 1.000 0.610 0.535 0.301 0.548 0.345 0.536 0.348 -0.047 -0.045
D1qspr_ew 0.252 1.000 0.277 0.469 0.462 0.591 0.452 0.600 -0.072 -0.057
D1relespr_ew 0.163 0.051 1.000 0.629 0.249 0.149 0.367 0.195 -0.072 -0.114
D1relqspr_ew 0.157 0.517 0.100 1.000 0.220 0.266 0.280 0.347 -0.121 -0.174
D1espr_vw 0.229 0.321 0.025 0.166 1.000 0.672 0.847 0.614 -0.103 -0.094
D1qspr_vw 0.082 0.612 0.013 0.255 0.639 1.000 0.588 0.908 -0.137 -0.109
D1relespr_vw 0.126 0.242 0.086 0.149 0.941 0.609 1.000 0.647 -0.196 -0.200
D1relqspr_vw 0.068 0.528 0.012 0.247 0.652 0.965 0.671 1.000 -0.257 -0.243
VWRETD -0.048 -0.120 0.002 -0.173 -0.086 -0.068 -0.095 -0.083 1.000 0.795
EWRETD -0.055 -0.128 -0.013 -0.241 -0.095 -0.064 -0.103 -0.083 0.838 1.000
Panel C: First and second order autocorrelations, pearson correlations.
Variable Lag 1 Lag 2
D1espr_vw -0.404 0.141
D1qspr_vw -0.350 0.037
D1relespr_vw -0.336 0.156
D1relqspr_vw -0.302 0.034  
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Table 3.3 presents a summary of the correlations between both equal-weighted and 
value weighted measures of marketwide liquidity. In Panels A and B, I present both 
the Pearson correlations (bottom triangle) and Spearman rank correlations (top 
triangle) as the distributions of both the level and changes of marketwide liquidity 
measures exhibited positive skewness.  
Panel A presents the correlations between the levels of different marketwide liquidity 
measures.
73 All four measures of marketwide liquidity measures exhibit strong 
positive correlation with each other indicating that they are capturing similar 
phenomenon. The correlations between ESPR and QSPR are 0.74 (equal-weighted 
series) and 0.97 (value-weighted series). Similarly, the correlations between RELESPR 
and RELQSPR are 0.77 (equal-weighted series) and 0.97 (value-weighted series). The 
correlations between the value-weighted and equal-weighted series for the four 
liquidity measures are also very high. Overall, the Spearman rank correlations tend to 
be higher than the Pearson ones. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents the correlations between the daily changes in different 
marketwide liquidity measures and CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted returns. 
The correlations between changes in different market liquidity measures are always 
positive and are, on average, around 0.4. However, those between the value-weighted 
measures tend to be higher and around 0.73, on average. The Spearman rank 
correlations tend to be higher than the Pearson correlations, similar to those obtained 
in Panel A. The correlations between market returns and changes in marketwide 
liquidity measures are negative and significant. There is a strong negative correlation 
                                                 
73 As changes in tick sizes in 1997 and 2001 resulted in large declines in both spreads and market 
depths, I estimate the correlations between the marketwide liquidity measures over three subperiods 
(prior to 1997, between 1998 and the end of 2000, and after the beginning of 2002). I report the mean of 
the correlations for the three subperiods weighted by the number of observations in each period.  
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between market returns and changes in value-weighted market liquidity measures (-
0.083 for RELQSPR and -0.095 for RELESPR). I observe similar negative correlations 
between market returns and unscaled versions of marketwide liquidity measures QSPR 
and ESPR. These correlations indicate that positive market returns are associated with 
an increase in market liquidity while negative market returns are associated with a 
decline in market liquidity, and the effects are not solely a result of changes in security 
prices. This finding is consistent with the prediction of Kyle and Xiong (2001) and 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), where the wealth effect of a marketwide drop in 
asset prices is associated with a fall in liquidity.  
Panel C of Table 3.3 presents the autocorrelations between daily changes in market 
liquidity measures. I observe negative autocorrelation among the four market liquidity 
measures. The mean first order and second order auto-correlation coefficients for 
changes in the four marketwide liquidity measures are -0.35 and 0.09. The strong 
negative first order autocorrelation indicates that changes in market liquidity exhibit a 
strong reversal and the changes are not highly persistent. The negative 
autocorrelations among the unscaled measures ESPR and QSPR also shows that these 
autocorrelations are not solely an effect of security price changes. 
SECTION 2.3: FIRM-LEVEL MEASURES OF LIQUIDITY RISK 
To estimate systematic liquidity risk I follow the approach proposed by CRS (2000). I 
examine the relation between percentage changes in measures of firm liquidity and 
percentage changes in market liquidity to identify the degree of co-movement in 
liquidity. Following the process used for computing the changes in marketwide 
liquidity, I compute the changes in firm-level liquidity. Liquidity measures at firm 
level exhibit more extreme movements on a daily basis. I therefore winsorize the  
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extreme observations of liquidity changes for a firm, at 5% and 95% level prior to 
running the regressions for estimating firm-level liquidity betas, to prevent the outliers 
from biasing the estimates.
74  
I run the following time-series regression for each firm, every year to estimate a 
simple “market model” for an individual stock regressed on market measures of 
liquidity and estimate the coefficients using Spec 1. I include market returns as an 
additional variable, to capture the effect of market returns on liquidity of stocks. 
Market returns will also remove any spurious dependence induced by an association 
between returns and spread measures, especially when they are functions of the 
transaction price. I include indicator variables for days of the week to prevent daily 
patterns observed in spreads from biasing the liquidity risk estimates. Existence of a 
regular pattern in spreads for securities during the week will induce a regular pattern 
in changes in spreads over time, subsequently inducing a positive correlation between 
market liquidity and stocks liquidity. Lastly, I include the squared returns to proxy for 
information flow. Both adverse selection risks and inventory risks faced by liquidity 
providers will increase with new information arrival, and thus impact measures of 
liquidity. 
If liquidity measures for a firm are available for less than 100 trading days in a year, I 
eliminate the firm from subsequent analysis.  
1 ... * * * 3 2 1 0 Spec Sqret Mktret MktLiq Liq it it t t it ε β β β α + + + Δ + = Δ
 
                                                 
74 The use of these regression helps curb the influence of the outliers, and the procedure results in more 
robust estimations of beta. The approach is discussed in details in Chan and Lakonishok (1992).   
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I run a modified version of the above regression, using Spec 2, to account for possible 
non-synchronicities in trading activities of the firms. The lead and lag terms for 
market liquidity and market returns are included to capture any lagged adjustments in 
commonality and account for the effects of return spillovers and liquidity spillovers. 
These terms could have more relevance for smaller stocks that happen to trade less 
frequently. 
2 ......... * * * *
* * * *
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While estimating these regressions for a firm to calculate its liquidity beta, I exclude 
that firm from the market portfolio in order to minimize the cross-sectional 
dependence in the estimated slope coefficients. I estimate these regressions using all 
four measures of liquidity (ESPR, QSPR, RELQSPR, and RELESPR) and both value-
weighted and equal-weighted market liquidity measures. When estimating the 
coefficients using the value-weighted measure of market liquidity, I include the value-
weighted market return. Similarly, when estimating the coefficients using the equal-
weighted measure of market liquidity, I include the equal-weighted market return.  
Table 3.4 presents a summary of the estimates of the beta coefficients: Panel A for 
those obtained using Spec 1 and Panel B for those obtained using Spec 2. I report the 
mean and median coefficients by first calculating the cross-sectional mean and median 
for the coefficients of interest each year and then taking the time-series mean over the 
period 1983–2005. I also present the fraction of market liquidity beta coefficients that 
are positive and the fraction that is positive and significant at 5% level each year. I 
similarly summarize the coefficients on the market return betas. I also present 
transition probabilities for the estimated beta coefficients in order to test the  
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persistence of the measures of liquidity risk. To compute these transition probabilities, 
I rank the firms by their liquidity betas each year into 5 groups. By following the firms 
over time and examining their ranks in the subsequent year, I compute the fraction of 
firms for which the rank in subsequent year stayed the same, giving me an estimate for 
the transition probability. Transition probabilities indicate the probability that the firm 
will be staying in same group 1 year ahead. The last two columns present the R-square 
of the regressions. For Spec 2, I also present the sum of the liquidity beta coefficients 
β1, β2, and β3, and the sum of the return beta coefficients β4, β5, and β6 to examine the 
effects of non-synchronicities. 
For the 41,604 firm years in the sample, when using Spec 1 and the value-weighted 
measures of market liquidity and returns, nearly 70% of firm years have a positive β1 
coefficient while 15% are positive and significant at 5% level. For the four liquidity 
measures, the mean (median) liquidity beta β1  coefficients are approximately 0.24 
(0.26), while the mean (median) return beta β2 coefficients are approximately -0.13 
(-0.15), respectively. The positive liquidity beta coefficients indicate that liquidity of 
individual stocks co-moves with market liquidity, confirming the existence of 
commonality in liquidity measures. The negative return beta β2 coefficients indicate 
that stocks become more liquid when market returns are positive, while their liquidity 
decreases when market returns are negative. The finding suggests that as financing 
constraints of intermediaries providing liquidity relax, liquidity increases, consistent 
with the claims in Coughenour and Saad (2004) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2008). The mean and median coefficients obtained using the RELQSPR liquidity 
measure (0.290 and 0.313) are the largest among the four liquidity measures. Later, 
when examining cross-sectional variation in the systematic liquidity risk, I present 
findings using RELQSPR liquidity betas. I find a large positive-and-significant  
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coefficient on squared returns, indicating that large price changes are associated with a 
decline in liquidity. This finding can easily result from market makers reducing 
liquidity provision at times of new information arrival. The findings from regressions 
using the equal-weighted market liquidity measures are mostly similar to those 
obtained using the value-weighted market liquidity measures. The unscaled measures, 
QSPR and ESPR appear to exhibit higher commonality than the scaled measures, 
RELQSPR and RELESPR. Also as noted previously, the quoted-spread measures 
exhibit higher commonality. 
The findings from the modified regression presented in Panel B are almost identical to 
those of Panel A. The β2 and β3 coefficients for lagged and leading measures of market 
liquidity are very small, resulting in a sum of the liquidity beta coefficients almost 
identical to that of β1 and also similar to those from Spec 1. Overall, these findings 
confirm the findings of CRS (2000) over a much longer sample period and indicate 
that liquidity at firm level exhibits commonality.
75 However, the average explanatory 
power of these regressions is around 4.3%, which suggests that market liquidity 
explains a very small part of the time variation in liquidity at firm level. Also, the 
transition probabilities based on forming 5 groups of firms indicates that the estimated 
liquidity beta coefficients at firm level are not persistent over time, which could be a 
result of errors in both estimation and time variation in liquidity risk. Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) also points out the difficulty in accurately estimating their measures 
of liquidity risk.  
                                                 
75 On separately examining the findings for year 1992, without including the indicator variables for days 
of the week, I find that the results are similar to those of CRS (2000). The estimated mean and median 
liquidity beta coefficients for the four measures are in the range of 0.4–0.7. The fraction of the liquidity 
beta coefficients that are positive is around 75%, while the fraction of the liquidity beta coefficients that 
is positive and significant at 5% level is around 23%.  
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics: Firm-level systematic liquidity risk measures.  The mean and median liquidity beta estimates for 
firms listed on NYSE and AMEX during the sample period 1983–2005 are calculated each year and then averaged over the sample 
period. Fraction of betas that are positive and positive and significant at 5% levels are also listed. Panel A presents estimates using 
Spec 1. Panel B presents findings using Spec 2. 
Panel A Mean Median Fraction +
Fraction +/ 
Sig at 5%
Transition 
Probability Mean Median Fraction -
Fraction -/ 
Sig at 5%
Transition 
Probability R_square Adj R_square
Spec 1 (Value weighted market portfolio)
D1espr 0.211 0.227 68.4% 16.0% 25.2% -0.121 -0.110 52.4% 3.0% 24.2% 4.37% 1.32%
D1qspr 0.221 0.238 67.2% 14.2% 24.4% -0.072 -0.102 52.4% 2.9% 22.5% 4.30% 1.24%
D1relespr 0.249 0.258 69.6% 15.7% 24.4% -0.226 -0.239 55.3% 3.9% 24.5% 4.26% 1.20%
D1relqspr 0.290 0.313 70.6% 16.3% 23.9% -0.103 -0.149 53.7% 3.7% 22.7% 4.33% 1.27%
Spec 1 (Equal weighted market portfolio)
D1espr 0.353 0.335 70.1% 15.4% 24.9% -0.264 -0.253 54.4% 2.6% 24.4% 4.23% 1.17%
D1qspr 0.438 0.418 72.5% 14.3% 23.7% -0.121 -0.182 53.2% 2.8% 23.0% 4.19% 1.12%
D1relespr 0.149 0.125 60.0% 7.5% 24.5% -0.750 -0.770 63.6% 5.5% 24.4% 3.94% 0.87%
D1relqspr 0.225 0.202 64.7% 8.4% 23.2% -0.527 -0.623 62.2% 5.5% 23.0% 4.02% 0.95%
Liquidity beta Return beta
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Panel B Mean Median Fraction +
Fraction +/ 
Sig at 5%
Transition 
Probability Mean Median Fraction -
Fraction -/ 
Sig at 5%
Transition 
Probability R_square Adj R_square
Spec 2 (Value weighted market portfolio)
D1espr 0.218 0.235 68.8% 11.1% 25.1% -0.113 -0.106 52.1% 3.5% 24.3% 4.11% 1.02%
D1qspr 0.216 0.231 67.1% 9.8% 24.1% -0.071 -0.099 52.0% 3.3% 22.8% 4.00% 0.91%
D1relespr 0.256 0.266 69.2% 10.3% 24.3% -0.214 -0.225 54.9% 3.9% 24.6% 4.01% 0.92%
D1relqspr 0.293 0.314 70.3% 11.3% 23.7% -0.101 -0.141 53.3% 3.6% 22.6% 4.04% 0.95%
Sum betas
D1espr 0.222 0.236 -0.195 -0.144
D1qspr 0.202 0.209 -0.172 -0.176
D1relespr 0.248 0.252 -0.404 -0.372
D1relqspr 0.279 0.293 -0.293 -0.324
Spec 2 (Equal weighted market portfolio)
D1espr 0.367 0.353 70.4% 9.4% 24.3% -0.247 -0.251 53.4% 4.6% 24.5% 3.97% 0.88%
D1qspr 0.449 0.432 73.0% 9.4% 23.1% -0.112 -0.164 52.6% 4.5% 23.2% 3.93% 0.83%
D1relespr 0.145 0.116 59.4% 4.0% 24.1% -0.704 -0.736 61.1% 7.0% 24.5% 3.67% 0.57%
D1relqspr 0.240 0.203 64.6% 5.2% 23.1% -0.439 -0.541 59.3% 6.7% 22.8% 3.72% 0.62%
Sum betas
D1espr 0.386 0.376 -0.221 -0.150
D1qspr 0.447 0.429 -0.154 -0.151
D1relespr 0.151 0.118 -0.767 -0.701
D1relqspr 0.277 0.236 -0.519 -0.586
Liquidity beta Return beta
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics: Firm-level total liquidity risk measures.  Summary of firm-level standard deviation and coefficient 
of variation [COV] of liquidity measures. The COV is defined as the standard deviation of the daily liquidity measures scaled by 
the mean of the daily liquidity measures over the year. 
Min P5 Mean P95 Max StdDev Kurt Skew Year 1 Year 3
Standard deviation of liquidity measures (calculated after winsorizing observations at 1% and 99% level)
espr 0.000 0.005 0.042 0.079 3.681 0.127 183.23 18.65 64.4% 53.3%
qspr 0.000 0.006 0.040 0.074 2.011 0.062 139.01 9.00 58.9% 47.4%
relespr 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.020 0.174 0.049 14.92 6.81 72.2% 59.3%
relqspr 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.024 0.086 0.009 9.76 3.02 69.3% 57.6%
Coefficient of variation (defined as : Standard deviation/ Mean)
espr 0.000 0.091 0.256 0.438 2.380 0.125 14.56 2.14 56.9% 48.4%
qspr 0.000 0.101 0.218 0.372 1.472 0.103 17.59 2.97 48.5% 39.9%
relespr 0.000 0.127 0.293 0.491 2.210 0.132 14.86 2.23 48.3% 41.8%
relqspr 0.000 0.127 0.256 0.434 1.497 0.114 13.36 2.62 41.1% 35.1%
Transition probability
 
 
  
134 
The liquidity beta β1 coefficients, the measure of systematic liquidity risk of a firm 
which captures the co-movement between liquidity of firm and market liquidity, also 
exhibits significant cross-sectional heterogeneity (not reported). I focus later on 
explaining whether firm-specific characteristics explain the cross-sectional variation in 
the measure of systematic liquidity risk. I specifically examine whether the ownership 
characteristics and measures of information asymmetry are important determinants of 
systematic liquidity risk. Given the low explanatory power of these “market model” 
regressions, I also examine the variance of liquidity of a firm. 
SECTION 2.4: FIRM-LEVEL VARIATION IN LIQUIDITY/TOTAL LIQUIDITY RISK 
Figure 3.2 illustrated the sizable time variation in market liquidity over the sample 
period. As expected, the total variation in liquidity at the firm level is much higher 
than that of the market. In Table 3.5, I present a summary of the variation in firm-level 
liquidity measures calculated over a one year period. Due to large outliers in liquidity 
measures, I winsorize the liquidity measures for a firm at 5% and 95% level and 
subsequently calculate their standard deviation. The standard deviation of the spread-
based liquidity measures increases with the mean level of spreads of the firm and, 
therefore, I also examine the coefficient of variation (COV), a normalized measure of 
the standard deviation.
76 The COV measure is a dimensionless quantity. Both standard 
deviation and COV measures indicate a sizable variation in liquidity at firm level over 
time. To test whether the liquidity variation at firm level is persistent over time, I 
examine the transition probabilities for both the volatility and COV of the liquidity 
measures. To compute these transition probabilities, I rank the firms by their liquidity 
risk measures each year into 5 groups. By following the firms over time and 
examining their ranks in the subsequent year and three years ahead, I compute the 
                                                 
76 COV is defined as Standard Deviation (Liquidity)/ Mean (Liquidity). I calculate the COV measures for 
each firm using daily measures of the liquidity of the firm over a 1 year period.   
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fraction of firms for which the rank in subsequent years stayed the same, giving me an 
estimate for the transition probability. The transition probabilities indicate a strong 
persistence in the measures of total variation of liquidity at firm level using all four 
measures of liquidity. The average probability of staying in the same ranked group one 
year ahead is 66.2%, while the average probability of staying in the same ranked 
group 3 years ahead is 54.4%, compared to the unconditional probabilities of 20%. I 
noted limited evidence of persistence in the systematic component of the liquidity risk 
measures in Section 2.3. The persistence in the liquidity variation over time and, to an 
extent, its effect on expected returns makes a case for examining its determinants.  
SECTION 2.5: FIRM-LEVEL MEASURES OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
In this section, I briefly describe the institutional ownership data and my measures of 
ownership concentration, investor horizon, and investor homogeneity. I also briefly 
outline the variables used in existing microstructure literature for measuring 
information asymmetry and information risk.  
I obtain institutional holdings data for the period 1980–2005 from Thomson Financial 
(previously known as CDA Spectrum) database, which consists of 13F filings reported 
quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Institutional investment 
managers are required to report their holdings—number of shares and fair market 
value—as of the last day of the calendar quarter according to Section 13(f)(1) and 
Rule 13f-1. The 13F reporting requirements apply regardless of whether an institution 
is regulated by the SEC or not. They also apply to foreign institutions if they “use any 
means or instrumentality of United States interstate commerce in the course of their 
business.” I simply sum up the holdings at the end of each quarter, for all institutions 
in the sample, to obtain total institutional holdings of the security at the end of the  
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quarter. I divide the total institutional holdings by the shares outstanding obtained 
from CRSP at end of each quarter and then take the yearly average of the proportion 
of the holdings to obtain an annual measure of institutional holdings referred to as 
fracinst.
77 The mean level of institutional ownership for the sample is 40.1% while the 
median is 38.9%. In general, the level of institutional ownership in the sample has 
been increasing over time. The median institutional ownership in firms increased from 
21.3% in 1983 to 66.7% in 2005. 
2.5.1: Ownership concentration 
I use three variables to test the effect of ownership concentration on liquidity risk. 
First, I create a measure of ownership dispersion by counting the average number of 
institutions holding equity in the firm over the four quarters. Due to the positive 
skewness of the variable in cross-section, I take its natural logarithm to obtain a 
measure of ownership dispersion, denoted as lnnuminst. Increase in the measure 
indicates an increase in ownership dispersion or reduction in concentration of 
holdings. Second, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, I measure concentration of 
institutional ownership in a firm, defining it as the sum of the squares of the ownership 
                                                 
77 All institutional managers who exercise investment discretion over 13F securities with a market value 
over $100 million are required to report their holdings within 45 days after the close of the quarter, 
according to the 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Institutions are required 
to report all equity positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. In two respects, 
13F data is incomplete: (1) institutions may be granted exception from filing these reports when they 
request confidential treatment to prevent disclosure of their proprietary trading strategies, and (2) 
institutions have to disclose only their long positions and the 13F filings do not contain information on 
short positions or options written. Given that a majority of institutional investors (pension funds, mutual 
funds, insurance companies) have mandates preventing them from short sales, and, on average, short 
interest in most securities is around 2%, this factor should not materially affect the holdings data. In 
addition, CDA Spectrum classifies each institutional investor as one of five types: bank trust 
departments, insurance companies, mutual funds, independent investment advisors, and unclassified 
institutions. The filing requirements also apply to hedge funds, if their holdings of U.S. stocks exceed 
the specified thresholds. Hedge funds may be able to mask their holdings from the SEC and, given that 
a large fraction of hedge funds invest in long/short equity strategy, the holdings data will not be 
accurate. Identifying the holdings by hedge fund managers is difficult, as the reporting entity is the 
institution and not the fund. An institution can have other funds besides hedge funds, like mutual funds, 
and the disclosed holdings to the SEC are at the aggregate level.  
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of each institution in the firm, where the ownership is expressed as a percentage of 
outstanding shares. Again due to the positive skewness of the variable, I take its 
natural logarithm to obtain a measure of ownership concentration, denoted as 
lnhhi_inst. Increases in lnhhi_inst will indicate an increase in ownership concentration 
while a decrease will indicate the opposite. The two variables lnnuminst and lnhhi_inst 
exhibit correlations of 0.74 and 0.78 with fracinst, respectively, and a positive 
correlation of 0.475 with each other in sample. The findings indicate that with an 
increase in the number of institutions holding equity in a firm, the fraction of 
institutional ownership in the firm increases. The correlation coefficient between 
lnhhi_inst and lnnuminst, after partialing out the effect of level of institutional 
ownership (fracinst), is -0.21. As expected the finding indicates that for the same level 
of institutional ownership in a firm, ownership concentration decreases with an 
increase in the number of institutions holding equity in the firm. I also look at the 
effect of block ownership, as presence of blocks indicates concentrated ownership. I 
include the variable number of blocks (NumBlocks), where a block exists if an 
institution holds more than 5% of outstanding equity in the firm. The mean number of 
block-holdings in the sample is 1.23, while the median is 1. NumBlocks exhibits a high 
correlation of 0.70 with lnhhi_inst and 0.65 with fracinst, indicating that the incidence 
of large block-holdings will increase as the level of institutional holdings increases.  
2.5.2: Investor horizon 
Using institutional holdings data from CDA/Spectrum as of the end of each quarter in 
a year, I estimate measures of portfolio turnover for each institution. The rationale for 
using portfolio turnover as a means for classifying institutions, is that short-term 
investors will buy and sell their investments more frequently while long-term investors 
will hold their positions unchanged for a considerable period. Thus, greater differences  
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in portfolio holdings will be observed over time for institutions with short-term 
investment horizon compared to those with long-term investment horizon. To 
implement this idea empirically, I follow the approach proposed by Gaspar, Massa, 
and Matos (2005) for estimating the portfolio turnover measures of the institutions. I 
measure an institution’s portfolio turnover using all stocks held by the institution.
78  
The turnover measures exhibit considerable persistence over time, indicating that 
institutions do not typically change their investment horizon and trading habits.
79 I 
divide institutions into three groups based on the measure of their portfolio turnover, 
with group 1 having the lowest turnover and group 3 having the largest. The 
institutions that fall into group 1 are classified as having a long-term investment 
horizon, while those falling into group 3 are classified as having a short-term 
investment horizon. The remaining institutions that fell into group 2, are considered to 
be those having a medium-term investment horizon. Subsequently, I divide stock 
holdings of each firm into three categories based on the fraction of shares held by each 
type of institution: long-term (low turnover), medium-term (medium turnover) and 
short-term (high turnover). I form these three categories by using the investment 
horizon of institutions from the previous year, to reduce the contemporaneous effect of 
their turnover on measures of liquidity variation. Fraction of shares held by low-
turnover institutions is referred to as fraclong. Buy and hold investors have low 
turnover. Similarly, fracmedium and fracshort represent shares held by medium-term 
investors and short-term (high turnover) investors, respectively. I examine the effect of 
                                                 
78 Yan and Zhang (2009) use the approach by Gaspar et al. to classify institutions as short-term and 
long-term and, subsequently, show that trading by short-term institutions forecasts future stock returns. 
79 In unreported results, I again calculate transition probabilities for institutions by ranking them into 
three groups and following their ranks over time. I find that one year onward the probability of staying 
in the same ranked group remains considerably higher (60%–65%) than the probability of switching to 
one of the other two groups (unconditional probability should be 33%). Similar results are observed 
when dividing the institutions into more groups and examining over longer periods.  
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investor horizon by looking at the difference between long-term ownership and short-
term ownership, designated as long_short.  
The mean (median) level of fraclong for the sample is 11.9% (10.1%), while the mean 
(median) level of fracshort for the sample is 10.7% (8.7%). The difference between 
long-term and short-term institutional ownership (long_short) exhibits a sizable cross-
sectional variation over the sample, with a standard deviation of 11.9%. The variable 
long_short exhibits a very small correlation of 0.02 with the level of institutional 
ownership, thus, allowing me to examine the difference in investment horizon of 
institutions holding equity in a firm on measures of time variation in liquidity. 
2.5.3: Investor homogeneity 
Using institutional holdings data from CDA/Spectrum and returns data from CRSP, I 
construct a measure to capture the homogeneity of the institutional investor base of a 
firm. The underlying idea is that two investors are considered alike if their observed 
portfolio holdings are similar. I consider a firm that has institutions exhibiting greater 
similarity in their portfolio holdings, as one with a more homogeneous investor base.  
To implement this idea empirically, I first calculate the daily portfolio returns of all 
institutions in my sample using their portfolio holdings at the beginning of each 
quarter. Subsequently, I measure pair-wise correlations between the daily portfolio 
returns of all institutions every year. Suppose a firm F has n institutional investors that 
hold equity in it during a one year period. The correlation between the daily returns on 
portfolios held by two institutions “i” and “j” holding equity in firm F over a one year 
period is represented as ρi,jF. The fraction of equity held by the institution “i” in the 
firm  F is denoted as viF. I then calculate the homogeneity measure hm_yearF  of  
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institutional investor base in a firm F  as a weighted measure of the pair-wise 
correlations among portfolio returns of institutions having equity ownership in the 
firm as in Equation 1. The weight wiF for an institution “i” in the firm F is calculated 
based on number of shares outstanding held by the institution in the firm as a fraction 
of total outstanding shares held by all institutions in the firm.  
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The measure hm_yearF will increase with an increase in the correlations of portfolio 
returns among investors holding equity in the firm. It will also increase with 
concentration of ownership in a firm assuming the correlations among investor base 
stay constant. Increases in hm_yearF will indicate an increase in investor homogeneity, 
while a decrease will indicate the opposite. If we represent the column vector of 
weights of holdings by institutions in firm F as wF and the correlation matrix for 
institutions holding equity in firm F as ρF then an alternative representation for 
hm_year is in Equation 2. 
2 .. ........ .......... * * _ Equation w w year hm F F F F ρ ′ =  
This measure can therefore theoretically lie between 0 and 1, as correlation matrices 
are positive semi-definite. In the sample, the mean (median) homogeneity measure is 
0.905 (0.917) with a standard deviation of 0.052. The measure ranges from 0.37 to 1.0, 
with 90% values lying between 0.79 and 0.97.   
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I present an example of the calculation of the homogeneity measure for illustration. 
Suppose a firm X has equity held by three institutions ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’. The fraction of 
equity held by the three institutions are 25%, 15% and 10% respectively, therefore the 
total amount of equity held by the institutions in the firm X is 50%. As a result, the 
weights waF, waF, and waF of the institutions are 50%, 30% and 20% respectively. The 
vector of weights can be denoted as wX (0.50, 0.30, 0.20). Let the correlation matrix of 
daily portfolio returns of the three institutions ρX be as following: 
 Institution a b c
a1 0 . 8 0 . 6
b0 . 810 . 5
c0 . 6 0 . 51  
Then the homogeneity measure of the institutional investor base for firm X is wX’ ρX 
wX and is equal to 0.8. Now, if the correlation between returns of institutions ‘a’ and 
‘b’ increases from 0.8 to 0.9, keeping everything else constant, the homogeneity 
measure increases to 0.83. In essence, if portfolios of institutions ‘a’ and ‘b’ become 
similar, the homogeneity measure will increase. 
SECTION  2.6:  MEASURES OF ADVERSE-SELECTION COMPONENT OF SPREAD AND 
INFORMATION RISK 
Measuring information asymmetry among the investors of a firm is extremely 
difficult, given the unobservability of private information. Over the years, market 
microstructure literature has come up with structural models to identify information 
asymmetry. I follow two approaches used in the literature to measure information 
asymmetry among the investors of a firm. One approach is to use a measure of the 
probability of informed trading (PIN) and the other is to use a measure of adverse-
selection component of spread (fracas_gh).   
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In a series of papers (see Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996a, 1997); Easley et al. 
(1996b); and Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1998)), Easley and O’Hara provide a 
method to estimate the probability of information-based trading. Their method uses 
data on buys and sells to estimate the underlying parameters of the microstructure 
model and shows how to combine these parameters to find a single measure of the 
probability of information-based trading. PIN has been shown in previous work to 
explain a number of information-based regularities, providing me with the measure 
needed to examine the effect of information asymmetry on liquidity risk.  
The second approach uses a measure based on the spread decomposition models. The 
spread posted by the market maker compensates him for the adverse selection risk he 
faces in trading with informed traders, inventory risk due to price volatility of the 
stock, and other fixed costs. Following the approach of Glosten and Harris (1988) and 
using the trade indicator model, I estimate the adverse selection component of spread 
(fracas_gh). The trade indicator model allows for decomposition of the spread posted 
by a market maker assuming that liquidity motivated trades have a temporary price 
impact, while information-motivated trades have a permanent impact. 
SECTION 3: MAIN FINDINGS 
I present results starting with the effect of institutional ownership on systematic 
liquidity risk measures. When examining the effect of institutional ownership and 
information asymmetry on systematic liquidity risk measures, hypotheses 1 through 6 
provide the framework to interpret the findings. Given the low explanatory power of 
the “market model,” for explaining the time variation in firm liquidity, I later examine 
the effect of institutional ownership on time variation and coefficient of variation  
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[COV] of liquidity measures. However, I don’t have strong priors on the effect of 
institutional ownership on the total liquidity risk measures. 
SECTION 3.1: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND SYSTEMATIC LIQUIDITY RISK 
3.1.1: Portfolio results 
In this section, I present the findings using the liquidity beta (β1) coefficients estimated 
with Spec 1 from Section 2.3. The liquidity beta coefficients measure the systematic 
liquidity risk of a stock resulting from the covariance of changes in the stocks liquidity 
with measures of changes in market liquidity. I start out by stratifying the sample into 
five quintiles each year, based on different firm and institutional investor 
characteristics. Table 3.6 presents some observations based on the variation of 
systematic liquidity risk measure across groups of firms formed on those firm 
characteristics. I present the mean liquidity beta coefficients for all four measures of 
liquidity (ESPR, QSPR, RELESPR, and RELQSPR) for groups formed based on size of 
the firm, liquidity level of the firm, institutional ownership of the firm, investor 
horizon, homogeneity of the investor base, and information risk measures. I quickly 
summarize findings from the portfolio results and defer a more detailed interpretation 
of the findings in the context of the hypotheses until I present the regression results. 
Table 3.6 indicates that liquidity betas vary systematically across several firm 
characteristics. I find that systematic liquidity risk increases with size of the firm, as 
measured by both market capitalization of the firm and its revenues. It also increases 
with the level of institutional ownership and increasing homogeneity of the 
institutional investor base. Systematic liquidity risk also increases with increase in 
ownership by both short-term and long-term investors. On examining the difference 
between the long-term and short-term ownership (long_short), I find some evidence of  
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a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship, with an overall trend indicating an increase 
in systematic liquidity risk measures with a shift in ownership towards long-term 
investors. On exploring the non-monotonic relationship further, I find that the 
systematic liquidity risk is higher when the magnitude of difference between holdings 
of long-term and short-term investors, an imbalance in ownership type, is high. A shift 
in holdings towards either short-term or long-term investors is associated with an 
increase in the homogeneity of the institutional investor base, which can result in an 
increase in liquidity risk. I also find that an increase in the measures of information 
asymmetry is associated with a reduction in the systematic liquidity risk.  
Because both information risk and the level of institutional ownership measures 
exhibit a strong correlation with the firm size, and investor horizon, ownership 
concentration, and investor homogeneity measures exhibit a strong correlation with 
the level of institutional ownership, I also present findings by forming groups based on 
sequential sorts. In Panel A of Table 3.7, I present the findings by stratifying firms 
each year into five size-based quintiles and then, in turn, within each size-based 
quintile, into quintiles based on the characteristic of interest. This process of forming 
groups controls for the effect of size on systematic liquidity risk and produces 
variation in the liquidity betas related to the characteristic of interest. In a summary of 
the findings, I present the means of the liquidity betas for the characteristic-based 
quintiles across the different size categories.  
After controlling for the effect of firm size, I find that the liquidity beta measures 
increase with fracinst and ownership dispersion (lnnuminst). Both increase in 
institutional ownership level and ownership dispersion can increase systematic 
liquidity risk, by increasing the likelihood of herd formation and correlated trading.  
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After controlling for size effect, I find that systematic liquidity risk decreases with 
both increases in spreads and with information asymmetry. The inverse relation 
between liquidity and systematic liquidity risk is consistent with a preference of 
investors to liquidate or trade in assets that are more liquid to save on transaction costs 
during declines in market liquidity. A decrease in liquidity risk with information 
asymmetry is consistent with the idea that, investors increase reliance on their private 
information in taking decisions, when the value of private information is higher. 
Herding is less likely to occur in such circumstances due to a reduced likelihood of 
information cascades.  
In Panel B of Table 3.7, I present the findings by stratifying the firms into five 
fracinst-based quintiles for each year and then, in turn, within each fracinst-based 
quintile, into quintiles based on the characteristic of interest. This process of forming 
groups controls for the effect of the level of institutional ownership on systematic 
liquidity risk and relates the variation in the liquidity betas to other attributes of 
institutional ownership. In general, I find that the systematic liquidity risk increases 
with long-term ownership, while it decreases with short-term ownership. On 
examining the effect of the imbalance in ownership on liquidity risk, I find that 
liquidity risk increases with an increase in long_short, but at a decreasing rate 
suggesting that a shift towards longer term ownership results in increased systematic 
liquidity risk. This finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4 where I claimed that that 
liquidity risk of stocks will increase as ownership by short-term investors increases 
due to the greater likelihood of them facing liquidity shocks and demanding liquidity 
when market liquidity is low. A possible interpretation is that as the shares held by 
long-term investors in a firm increases, they get tied up for longer duration, and the 
fraction that remains exhibits more volatile trading.  
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Table 3.6: Parametric analysis: Systematic liquidity risk measures (single sorted).  Liquidity beta estimates for firms listed on 
NYSE and AMEX during the sample period 1983–2005 are summarized. Each year firms are divided into five groups based on 
certain firm characteristics. Mean liquidity beta measures are presented for firms in the groups to examine the effect of variation in 
firm characteristic on the liquidity betas. 
Characteristic Lowest Medium High Characteristic Lowest Medium High
Market Capitalization [lnSize] Short term institutional ownership [fracshort]
espr 0.073 0.137 0.196 0.253 0.356 espr 0.093 0.178 0.242 0.280 0.280
qspr 0.072 0.114 0.170 0.259 0.453 qspr 0.098 0.197 0.272 0.297 0.274
relespr 0.123 0.201 0.253 0.278 0.328 relespr 0.152 0.220 0.271 0.292 0.300
relqspr 0.135 0.216 0.260 0.339 0.472 relqspr 0.174 0.279 0.342 0.366 0.355
Sales [LnSales] Long term institutional ownership [fraclong]
espr 0.092 0.155 0.200 0.248 0.348 espr 0.118 0.157 0.204 0.276 0.323
qspr 0.075 0.134 0.183 0.263 0.442 qspr 0.102 0.162 0.212 0.296 0.386
relespr 0.146 0.213 0.242 0.279 0.325 relespr 0.185 0.209 0.234 0.292 0.327
relqspr 0.154 0.228 0.276 0.330 0.461 relqspr 0.200 0.254 0.285 0.359 0.417
Liquidity measure [c_BMA] Investor horizon [long_short]
espr 0.326 0.271 0.241 0.182 0.081 espr 0.247 0.205 0.191 0.202 0.280
qspr 0.357 0.284 0.251 0.188 0.078 qspr 0.224 0.226 0.192 0.226 0.327
relespr 0.318 0.299 0.283 0.226 0.130 relespr 0.282 0.242 0.236 0.226 0.295
relqspr 0.399 0.351 0.325 0.275 0.152 relqspr 0.313 0.305 0.272 0.291 0.372
Institutional Ownership [fracinst] Investor horizon [abslong_short]
espr 0.087 0.157 0.217 0.282 0.322 espr 0.1784 0.192 0.2155 0.2559 0.2792
qspr 0.104 0.152 0.240 0.300 0.347 qspr 0.1869 0.2259 0.2384 0.2657 0.2776
relespr 0.150 0.205 0.246 0.301 0.327 relespr 0.2335 0.2254 0.2416 0.2806 0.297
relqspr 0.172 0.245 0.312 0.369 0.396 relqspr 0.2611 0.296 0.308 0.3403 0.3471
Homogeneity of investors [hm_year] PIN
espr 0.164 0.191 0.220 0.287 0.258 espr 0.290 0.253 0.216 0.191 0.088
qspr 0.173 0.175 0.220 0.314 0.299 qspr 0.362 0.305 0.234 0.172 0.093
relespr 0.209 0.234 0.259 0.295 0.280 relespr 0.292 0.284 0.258 0.256 0.128
relqspr 0.241 0.271 0.301 0.372 0.362 relqspr 0.417 0.379 0.323 0.263 0.162  
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Table 3.7: Parametric analysis: Systematic liquidity risk measures (double sorted).  Liquidity beta measures of a firm each year by 
dividing the firms listed on NYSE and AMEX into groups each year are summarized. The portfolio sorts are carried out 
sequentially to identify the effect of the characteristic after controlling for the effect of control characteristics. The control 
characteristics are indicated in brackets and are either size or level of institutional ownership. 
Characteristic Lowest Medium High Characteristic Lowest Medium High
Panel A: Controlling for size of firm
Institutional Ownership [fracinst] (Control: size) PIN (Control: size)
espr 0.150 0.198 0.212 0.231 0.247 espr 0.227 0.218 0.205 0.191 0.166
qspr 0.170 0.210 0.223 0.242 0.232 qspr 0.255 0.251 0.239 0.212 0.178
relespr 0.191 0.227 0.248 0.265 0.274 relespr 0.249 0.270 0.243 0.227 0.213
relqspr 0.247 0.281 0.289 0.314 0.308 relqspr 0.331 0.330 0.312 0.282 0.228
Ownership dispersion [lnnuminst] (Control: size) Liquidity measure [c_BMA] (Control: size)
espr 0.134 0.181 0.206 0.220 0.270 espr 0.260 0.249 0.224 0.192 0.130
qspr 0.133 0.197 0.197 0.252 0.295 qspr 0.253 0.236 0.238 0.217 0.152
relespr 0.183 0.223 0.237 0.262 0.279 relespr 0.291 0.277 0.248 0.226 0.177
relqspr 0.204 0.249 0.277 0.331 0.357 relqspr 0.310 0.305 0.310 0.293 0.229
Panel B: Controlling for institutional ownership (fracinst) of firm
Long term institutional ownership [fraclong] (Control: fracinst) Ownership concentration [lnhhi_inst] (Control: fracinst)
espr 0.192 0.201 0.221 0.235 0.228 espr 0.273 0.222 0.205 0.190 0.151
qspr 0.156 0.205 0.245 0.267 0.264 qspr 0.327 0.233 0.200 0.187 0.145
relespr 0.240 0.244 0.254 0.256 0.244 relespr 0.285 0.238 0.250 0.242 0.208
relqspr 0.258 0.289 0.313 0.324 0.313 relqspr 0.376 0.314 0.291 0.259 0.220
Short term institutional ownership [fracshort] (Control: fracinst) Ownership dispersion [lnnuminst] (Control: fracinst)
espr 0.209 0.232 0.229 0.201 0.195 espr 0.144 0.157 0.194 0.238 0.281
qspr 0.228 0.274 0.232 0.219 0.180 qspr 0.102 0.151 0.183 0.257 0.369
relespr 0.241 0.251 0.252 0.241 0.236 relespr 0.195 0.229 0.233 0.264 0.288
relqspr 0.284 0.343 0.305 0.297 0.268 relqspr 0.185 0.222 0.267 0.334 0.414
Investor horizon [long_short] (Control: fracinst) Homogeneity of investors [HM_year] (Control: fracinst)
espr 0.199 0.203 0.217 0.229 0.229 espr 0.168 0.178 0.214 0.236 0.262
qspr 0.179 0.208 0.234 0.261 0.261 qspr 0.178 0.172 0.216 0.259 0.299
relespr 0.240 0.247 0.246 0.248 0.249 relespr 0.214 0.234 0.238 0.255 0.277
relqspr 0.270 0.289 0.305 0.322 0.313 relqspr 0.245 0.267 0.291 0.319 0.361   
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After controlling for the level of institutional ownership, I find that the liquidity beta 
measures decrease with ownership concentration (lnhhi_inst) while they increase with 
ownership dispersion. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 3. The finding 
supports my claim that concentrated ownership will reduce the likelihood of herding 
due to greater incentives to collect and act on private information. Investors holding 
concentrated positions rely more on their private information and act less on the basis 
of their inference of others’ actions. I also find strong evidence consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 that the liquidity risk measures increase with the homogeneity of 
investor base after controlling for the level of institutional ownership. The finding 
regarding effect of homogeneity of institutional investor base on liquidity risk supports 
my earlier claim that as ownership of an asset becomes more homogeneous, both the 
likelihood of owners facing a common liquidity shock and the effect of the liquidity 
shock on the asset increases. Homogeneity of ownership also increases the propensity 
to herd as it naturally results in a reduction in the dispersion of institutions’ private 
information. This finding is consistent with that of Fernando et al. (2008), which 
found that the homogeneity in the investor base of PERPS, due to its concentrated 
ownership by Japanese banks, led to its sudden significant decline in liquidity.  
3.1.2: Multivariate results 
In this section, I examine the relationship between liquidity risk and the institutional 
ownership variables in a multivariate framework to control for other firm 
characteristics and test hypotheses 1 through 6. Due to the uneven number of firms in 
the panel each year, I rely on pooled regressions with year and industry fixed effects. I 
include industry fixed effects to control for the differences in liquidity risk across 
industries using the Fama-French 12 classification. The year fixed effects take into 
account the time trends of the variables and thus avoid spurious relationships. To  
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ensure that standard errors are not biased, I estimate them by clustering them both on 
the firm and time dimensions. Clustering ensures that the inference is based on 
standard errors that are robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over time 
and across firms in the same year.
80 As the liquidity measures are noisy, there will be 
errors in the estimation of liquidity betas. However, there is no reason to believe that 
certain firm characteristics will influence the errors in the estimated liquidity betas, the 
dependent variables in the cross-sectional regression, and, thus, bias the inference 
drawn from studying the relationship between liquidity betas and firm characteristics. 
For the sake of brevity, I present the findings for liquidity betas for the RELQSPR 
measure. I present the results using value-weighted measures of market liquidity and 
returns using Spec 1 from Section 2.3, as these measures exhibited the greatest degree 
of commonality. 
The primary variables of interest are the ones associated with ownership structure and 
information asymmetry. I also include additional control variables to capture those 
firm characteristics that I suspect could influence the time variation in a stock’s 
liquidity and its liquidity risk. Investors in need of funds may prefer to liquidate assets 
that are more liquid, which can cause the liquidity demand for those assets to vary 
more over time. Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) also indicate the time-varying nature 
of the liquidity risk and use trading volume to identify the liquidity state. I, therefore, 
add the liquidity of a firm as an additional control variable. Benston and Hagerman 
(1974) find that higher individual stock volatility is cross-sectionally associated with 
higher spreads. Firms with higher volatility levels may exhibit greater time variation in 
volatility. For this reason, I include a lagged measure of the stock-return volatility 
(lagvolatility) as an additional control variable. Volatility is calculated using the 
                                                 
80 Since the measured liquidity betas are not highly persistent over time, serial correlation among the 
residuals is not a concern.  
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standard deviation of the daily stock returns, excluding the dividends, over a one-year 
period. Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) found greater herding behavior in past 
winners. They suggest that many mutual funds follow momentum strategies and, as a 
result, the herding behavior is likely to be more prominent in winner stocks. The 
researchers also observed that the growth-oriented funds exhibited a greater tendency 
to herd than the income-oriented funds. This could be because the growth-oriented 
funds trade and hold a larger proportion of growth stocks, many of which are small 
caps on whom public information is harder to obtain and analyze. As a result, there is 
a greater likelihood of the herding behavior in high-growth stocks. Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999) suggest that if institutional investors are better informed, they are more likely 
to herd in under-valued stocks. To control for the herding effects resulting from past 
returns and the growth prospects of a firm and style investing, I include the book-to-
market ratio (booktomkt) and the last year’s annual returns (lagannret). 
Table 3.8 presents the findings from the pooled regressions. Spec 1 indicates that the 
systematic liquidity risk increases with the size and liquidity of the firm. As mentioned 
earlier, the inverse relation between liquidity and liquidity risk can result from a 
preference of investors to liquidate relatively liquid assets to save on the transaction 
costs during periods of low market liquidity. As a result, stocks that are more liquid 
may exhibit a greater reaction to aggregate liquidity changes given an increased 
liquidity demand for these stocks. This finding is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Fernando (2003) who find that investors facing liquidity shocks will 
trade in more liquid assets.   
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Table 3.8: Cross-sectional results: Determinants of systematic liquidity risk.  Cross-
sectional results for effects of institutional ownership on liquidity risk for stocks listed 
on NYSE and AMEX are presented. The dependent variable is the liquidity beta 
estimated from the regression of daily changes in relqspr on daily changes in a value 
weighted measure of market liquidity. relqspr measures are obtained using TAQ data. 
The period of study is 1983–2004 when using the PIN metric as an explanatory 
variable. Pooled regression is run using year and industry fixed effects due to 
inherently unbalanced nature of the panel. The standard errors are estimated by 
clustering on year and firm and are presented in italics below the estimates.  
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Variable Spec 1 Spec 2 Spe c 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6 Spec 7
Size 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038***
0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
c_bma -3.898*** -4.761*** -4.253*** -4.037*** -3.999*** -4.033*** -4.018***
0.884 0.872 0.880 0.877 0.875 0.876 0.869
fracinst 0.033 0.05** 0.169*** 0.173*** 0.044* 0.042*
0.022 0.022 0.057 0.039 0.027 0.023
PIN -0.452*** -0.406*** -0.383*** -0.45*** -0.454*** -0.45***
0.062 0.063 0.064 0.062 0.062 0.063
fracas_gh -0.149***
0.034
lnhhi_inst -0.029***
0.008
numblocks -0.034***
0.006
fraclong 0.222**
0.101
fracshort -0.035
0.050
long_short 0.124*
0.063
hm_year 0.275***
0.105
lagvolatility 0.982** 0.824* 0.927** 1.018** 1.149** 1.15** 1**
0.457 0.426 0.457 0.452 0.495 0.497 0.454
lagannret 0.028** 0.031** 0.022* 0.02 0.031** 0.032** 0.026**
0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
booktomkt 0.001 0** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Adj R2 5.29% 5.65% 5.40% 5.43% 5.33% 5.32% 5.32%
No. of obs. 38288 40472 38288 38288 38288 38288 38288
No. of parameters 39 40 40 40 40 40 40
F. Value 272.82 307.21 275.34 276.70 258.04 258.06 270.24  
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance 
is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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In the remaining specifications, where I control for other institutional characteristics, 
the coefficient on the level of institutional ownership is positive and significant. On 
the whole, I find that increasing institutional ownership results in an increasing 
commonality in liquidity and, in addition, is a source of systematic liquidity risk. 
These results lend support to Hypothesis 1 of this chapter. Stocks predominantly held 
by institutions could exhibit increased herding and correlated trading, due to the 
greater homogeneity of institutional investors, resulting in an increased liquidity risk 
and commonality in liquidity. This finding also relates to the evidence found by 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) regarding the phenomenon of “style investing” as a 
source of commonality in returns. 
After controlling for size and liquidity level, I find that an increase in information-
asymmetry measures lead to a decline in the liquidity betas. Coefficient estimates of 
both the measures of information asymmetry, PIN (Spec 1) and fracas_gh (Spec 2), 
are negative and statistically significant (-0.452 and -0.149, respectively). The 
economic effects are not sizable, with a one standard deviation increase in these 
measures, leading to a decline in the systematic liquidity risk measure of ~0.06 
standard deviation.
81 This finding lends additional support to both institutional herding 
and correlated trading as a source of commonality in liquidity and systematic liquidity 
risk. Correlated trading can be a result from herding or investors acting on common 
signals about macroeconomic factors. However, with the private information among 
investors increasing, investors having precise information are more likely to rely on 
their information in making decisions. Such investors are not only less likely to exhibit 
                                                 
81 These findings are obtained after controlling for the effect of size of the firm. Size and the 
information asymmetry measures PIN and fracas_gh exhibit a strong negative correlation. Size is often 
considered as a proxy for the information environment of the firm, with larger firms having less private 
information. In light of the above, the effect of information asymmetry on systematic liquidity risk after 
controlling for the firm size, is a significant finding.  
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a herding tendency but also act in a stabilizing manner, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of information cascades. Another interpretation is that the informed 
investors in these firms are more likely to respond to sudden spikes in liquidity 
demand when there are changes in the market liquidity, thus reducing the systematic 
liquidity risk of these stocks. The above finding strongly supports the effect of 
information asymmetry on the liquidity risk and adds a potential link between the level 
of liquidity and the systematic liquidity risk. 
In Spec 3 and Spec 4, I examine the effect of ownership concentration and block-
holdings on the systematic liquidity risk after controlling for the level of ownership. 
Systematic liquidity risk decreases with both an increase in ownership concentration 
and an increase in block-holdings. These findings support the claim that concentrated 
ownership will reduce the likelihood of herding and correlated trading. When 
institutions hold larger stakes in a firm they have greater incentives to collect and act 
on their private information and are therefore less likely to rely on inferences drawn 
from the actions of others. As a result, for similar levels of institutional ownership, the 
likelihood of herding behavior and correlated trading is lower, when ownership is 
concentrated among fewer institutions, reducing the systematic liquidity risk. These 
findings are also consistent with the argument in Fernando (2003) where an increase in 
heterogeneity of investors exposure to systematic liquidity shocks alleviates the 
impact of the liquidity shocks thereby reducing commonality in liquidity.  
In Spec 5 and Spec 6, I examine the effect of investor horizon on the systematic 
liquidity risk after controlling for the level of ownership. I find that the systematic 
liquidity risk increases with long-term institutional ownership (fraclong and 
long_short) indicating that the liquidity of firms having a larger fraction of shares held  
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by long-term investors reacts more to changes in the marketwide liquidity. As 
mentioned earlier in the portfolio results, this finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 3 
that liquidity risk of stocks will increase as ownership by short-term investors 
increases. I had earlier proposed that the systematic liquidity risk should increase with 
increasing ownership by short-term investors due to their greater likelihood of facing 
liquidity shocks and demanding liquidity when market liquidity is low. This contrary 
finding is surprising and suggests that herding behavior by institutions with a short-
term investment horizon may not be a primary cause for commonality in liquidity. An 
alternative interpretation of this finding is that the short-term investors are more likely 
to step in and provide liquidity to long-term investors when market liquidity is low. 
Long-term investors, however, may not step in and meet the liquidity needs of the 
short-term investors. Another possibility is that as the shares held by long-term 
investors in a firm increases, they get tied up for longer duration, and the fraction that 
remains exhibits more volatile trading. 
In Spec 7, I find that the liquidity risk increases with investor homogeneity. The 
coefficient on hm_year (0.275) is positive and statistically significant. The economic 
effects though are not sizable, with a one standard deviation increase in these 
measures leading to an increase in the systematic liquidity risk measure of ~0.03 
standard deviation. This finding supports my earlier claim that as the ownership of an 
asset becomes more homogeneous, both the likelihood of the owners facing a common 
liquidity shock and the effect of the liquidity shock on the asset will increase. The 
likelihood of herding increases with homogeneity of ownership as it naturally results 
in a reduction in the dispersion of the private information of institutions. This finding 
further confirms the claim that the tendency of institutions to herd and follow similar 
investment strategies can be a source of increased liquidity risk.   
156 
The average explanatory power of these cross-sectional regressions is low and around 
5%. However, the findings examining the effect of institutional ownership on 
systematic liquidity risk highlight the role of ownership of assets as a source of 
commonality in liquidity and the liquidity risk. These findings from the equity markets 
provide a starting point to further examine the effects of the ownership attributes on 
the systematic liquidity risk in other asset markets. 
3.1.3: Robustness tests 
I first test robustness of the results obtained in Section 3.1.2 using alternative 
estimation methods. For sake of conciseness, I don’t report results in this section and 
only present a summary of the various robustness tests. I obtain estimates consistent 
with those in Table 3.7 when using within-firm variation using firm fixed effects, 
estimates obtained using between firm variation, and those obtained using the Fama-
Macbeth approach. I also estimate the cross-sectional regressions using other liquidity 
measures QSPR, ESPR, and RELESPR. Similarly, I redo the regressions to account for 
the effect of non-synchronicities, by using the sum of the liquidity beta coefficients β1, 
β2,  and  β3, from Spec 2, in Section 2.3. The findings reported in Table 3.8 for 
determinants of the systematic liquidity risk measures using other liquidity measures 
and after accounting for non-synchronicities, remain qualitatively unaltered. 
I test the robustness of the main results across two sub-periods and by dividing the 
sample into groups based on the following firm characteristics: size, volatility, book to 
market ratio and liquidity. I partition firms into equal sized groups using the median 
value of the characteristic over the sample period, and then test whether the effect of 
institutional ownership on systematic liquidity risk is consistent across these groups.  
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This approach assists in checking stability of parameters and existence of any 
interaction effects that may influence the main results. 
I split the sample into the sub-periods 1983–1992 (ISSM data) and 1993–2005 (TAQ 
data) and also dividing them into equal periods 1983–1993 and 1994–2005. Consistent 
findings across these sub-periods and similar findings from the Fama-Macbeth 
approach indicate stability of estimates over time. On analyzing the firms from NYSE 
and AMEX separately, the findings are very similar. The findings are robust to 
excluding firms belonging to the financial and utilities sector (SIC codes belonging to 
6000–6999 and 4900–4949, respectively). The findings are also very similar across 
equal sized groups of firms formed based on firm size, historical returns, liquidity and 
volatility. Overall, the findings indicate that both the effects of information asymmetry 
variables and institutional ownership variables—level of institutional ownership, 
concentration of institutional ownership, homogeneity of institutional investor base, 
investment horizon of the institutional investor base—are fairly robust though they 
tend to be relatively stronger for less liquid firms. Furthermore, on examining the 
effects of concentration of institutional ownership, homogeneity of institutional 
investor base, investment horizon of the institutional investor base across groups 
formed based on the level of institutional ownership the results are very consistent. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, over time, indexing has become more popular as a low 
cost alternative to active investing. Current estimates suggest that roughly 20% of the 
outstanding equity of various firms held by institutions is passively managed. Firms 
included in major stock indices can exhibit greater commonality in liquidity resulting 
from liquidity needs of passive indexers due to fund flows and active indexers trying 
to stay close to their respective benchmark weights. Harford and Kaul (2005) find that  
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stocks listed in S&P 500 index are correlated more with other index components than 
with stocks that belong to the same industry, suggesting that basket trading by 
arbitrageurs of index components gives rise to correlated liquidity demands. I 
therefore test the robustness of results to including two indicator variables, first for 
inclusion of a firm in the Dow Jones Industrial Index and the other for inclusion of a 
firm in the S&P 500 index. I find evidence that systematic liquidity risk increases for 
firms that are included in these indices. The different effects of institutional ownership 
remain significant though their effects are marginally lower. 
There is also a concern that lead-lag effects could drive some of the reported findings. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that small stocks react slowly compared to larger 
stocks to arrival of new information. This can result in systematic liquidity risk 
measures to increase with firm size when using value weighted measure of market 
liquidity. To address this concern, I redid my time-series regressions for estimating 
systematic liquidity risk with equal weighted measures of market liquidity and market 
returns and using Spec 1 from Section 2.3. While estimating these regressions for a 
firm to calculate its liquidity beta, I exclude that firm from the market portfolio in 
order to minimize the cross-sectional dependence in the estimated slope coefficients. I 
estimated the effect of institutional ownership variables on these new measures of 
liquidity beta. The cross-sectional regression results are qualitatively similar and 
indicate that the increase in systematic liquidity risk with firm size and level of 
institutional ownership is not an artifact of the lead-lag effects. 
While examining the effect of investor horizon on measures of liquidity risk, I had 
classified the ownership by long-term and short-term institutions based on the 
portfolio turnover measures of institutions from the previous year. When reclassifying  
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the institutions based on their contemporaneous portfolio turnover, the effect of 
investor horizon on liquidity risk measures remains practically identical.  
The findings I have reported so far are based on following a two step procedure. In the 
first step, I measure systematic liquidity risk, and then in a subsequent step run the 
cross-sectional regression to determine the effects of ownership characteristics and 
information asymmetry on liquidity risk. I mentioned earlier that there could be a 
concern that some of these findings are biased due to the two-step procedure, if the 
estimation errors in first stage are related to firm characteristics. Nevertheless, I 
address this issue by estimating a single panel regression using both time-series as 
well as cross-sectional data. The panel regression allows me to estimate, the impact of 
the ownership characteristics on the measures of systematic liquidity risk in a single 
step. For purpose of illustration, I present the specification similar to Spec 1 of Table 
3.7. I estimate the following regression across all firms and all days over the period 
1983-2005. 
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In the above regression, the coefficients on the interaction terms capture the sensitivity 
of the co-movement of liquidity with market liquidity to the relevant cross-sectional 
variable. The coefficients of interest are β13 and β14, which capture the effect of level 
of institutional ownership and information asymmetry on measures of systematic 
liquidity risk. The findings from following this one step procedure are qualitatively 
similar to those from the two step procedure presented in Table 3.7. For sake of  
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conciseness, I don’t present the specifications for the other cross-sectional regressions 
(Spec2–Spec7). Findings for these specifications using the one step procedure are 
consistent with those reported following the two step procedure. 
In the measures of liquidity risk, using the market models, I winsorized the measures 
of liquidity at 5% and 95% level to  remove the effect  of outliers.  This raises the 
concern that, I may not be  capturing the large extreme changes in liquidity, the 
changes we should really be concerned about and are a significant component 
of liquidity  risk.  Therefore,  to further test robustness of my results, I estimated 
measures of liquidity risk using the liquidity measures winsorized at 1% and 99% 
level. The findings are similar to those reported earlier. The effect of level of 
institutional ownership is somewhat stronger while the effect of ownership 
concentration is a little weak. 
SECTION 3.2: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND TOTAL LIQUIDITY RISK 
The previous section presented the effect of the institutional ownership measures on 
cross-sectional variation in the systematic liquidity risk. The average explanatory 
power of the “market model” regressions used to estimate the systematic liquidity risk 
was around 4.3%, which suggests that the changes in market liquidity explains a very 
small part of the time variation in the liquidity at the firm level. The estimated 
liquidity beta coefficients at firm level were also not persistent over time, indicating 
the difficulty in accurately estimating the measures of systematic liquidity risk. In 
Table 3.5, I showed that the time variation of the liquidity measures at the firm level 
were fairly persistent over time. I also claimed earlier that stochastic liquidity will be 
important for pricing derivatives, as investors trading derivatives may have less 
discretion in trading the underlying for replicating or hedging purposes. Similarly,  
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stochastic liquidity will affect the ability of arbitrageurs to eliminate mispricing. The 
capital constraints on arbitrageurs generally force them to hold undiversified 
portfolios, thus exposing them not just to the systematic variation in liquidity but also 
to the total liquidity variation. I, therefore, turn to examining the effects of institutional 
ownership and information asymmetry at a firm level on the measures of total 
variation in liquidity. 
3.2.1: PORTFOLIO RESULTS 
As a precursor to the regressions, for each year, I stratify the sample into five quintiles 
based on different firm characteristics. Table 3.9 presents observations based on the 
standard deviation of firm level liquidity across the groups of firms formed on these 
firm characteristics. I find that the time variation of all four liquidity measures tends to 
decrease with the size of the firm as measured by the market capitalization or the 
annual sales of the firm. I also find that the total variation in liquidity measures tend to 
increase with the mean spreads of the firm and with an increase in both measures of 
information asymmetry, PIN and fracas_gh. These findings suggest that an increase in 
information asymmetry not only increases the measures of spreads but also increases 
their variation over time. With an increase in the level of institutional ownership 
fracinst, I find that the time variation in liquidity measures tend to decrease, indicating 
that the overall liquidity of firms held predominantly by institutions varies less over 
time. I find similar results when examining the ownership level by institutions having 
both long-term and short-term investment horizons. No clear pattern emerges from the 
effect of difference in investor horizon (long_short) and investor hormogeneity 
(hm_year) on time variation in liquidity.   
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Table 3.9: Parametric analysis: Total liquidity risk measures (single sorted).  Total liquidity risk measures for firms listed on NYSE 
and AMEX during the sample period 1983–2005 are summarized. Each year firms are divided into five groups based on certain 
firm characteristics. Mean total liquidity risk measures are presented for firms in the groups to examine the effect of variation in 
firm characteristic on the liquidity betas. 
Characteristic Lowest Medium High Characteristic Lowest Medium High
Sales [lnSales] Institutional Ownership [fracinst]
espr 0.0888 0.0718 0.0719 0.0378 0.0517 espr 0.1121 0.0573 0.0413 0.0569 0.0613
qspr 0.0516 0.0489 0.0444 0.0398 0.0272 qspr 0.0516 0.0460 0.0402 0.0371 0.0372
relespr 0.1127 0.0280 0.0412 0.0160 0.0010 relespr 0.1690 0.0374 0.0110 0.0022 0.0019
relqspr 0.0145 0.0068 0.0039 0.0024 0.0011 relqspr 0.0148 0.0065 0.0036 0.0023 0.0017
Market Capitalization [lnSize] Short term institutional ownership [fracshort]
espr 0.1192 0.0692 0.0546 0.0337 0.0523 espr 0.1051 0.0580 0.0475 0.0621 0.0561
qspr 0.0511 0.0487 0.0453 0.0384 0.0286 qspr 0.0546 0.0455 0.0384 0.0368 0.0367
relespr 0.1874 0.0220 0.0098 0.0016 0.0008 relespr 0.1621 0.0332 0.0145 0.0038 0.0078
relqspr 0.0165 0.0063 0.0032 0.0018 0.0009 relqspr 0.0141 0.0059 0.0036 0.0028 0.0025
Liquidity measure [c_BMA] Long term institutional ownership [fraclong]
espr 0.0712 0.0389 0.0390 0.0655 0.1143 espr 0.0983 0.0632 0.0552 0.0480 0.0641
qspr 0.0426 0.0419 0.0421 0.0438 0.0415 qspr 0.0489 0.0471 0.0403 0.0369 0.0388
relespr 0.0013 0.0030 0.0026 0.0119 0.2027 relespr 0.1498 0.0383 0.0193 0.0110 0.0029
relqspr 0.0014 0.0021 0.0029 0.0050 0.0175 relqspr 0.0131 0.0071 0.0041 0.0026 0.0020
PIN Investor horizon [long_short]
espr 0.0384 0.0355 0.0554 0.0689 0.1115 espr 0.0615 0.0550 0.0836 0.0530 0.0758
qspr 0.0314 0.0342 0.0399 0.0485 0.0629 qspr 0.0394 0.0428 0.0433 0.0433 0.0433
relespr 0.0325 0.0294 0.0461 0.0823 0.0434 relespr 0.0160 0.0344 0.1181 0.0320 0.0208
relqspr 0.0035 0.0029 0.0043 0.0069 0.0120 relqspr 0.0041 0.0071 0.0078 0.0063 0.0035
Adverse selection component of Spread [fracas_gh] Homogeneity of investors [hm_year]
espr 0.0695 0.0385 0.0360 0.0700 0.1148 espr 0.0623 0.0953 0.0489 0.0597 0.0626
qspr 0.0284 0.0353 0.0395 0.0442 0.0646 qspr 0.0467 0.0437 0.0415 0.0379 0.0422
relespr 0.1299 0.0226 0.0112 0.0164 0.0412 relespr 0.0563 0.0831 0.0329 0.0122 0.0367
relqspr 0.0088 0.0048 0.0045 0.0046 0.0062 relqspr 0.0068 0.0056 0.0047 0.0037 0.0082  
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3.2.2: MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Because both the information risk and the level of institutional ownership measures 
exhibit a strong correlation with firm size, and investor horizon, ownership 
concentration, and investor homogeneity measures exhibit a strong correlation with 
the level of institutional ownership, in this section I present findings using multivariate 
analysis. I use pooled regressions including the time and the industry fixed effects. 
Due to the persistence in the variation of liquidity measures of a firm, I estimate the 
standard errors by clustering them on both firm and time dimensions. Clustering 
ensures that the inference is based on the standard errors robust to correlation across 
residuals within a firm over time and across firms in the same year. I also include 
additional control variables to capture those firm characteristics that I suspect could 
influence the time variation in a stock liquidity. Primarily, I include the size of the 
firm, liquidity, historical volatility, past returns, and the book-to-market ratio. 
Table 3.10 presents the findings from the pooled regressions. For the sake of brevity, I 
present only the findings using the variation of RELQSPR measure. In Spec 1, I find 
that after controlling for the firm size and the liquidity measure, the liquidity variance 
over time increases with information asymmetry (PIN) while it decreases with the 
level of institutional ownership (fracinst). An increase in PIN is associated with an 
increase in private information-based trading, which can result in idiosyncratic 
liquidity needs causing a greater variation of liquidity over time. Institutions may be 
more willing to absorb idiosyncratic liquidity needs of other informed investors, and 
as a result, an increase in institutional ownership could decrease the liquidity variation 
over time.   
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Table 3.10: Cross-sectional results: Determinants of total liquidity risk.  Cross-
sectional results for effects of institutional ownership on liquidity risk for stocks listed 
on NYSE and AMEX are presented. The dependent variable is the standard-deviation 
of daily relative quoted spread [relqspr] using daily measures over a 1 year period. 
The period of study is 1983–2004. Pooled regression is run using year and industry 
fixed effects due to inherently unbalanced nature of the panel. The standard errors are 
estimated by clustering on year and firm and are presented in italics below the 
estimates.  
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Variable Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6
lnsize -0.00104*** -0.00094*** -0.00096*** -0.00095*** -0.0009*** -0.00093***
0.00008 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00006 0.00006
c_bma 0.53338*** 0.46001*** 0.46222*** 0.46542*** 0.4644*** 0.46144***
0.02522 0.02371 0.02381 0.02400 0.02376 0.02310
fracinst -0.0037*** -0.00215*** -0.00248*** -0.00349*** -0.0033***
0.00058 0.00069 0.00063 0.00057 0.00056
PIN 0.00302*** 0.00506*** 0.00506*** 0.00505*** 0.00494*** 0.00481***
0.00068 0.00080 0.00079 0.00083 0.00079 0.00077
lnhhi_inst -0.00027***
0.00009
numblocks -0.00024***
0.00007
fraclong -0.00424***
0.00109
fracshort -0.00502***
0.00097
long_short3 0.00023
0.00035
hm_year -0.00058***
0.00013
lagvolatility 0.05631*** 0.05693*** 0.05944*** 0.05783*** 0.05759***
0.00895 0.00895 0.00901 0.00887 0.00894
lagannret -0.00143*** -0.00142*** -0.00134*** -0.00139*** -0.00142***
0.00022 0.00022 0.00023 0.00022 0.00022
booktomkt 0.00001 0.00001 0 0.00001 0.00001
0.00003 0.00004 0.00000 0.00004 0.00005
Adj R2 75.79% 77.45% 77.43% 77.20% 77.38% 77.49%
No. of obs 40785 39760 39760 39760 39760 39760
No. of parameters 36 40 40 40 40 40
F. Value 1280.97 1223.60 1231.72 1200.05 1196.72 1222.09  
Note. *** indicates the result is significant at 1%, ** indicates the result is significant at 5%, and * indicates the result is significant at 10%. The significance 
is reported based on two-tailed tests.  
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Table 3.11: Cross-sectional results: Determinants of total liquidity risk across liquidity groups.  Cross-sectional results for effects of 
institutional ownership on liquidity risk for stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX are presented. The dependent variable is the 
standard-deviation of daily relative quoted spread [relqspr] using daily measures over a 1 year period. The period of study is 1983–
2004. Pooled regression is run using year and industry fixed effects due to inherently unbalanced nature of the panel. Cross-
sectional regressions across groups formed by dividing firms based on their RELQSPR measure. Group 1 consists of the highest 
liquidity firms while Group 5 consists of lowest liquidity firms. The groups are formed each year.  
Estimate T-stat Estimate T-stat Estimate T-stat Estimate T-stat Estimate T-stat
Spec 1
lnsize -0.00012 -8.0979 -0.00021 -9.0121 -0.00021 -9.0121 -0.0005 -6.1545 -0.0015 -9.0287
c_bma 0.05171 3.6129 0.0372 2.7294 0.05124 2.9088 0.13754 4.7475 0.233 15.6911
fracinst 0.05171 -5.8295 -0.00031 -6.1523 -0.0004 -3.8893 -0.00094 -6.0077 -0.00256 -3.2382
adjpin 0.05171 10.1726 0.00122 5.4527 0.00168 4.7492 0.0014 3.1292 0.00001 0.0061
Spec 2: Additional control variables- lnsize, c_bma, fracinst, PIN, lagvolatility, lagannret, booktomkt.
lnhhi_inst 0.00005 5.9901 0.00008 7.146 0.0001 3.7023 0.00015 2.4742 -0.00003 -0.343
Spec 3: Additional control variables- lnsize, c_bma, fracinst, PIN, lagvolatility, lagannret, booktomkt.
numblocks 0.00002 4.898 0.00005 6.2705 0.00005 3.0966 0.00017 3.6981 -0.00032 -2.152
Spec 4: Additional control variables- lnsize, c_bma, PIN, lagvolatility, lagannret, booktomkt.
fraclong -0.00036 -4.1649 -0.00048 -4.4995 -0.00055 -2.6309 -0.00173 -3.0739 -0.00845 -6.4315
fracshort -0.00051 -4.0085 -0.00044 -3.6006 -0.00063 -4.7073 -0.00168 -4.5406 -0.00198 -1.3477
Spec 5: Additional control variables- lnsize, c_bma, fracinst, PIN, lagvolatility, lagannret, booktomkt.
long_short3 0.00005 0.6287 -0.00002 -0.2642 0.00005 0.3813 0.00005 0.1693 -0.00315 -3.8721
Spec 6: Additional control variables- lnsize,c_bma, fracinst, PIN, lagvolatility,lagannret, booktomkt.
hm_year -0.00058 -3.9989 -0.00096 -4.4897 -0.00022 -0.6183 -0.00138 -2.3898 0.00101 0.6217
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
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The effect of increasing information asymmetry on increasing the total liquidity risk 
lends support to Hypothesis 7. For firms where there exists greater private 
information, the idiosyncratic liquidity demands will more likely be associated with 
private information. Liquidity suppliers will be less willing to meet sudden increased 
demands in liquidity in presence of greater information asymmetry. As a result, we 
observe a greater time variation in liquidity for firms with higher information 
asymmetry. 
In Spec 2 and Spec 3, I examine the effect of ownership concentration. I find that with 
increases in ownership concentration measured by lnhhi_inst  and  numblocks, the 
variation in liquidity measures decrease. This finding is puzzling as I expected that the 
liquidity needs of large owners could cause a significant increase in the time variation 
in liquidity of assets they trade. With increasing ownership concentration, the 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faced by the owners may not get diversified and result in 
increasing liquidity variation of stocks having concentrated ownership. A possible 
interpretation could be that institutions having concentrated positions are sensitive to 
the effects of their trading on stocks mitigating the observed effects of concentrated 
ownership on time variation in liquidity. In Chapter 2, we observed a lower level of 
liquidity in case of concentrated ownership. Here, I find that concentrated ownership 
results in a reduced variation of liquidity over time. However, as observed earlier 
increase in concentration of institutional ownership does lower the systematic 
component of liquidity risk due to reduced herding risk. 
In Spec 4 and Spec 5, I examine the effect of investor horizon. I find that with 
increases in both long-term and short-term institutional ownership the liquidity 
variation reduces. After controlling for the level of institutional ownership, I observe  
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that a change in the mix of institutional ownership towards long-term investors leads 
to an increase in liquidity variation over time, though the finding is not statistically 
significant. When using the effective spread (RELESPR) measure of liquidity, the 
effect of long_short was opposite to that observed using RELQSPR, hence I avoid 
drawing a strong inference. Spec 6 presents the findings using the measure of investor 
homogeneity. I find that the overall time variation in liquidity decreases with investor 
homogeneity. Liquidity variation over time increases with historical volatility of 
returns while decreasing with historical returns.  
In Table 3.11, I further examine the multivariate effects by partitioning the firms into 
five groups based on the level of liquidity measures. Consistent with earlier findings, I 
find that liquidity variation decreases with level of institutional ownership across all 
liquidity groups. Liquidity variation also increases with information risk across all 
liquidity groups though the effect is not significant for the least liquid firms in group 
5. For the firms belonging to the four most liquid groups, liquidity variation increases 
with both ownership concentration measures lnhhi_inst and numblocks. This finding is 
consistent with my expectation that with an increase in ownership concentration, the 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faced by the owners may not get diversified and result in 
increasing liquidity variation of stocks having concentrated ownership, a finding that 
was not evident for the whole sample.
82 The findings of long-term and short-term 
institutional ownership across liquidity groups were similar to those for the whole 
sample while those for investor homogeneity were consistent with the earlier findings 
for firms in liquidity groups 1, 2 and 4.  
                                                 
82 Another possibility is that when the tests on partitioned sample may reduce the ability to separate out 
the effects of ownwership concentration and level of institutional ownership due to the correlation 
between the measures.  
169 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the measures of institutional ownership and 
information asymmetry affect the variance of liquidity over time. These findings shed 
some additional light on the role of ownership of assets on variation of liquidity over 
time. Existing empirical studies in microstructure have emphasized the determinants 
of liquidity. I provide additional evidence on cross-sectional determinants of liquidity 
variation over time. 
SECTION 3.3: LEVERAGE EFFECT 
In this section, I test Hypothesis 5 and present the findings related to the asymmetric 
affect of the market returns on liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) show that 
the funding available to traders affects asset liquidity and can result in commonality in 
liquidity. When the market returns are negative, asset liquidity declines as the 
suppliers are less willing to supply the liquidity due to a decline in value of their 
collateral. In their model, the providers of liquidity become demanders of liquidity 
after a large drop in asset prices. As a result, there is, not only a reduction in the 
liquidity the intermediaries could supply, but also an increase in the liquidity they 
demand. This results in an asymmetric effect of the market returns on asset liquidity. 
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2007) found that the impact of market returns on 
stocks’ liquidity is asymmetric with a larger decline in liquidity taking place in down 
markets compared to the increase in liquidity in up markets. Earlier, I showed that the 
systematic liquidity risk of stocks increased with the investor horizon, with firms 
primarily held by long-term investors exhibiting greater systematic liquidity risk. 
I, therefore, test for the effect of investor horizon on asymmetric liquidity risk. In this 
setting, the liquidity risk is measured as the covariance of the asset liquidity with the 
market returns. I use the following specification to obtain the effects of the positive  
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and the negative market returns on changes in asset liquidity. The difference in the 
betas across up markets and down markets provides an estimate of the asymmetric 
impact of the market liquidity and market returns on firms’ liquidity and allows for the 
quantification of the asymmetric effect. In general, liquidity increases with positive 
market returns and declines with negative market returns, indicating that both β2+ and 
β2-  coefficients  will both be negative. Subsequently, I examine the cross-sectional 
variation of the difference between the sensitivities (β2+ - β2-) of a stock’s liquidity to 
positive market returns (β2+) and negative market returns (β2-).  
it it t t t t it Sqret Mktret Mktret MktLiq MktLiq Liq ε β β β β β α + + + + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − + + − − + + * * * * * 3 2 2 1 1 0  
I regress the difference in the return betas β2+ - β2- on both the level of institutional 
ownership and investor horizon (long_short), while including other control variables. 
The findings (not reported) indicate a strong and significant effect of investor horizon 
on the difference. The coefficient of long_short is negative and significant and 
confirms that the difference in sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to positive market 
returns and negative market returns is dependent on the investor horizon and increases 
with ownership by institutions having a short-term investment horizon. The finding 
confirms hypothesis 7 and suggests that the short-term investors tend to play a role in 
providing liquidity. However, the liquidity of a stock will become more sensitive to 
market returns, as short-term ownership of investors increases. 
SECTION 4: CONCLUSION 
An extensive literature in finance examines the effects of liquidity and liquidity risk on 
expected returns. Using a large sample of firms belonging to NYSE and AMEX over 
the period 1983–2005, I empirically examine the effect of institutional ownership on  
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time variation in liquidity. I rely on theories of herding and stochastic liquidity, to 
guide my empirical work and interpret my findings in the context of correlated trading 
by institutions resulting from a tendency to either herd or trade on common 
information.  
I find strong evidence that the ownership structure of an asset affects both the 
sensitivity of an asset’s liquidity to changes in marketwide liquidity (systematic 
liquidity risk) and the variation in its liquidity over time. I find that level of 
institutional ownership, investment horizon of the institutional investor base, 
concentration of ownership, and homogeneity of the investor base are important 
determinants of both systematic liquidity risk and total liquidity variance. Systematic 
liquidity risk increases with institutional ownership, increase in investor horizon, and 
increasing homogeneity of the investor base, while it decreases as ownership gets 
concentrated and block-holdings increase. The total liquidity variance however reacts 
to institutional ownership differently. The variance of liquidity decreases with 
institutional ownership and concentration of institutional ownership, while increasing 
with increasing homogeneity of the institutional investor base for the more liquid 
firms. With increasing information asymmetry among investors, systematic liquidity 
risk decreases while the total liquidity variance increases. Future research may benefit 
from treating time variation in liquidity of an asset as endogenous and incorporating 
the effects of ownership structure on liquidity variation for asset pricing implications.   
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